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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background of the first Indochina War 
The August Revolution (Vietnamese: Cách mạng Tháng Tám) is regarded 
as the greatest revolution in contemporary Vietnamese history. The proclamation 
of the independence of Vietnam by Ho Chi Minh on 2 September 1945 marked 
the beginning of the end of colonial rule, under which the French had 
simultaneously supported the survival of the ruling classes of the old Vietnamese 
monarchy. However, France did not recognize the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam (DRV) and the Vietnamese sovereignty that President Ho Chi Minh and 
his Vietminh supporters had declared.1 As a result, fighting soon broke out 
between the Vietminh and the French troops. For France, of course, the position in 
Indochina2 was essential to regain and occupy the status of a great power as 
France’s prestige was seriously tested during World War II (WW II) and lost by 
the collaboration of the Vichy government with Nazi Germany from 1940 to 
1944. In the first part of WW II, Germany and Japan achieved successes. 
Consequently, France lost control over its colonial territories; in some cases, 
opposing French military forces, i.e., Vichy France3 and Free France,4 even fought 
over the control of them. After the liberation of Paris and France as a whole in 
1944, the socio-economic condition was relatively unstable and weak. This 
explains why France decided to return to Indochina after 1945. Regaining former 
                                           
1
  One of the post-war aims of the French government was to re-establish a measure of colonial 
rule in Vietnam and Indochina. Britain’s military had also been ordered not to allow France to 
reclaim sovereignty in Vietnam.  
2
 The term Indochina originally referred to French Indochina, which included the current states of 
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. In current use, it applies largely to a geographic region, rather than 
a political area. 
3
 Vichy France was established after France had surrendered to Germany on 22 June 1940 and 
took its name from the government's administrative centre in Vichy, central France. 
4
 French partisans in WW II who decided to continue fighting against the forces of the Axis 
powers after the surrender of France and subsequent German occupation and, in the case of Vichy 
France, collaboration with the Germans. 
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colonial possessions was considered one of the best strategies to rescue the 
country’s traditional prestige. 
 
           Picture 1: Ho Chi Minh declares the birth of the DRV 
     on 2 September 1945. 
After the Japanese were defeated in WW II in August 1945, France had 
many reasons for seeking to re-establish its former colonial rule in Indochina. 
However, it ultimately failed in the nine-year conflict of the first Indochina War.5 
French enterprises were eager to recover their interests in these colonial countries. 
Prior to 1940, the Michelin Tire and Rubber Co., for instance, had owned huge 
rubber plantations in Vietnam. Some other French companies had profited from 
deposits of manganese, bauxite and other natural minerals. Substantial off-shore 
petroleum and natural gas reserves had scarcely been tapped. The hope of 
regaining the lost national prestige was probably even more important than the 
prospect of economic gain. France had been left humiliated by its quick defeat in 
WW II. Therefore, restoring the empire was seen as an essential contribution to 
                                           
5
 The conflict between France and Vietnam can be traced back to 1885, when France colonized 
Vietnam and divided it into three separate administrative areas: Cochin-China, Annam and 
Tonkin. Vietnamese resistance to French colonial rule was immediate and constant. 
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France as a great European power.6 As a result, returning to former colonial 
possession of Indochina could be seen as one of France’s major political goals. 
However, the attempts of France (as well as Britain) were undermined by the 
emerging decolonization trends after WW II. Colonized nations all over the world 
considered the outcome of WW II as a significant chance for them to strive for 
independence from their foreign rulers. After a series of negotiation efforts 
between Vietnam and France in spring and autumn 1946,7 the first Indochina War 
was finally declared on 19 December by the Vieminh that year. However, as the 
war escalated year after year, French public opinion continued moving against the 
war.8 
                                           
6
 Robin W. Winks and John E. Talbott, Europe 1945 to the present, Oxford University Press, 
2005, p. 29. 
7
 The French and the Vietminh attempted to negotiate a political settlement in Dalat, Vietnam in 
April and May 1946, but negotiations failed. The two parties were unable to agree to a definition 
of Vietnamese independence. Further negotiations failed also at the Fontainebleau Conference of 
July and August 1946. As in Dalat, an obstacle at Fontainebleau was the question of Vietnamese 
integrity, of reuniting Tonkin, Annam and Cochin-China into one nation. 
8
 There were four main reasons for this: (1) by 1952, 90,000 French troops had been killed, 
wounded or captured; (2) France was attempting to build up her economy after the devastation of 
WW II, and the cost of war in Indochina had so far been twice what they had received from the 
United States (U.S.) under the Marshall Plan; (3) the war had lasted seven years and there was still 
no sign of an outright French victory; (4) a growing number of people in France had reached the 
conclusion that their country did not have any moral justification for being in Vietnam. 
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Picture 2: Ho Chi Minh attends a party at the palace of France’s Foreign Minister 
of the provisional government Georges Bidault in July 1946. 
Within the context of the emerging Cold War in Europe in the second half 
of the 1940s and also the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the Indochina 
War was gradually internationalized, with the indirect involvement of the leading 
powers viz. the Western bloc, the U.S., the Soviet Union (SU) and Red China. 
From this point on, the nature of the war shifted from a colonial war to one aimed 
at preventing communist expansion in Asia. There continued to be a state of 
political conflict, military tension, proxy wars, and economic competition between 
the communist countries (the SU and its satellite states and allies) and the powers 
of the Western world (the U.S. and its allies). For the Americans, they were 
convinced by the “Domino theory” that if Indochina was lost, the remaining non-
communist countries in Asia would fall as well. More importantly, if there were 
no effective counter-measurements, both Suez and Africa would soon become 
communist.  
Simultaneously, France as a medium-sized power in Europe was being 
seriously criticized by its Western allies for its weakness of political and defense 
5 
 
determination on the continent. Also, France had to honor its pledges sealed in the 
transatlantic community. Additionally, the American ideas on the future West 
German rearmament troubled France very much as a result of its weak position in 
Europe. The demands of the Indochina War meant that France could not have a 
military presence both in its home continent and Indochina. Thus, it had to 
reluctantly accept the German rearmament idea. In a conference on 28 May 1952 
between Britain, the U.S. and France, the French President, Antoine Pinay, 
emphasized to his counterparts the very close connection between Indochina and 
the European Defense Community (EDC).9 He insisted that France was fighting in 
Asia to protect the interests of the free world. It was therefore unfair that France 
was being criticized for its light contribution to the European common effort to 
prevent any threat from the SU. France calculated that in the framework of the 
transatlantic community, not only the U.S. and Britain, but also other state 
members must realize the international nature of the Indochina War. Their role 
and actions in that war must be clearly shown. In other words, Indochina was used 
more or less as a playing card for France to bargain with other superpowers for 
pursuing its own colonial interests. 
This clearly indicated the decline of France’s political position in post-war 
Europe in the context of remarkable changes in the continent as well as the world. 
A series of world events occurred between late 1949 and early 1950 which 
fundamentally changed the international system. The Cold War escalated and 
reached its peak marked by the Korean War in June 1950 – “a Hot War inside a 
Cold War” - adding to the event in China with the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) one year earlier. After1950, the SU, the PRC and dozens 
of countries in the communist bloc diplomatically recognized the government of 
Vietnam and started assisting Vietnam in its fight against the French 
                                           
9
 In order to respond to the American demand for West German rearmament, in 1950 René Pleven, 
French Minister of Defense proposed a defense project under which together with existing 
members of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), West Germany could be rearmed 
but under the control of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s institution (NATO).  
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imperialists.10 In the context of the Cold War, France considered the war against 
the Vietminh a part of a long-term campaign against communism which was seen 
as one of the most important policies of the U.S. in its bid to prevent the spread of 
communism in South-east Asia.  
Based on those arguments, France requested political, military and 
financial support from the U.S. As early as 1950, when France had granted the 
Associated States of Indochina a largely fictitious independence, the U.S. quickly 
recognized those states and began sending military aid to Indochina, or, to be 
more specific, to the French in Indochina. All U.S. aid, from beginning to end, 
went only to the French, who used it as they saw fit. This was made possible by 
the Mutual Defense Assistance Act passed toward the end of 1949, which 
permitted the president to spend up to $75 million in military aid in “the general 
area of China”. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. announced that it was going to 
increase its military aid and in September, a MAAG11 for Indochina was set up. 
The outbreak of the Korean War had led Truman to accelerate the delivery of aid, 
with the result that large quantities of weapons and equipment began flowing into 
French hands. Also, with the recognition of the Bao Dai government, the U.S. 
raised its financial support to a maximum in 1954 with 2.2 billion US dollars, 
                                           
10
 In spite of Ho Chi Minh’s appeal for help, the SU urgued that the PRC should directly back the 
DRV’s resistance against the French colonialists as China was closer to Indochina in geographical 
terms; thus, the PRC sent its military advisers to Indochina and helped the Vietminh to organize 
military forces. 
11
 Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) is a designation for American military advisers 
sent to assist in the training of conventional armed forces in Third World countries. In September 
1950, U.S. President Harry Truman sent the MAAG to Vietnam to assist the French in the first 
Indochina War. The President claimed they were not sent as combat troops, but to supervise the 
use of $10 million worth of U.S. military equipment to support the French in their effort to fight 
the Vietminh forces. By 1953, aid increased dramatically to $350 million to replace old military 
equipment owned by the French. 
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which amounted to approximately 80% of the total financial costs of the war 
efforts in between 1950-1954.12  
1.2. Germany and France under post-war reconstruction 
It is undisputed that post-war Europe had many difficulties to deal with in 
reconstructing its economic and political structures. Under these circumstances, 
Germany and France also sought to achieve their individual goals by defining and 
implementing their own strategies in different ways. Turning to our main 
discussion on Germany’s political and economic situation within the above 
context, the main battlefield of the recently ended war in Europe was now under 
reconstruction. After the unconditional surrender of the army of Nazi Germany 
and in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement, Germany was divided into four 
occupational zones. Large territories in East Germany were ceded to Poland and 
the SU. Germany was severely damaged by the war; millions had died or become 
homeless. Millions of German soldiers were in captivity, and the prestige of the 
nation was severely broken by the atrocities and war crimes of Nazi regime. In the 
Potsdam Agreement, the allies agreed on the political and economic principles 
that were to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period.13  
Regarding the crucial task of economic recovery, West Germany was far 
more successful. Thanks to the Marshall Plan, West Germany gradually recovered 
its economy and, as Robin W. Winks and John E. Talbott point out, “the West 
German post-war recovery was the most remarkable of all. The wartime 
destruction of much of Germany’s industrial plant had paradoxically proved 
beneficial; the new plant was built with the latest technological equipment. The 
                                           
12
 Alfred Grosser, The Western Alliance, European – American Relations since 1945, New York, 
Continuum, 1980, pp. 131-132. See also: Irwin Wall, The United States and the Making of Post-
War France, Cambridge University Press, 1991.   
13
 The political principles were to democratize and treat Germany as a single unit. The principles 
aimed at disarmament, demilitarization and the elimination of all Nazi influence. The economic 
principles were to reduce or destroy all civilian heavy-industry with war-potential, such as 
shipbuilding, machine production and chemical factories and to restructure the German economy 
towards agriculture and light-industry. 
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Allied High Commission gradually abolished control over German industry, save 
for atomic energy and certain military restrictions. It provided economic aid and 
scaled down pre-war German debts. By the early 1950s, West Germany had a 
favourable balance of trade and a rate of industrial growth as high as 10 percent a 
year. The West German gross national product rose from 23 billion USD in 1950 
to 103 billion USD in 1964, with no serious inflation.”14 Germany’s historical 
past, such as the previous world wars, the Holocaust, etc. still burdened the nation. 
Germany had no other choice than learning from the past. This helped West 
Germany rapidly regain its prestige and successfully transform into a democratic 
and prosperous country. This would be done only by anchoring the federal state in 
the Western community. 
France was not able to achieve its objectives on the Indochina battlefield 
as easily as it could prior to 1945 because the global and regional situation after 
1945 contrasted sharply to that prior to 1940.15 Liberation movements emerged all 
over South and South-east Asia. If France was to control Indochina again it would 
have to adapt its strategy to the emerging new world order after the war. 
Nevertheless, France failed in this perspective as it mainly focused its attempt to 
regain control on a military solution. If we compare the goals of France and West 
Germany after WW II, we can see that both countries had the same goals. They 
were trying to regain their position within Europe as well as outside Europe but 
they acted differently. France tried to re-control its colonial possessions, West 
Germany instead concentrated on economic re-construction and a close alliance 
with the U.S.  But the question is whether or not both countries need 
reconciliation after 1945. Of course, they did. This is because both of them knew 
the deep importance of their roles in Europe. Without the conciliation between the 
two countries, there was no strong Western Europe to develop economically and 
to protect itself against the threat of a possible Soviet attack. Consequently, they 
                                           
14
 Robin W. Winks and John E. Talbott, op.cit., p. 57. 
15
 Roosevelt initially opposed any plan of France returning to Indochina after 1945 and once stated 
clearly that “France has had the country – thirty million inhabitants for nearly one hundred years, 
and the people are worse off than they were at the beginning.”    
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required common agreements and equal contributions to the organization of 
NATO.16  
One could easily see that the more deeply France became involved in 
Indochina, the weaker its role in Europe might become. In response to the 
Indochina conflict, NATO also released a resolution agreed in the North Atlantic 
Council (NAC) in which it affirmed its support for French involvement.17 In a 
meeting of the Atlantic Council on 16 December 1952, the French Foreign 
Minister, Robert Schuman, had to accept the difficulties that France was facing. 
Again, he stressed that its heavy burden in the Indochina War did not allow it to 
fully commit to the European defense community. Therefore, French policy 
towards West Germany must also be re-defined. However, France was already 
deeply involved in the war against the Vietminh in Indochina. The resolution on 
the conflict in Indochina, which was requested by France, was NATO’s first 
official statement on an out-of-area conflict involving one of the allies. However, 
rather than leading to the financial or military support that French had sought the 
resolution was essentially a form of moral support. Additional requests from 
French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault18 for further military support did not 
result in any further response from NATO. Without assistance from NATO allies, 
French’s struggle in Indochina eventually ended in May 1954 when a 16,200 
strong French garrison was surrounded by the armed forces of the Vietminh at 
Dien Bien Phu.19  
Previously, Paris had pledged 24 divisions to NATO, but it could muster 
only three divisions in West Germany and six in France. Meanwhile, they had to 
operate ten divisions which were pinned in Indochina. West German rearmament 
thus seemed to promise substantial savings for France and, above all, to 
strengthen a future NATO strategy in which not France but West Germany would 
                                           
16
 A military alliance established in 1949 by the U.S. and some Western European countries. 
17
 Jennifer Medcalf, Going global or going nowhere? NATO's role in contemporary international 
Security, Peter Lang, Germany, 2008, p. 38.   
18
 Georges Bidault (1899-1983) - French Foreign Minister during the Dien Bien Phu campaign. 
19
  Jennifer Medcalf, op.cit., p. 39. 
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stand on the first line of defense.20 This issue put France in an unexpected 
situation. It weakened the French position in comparison with West Germany 
within the Western alliance. This made it even more difficult for France to play its 
role as a mediator and balancer; it stood in the way of political and economic 
recovery, straining economic and fiscal resources to the limit and causing 
domestic turmoil; furthermore, it damaged France’s international image because 
of the organized brutality that accompanied French attempts to retain control over 
the colonial territories.21  
 Although French troops in Indochina were in certain ways much stronger 
than the Vietminh, they lost at the battlefield of Dien Bien Phu on 7 May 1954. 
This marked the end of the French military adventure after a nine-year resistance 
from the General Giap and his Vietminh soldiers against the French colonial 
rulers mostly backed by the Americans. The final outcome of the first Indochina 
War was decided at the Geneva Conference started in late April 1954.22 Although 
there have been many discussions on the outcome of that conference which was 
held in the very complicated context of the world’s politics at the time, one of the 
final conclusions was that it put a bitter end to the French colonizers in Indochina, 
where they had seen themselves as “civilizers” or the “mother country”.  
1.3. Purposes of study 
The French then had to withdraw its military troops in Indochina and 
return to Europe where the process of European integration required much more 
efforts from Western countries, of course, including France. As long as we have 
known it, this continent has been a source of international conflicts, from the 18th 
until the mid 20th century, when it was the main hotbed of WW II. European 
integration23 is a long and enduring process aiming to ensure security, peace and 
                                           
20
 Wolfram F. Hanrieder and Gräme P. Auton, The Foreign policies of West Germany, France and 
Britain, Prentice Hall, Inc, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1980, p. 101. 
21
 Ibid., p. 101. 
22
 Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam Wars: 1945-1990, New York: Harper Perennial, 1991, p. 41. 
23
 At the end of WW II, the continental political climate favored unity in Western Europe, seen by 
many as an escape from the extreme forms of nationalism which had devastated the continent. In a 
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stability for the continent, even for the whole world. The process of European 
integration and unification is mainly discussed from the internal European 
perspective, as a way to overcome the traditional conflicts, animosities and 
atrocities of the several European civil wars of the last centuries. As a matter of 
fact, this required both France and West Germany’s efforts if they wanted to 
create a balance of power in the context of the new world order after the 
disintegration of the European empires. 
In line with the above-mentioned arguments, the following text will be a 
humble attempt to bring forward different approaches. The process of European 
integration during the Cold War will be linked with the process of decolonization 
systematically. Regrettably, most previous research has only focused on this issue 
from a European perspective. In fact, it is the inextricably tangled connection 
between these two issues that interests me as I am researching the problem from a 
Vietnamese point of view. In this study, it is not my intention to change the 
perspectives entirely, but I will systematically elaborate the crucial changes in 
Europe as well as the post-war world system. To clarify, the decolonization 
process will be used as a means to explore the new interactions and the 
modifications of the “world entangled”. Within those developments, the inter-
relations and inter-connection between decolonization and European integration 
must be seen as one the most important issues. Therefore, the first Indochina War 
will serve as an example of outstanding importance, as the battle of Dien Bien 
Phu not only signified the downfall of the French colonial empire in Asia by the 
emergence of nationalism on the one hand, but with the Vietnamese victory a new 
interpretation of the contemporary changes emerged on the other. It cannot be 
denied that the victory of Vietnam became a national symbol to those colonial 
countries which gained their independence from France. Moreover, the outcomes 
of the first Indochina War did not only influence the regional system of states, but 
                                                                                                                   
speech delivered on 19 September 1946 at the University of Zürich, Switzerland, Winston 
Churchill postulated a “United States of Europe”. The same speech however contains remarks, less 
often quoted, which make it clear that Churchill did not see Britain as being part of this “United 
States of Europe”. See also: Winston Churchill, Speech to the Academic Youth, Zürich, 
Switzerland, 1946. 
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the balance of power in South-east Asia as well. French decolonization in 
Indochina played an important role in the process of European integration, in 
which Franco - German cooperation was seen as a major catalyst to speed up the 
process, along with other steps towards decolonization such as the Suez crisis24 
and the war in Algeria, etc. 
With the military defeat in Indochina, once again, France lost prestige on 
the international stage. Dien Bien Phu in Indochina was soon followed by a series 
of revolutionary uprisings in Algeria in November 1954 which led to the collapse 
of the French Fourth Republic later. Dien Bien Phu did not end the fighting in 
Indochina, but it destroyed the last vestiges of French determination to continue 
the war.25 As a result, France was forced to give the right of “self-determination” 
to other countries such as Morocco and Tunisia in 1956, Guinea in 1958, etc. 
France was again proved to be no longer a great power in Europe as well as in the 
world. The country’s defeat in Indochina and Algeria should not be considered 
only the failure of France’s colonial ambitions but also the great victory of those 
nations who had been fighting for the right of “self-determination” in the modern 
world. In the late 1950s, we witnessed the weakness and the chain collapse of the 
French colonial empire all over the world. Thus, there was no better option for 
France than to return to the European stage in which France might be able to settle 
its own domestic affairs. To develop its economy and play a leading role in the 
European integration process, France could not ignore the conciliation with West 
Germany in many fields. As a result, European integration was believed to be the 
best way for France to recover its international prestige. 
During and after the first Indochina War, France lost a lot of opportunities 
in Europe to recover both in economics and politics. France could by no means 
prevent West Germany from its strong developments in economics and politics, 
more importantly - from its rearmament with the prolific support of the U.S. The 
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 Two years later, the Suez crisis provided a further example of conflict caused by and out-of area 
issue. See also: Jennifer Medcalf, op.cit., p. 39. 
25
 Martin Shipway, Decolonization and its impact: a comparative approach to the end of the 
colonial empires, Oxford, 2008, p. 111. 
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ECSC project aimed to replace allied control over the Ruhr coal and steel 
industries with the ECSC, in which West Germany had been able to participate 
and act as an equal and active member since 1950. The ECSC in reality was 
considered the first step towards European integration because it laid the 
foundation stone for the further process of European unification resulting in future 
economic and political organizations like the European Economic Community 
(EEC) – later known as the European Community and the current European 
Union.  
By joining NATO in 1955, West Germany became more equal with other 
Western allies. On encountering the possible threat of the SU from the East during 
the Cold War, West Germany sought its national security without hesitation in re-
integration into Western Europe. In the meantime, France sought its re-
establishment as a great nation. After the war, Franco-German cooperation was 
fundamentally based on the Élysée Treaty signed by Charles de Gaulle and 
Konrad Adenauer on 22 January 1963. The treaty contained a number of 
agreements such as joint cooperation in foreign policy, economic, military 
integration and educational exchange. This officially marked the turning point of 
the bilateral relations between the two former enemies on the one hand, and 
achieved a great deal in initial European integration as well as a stronger Franco-
German co-position in transatlantic relations on the other. 
From the above arguments, the main aim of my research entitled “The 
Federal Republic of Germany and the first Indochina War (1946 – 1954)” is to 
seek and analyze the interactions between the French colonial war in Indochina 
and Germany.  For Vietnam, this war was the decisive step towards independence; 
for Germany it marked together with other events of the Cold War the beginning 
of specific characteristics of politics and political interpretations in the very 
important historical period of the 1950s. In this thesis, I will try to interpret some 
postcolonial theories in order to explain the inter-connections between 
colonialism and decolonization process. 
In Europe, especially in France in the 1950s onwards, intellectuals started 
studying what would be later better known as “postcolonial theory”. One of the 
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main issues on which postcolonial theory focuses is the situation of the former 
European colonies after being decolonized since the second half of the 20th 
century. Accordingly, how they readdress and overcome the political and cultural 
legacies of the colonial period has been largely debated. Postcolonial theory 
formulated in the second half of the 20th century thus engages scholars’ 
consciousness about the relationship between politics and culture.26 Historically, 
“postcolonial” was first used as an adjective by Western historians after WW II. It 
simply indicated the period when colonized countries were liberated. However, 
researchers influenced by Marxism employed this word as a term signifying the 
colonial legacies with which decolonized countries had to deal. Under that 
framework, postcolonial relations among Vietnam and its former “mother 
country” France and West Germany could be considered a new approach in 
postcolonial studies.27  
In line with postcolonial theory studies, since the 1990s the so-called 
“entangled history” also emerged as an indispensable discipline. Theoretically, 
studying the “entangled history” will bring to light the interesting interdependence 
amongst countries in one region, e.g., Germany and France because of their long 
and complicated history. Or it could make visible interregional relations between 
France and Indochina as France had long considered itself the “mother country” 
of the latter. It could also illuminate the interrelation between far distant regions 
such as West Germany and Indochina (Vietnam) and many other cases. We may 
say that the “entangled history” concentrates not only on the influences of the 
decolonization process on colonized peoples but also on the impacts of that 
development on the related countries. Scholars chose to shift their central 
researches on colonial history from a European perspective to a periphery 
                                           
26
 Douglas Robinson, Translation and empire: Postcolonial Theories Explained, Foreign 
Language Teaching and Research Press, Beijing, 2007, pp. 13-14. 
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Paul Charles Aymard Sartre with Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960) and Albert Memmi with 
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approach linked with related areas like Asia, and my research can be seen as an 
example of this. Consequently, the entanglement of the history of the above-
mentioned countries through the last part of the 20th century has recently attracted 
scholars in diverse continents and from different disciplines. Any outcome of that 
research will contribute to a better and deeper understanding of colonial history.28  
I take the French Indochina War and its results as a case study to 
understand the entanglement or the interrelations between a colonial war, which 
became internationalized, and the relation between France and Germany after 
WWII. That helps me understand how in globalized world Asian matters became 
European ones, and how the “colonial periphery” deeply influenced the colonial 
metropolises. That also explains why I am looking for a better understanding of 
the process of decolonization and European integration at the same time, and my 
thesis is that the breakdown of the colonial empires deeply influenced the 
relations between the European powers.  
In my thesis, I will try to explain the complicated postcolonial theory from 
which the world is understood as entangled. There is only One World, and from 
Ushaia to Tokio everything is interrelated and interconnected, and only this 
approach may help us to better understand what occurred after WW II in 
particular. And the issue of the post-war era was not only decolonization of the 
colonies, but also of the colonizers. The latter were not only stripped from their 
colonial possessions but also from their external assets to control their own 
societies. Therefore, colonialism does not only create injustice in the colonies but 
also in the colonizing countries. 
A large number of publications dealing with the Franco-Vietnam War 
before 1960 are published in French. Some of them can be named such as: Les 
rescapés de l’enfer. Les héros de Dien Bien Phu, by Lucien Bornert, Paris, Nouv. 
Presses Mondiales, 1954; Mission de la France en Asie, by Edouard Frederic-
Dupont, Paris, France-Empire, 1956; Deux actes du drame indochinois, Hanoi, 
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 See more: Alec G. Hargreaves (Hrsg.), Memory, empire, and postcolonialism: legacies of 
French colonialism, Lexington Books, 2005. 
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juin 1940. DBP 1954, Paris, Plon, 1959, by General Georges Catroux; La fin 
d’une guerre, by Philippe Devillers  and Jean Lacouture, 1954, Paris, Seuil, 
1960.29 West Germany’s research discussed the impacts of the second Vietnam 
War on the formation of a leftist movement in the Old Federal Republic. Their 
studies after 1975 mainly focused on Vietnamese refugees (boat-people) who 
emigrated to West Germany after the Vietnam War.30 Although there have been 
thousands of historical works on the Indochina wars, many of them addressed 
mainly the second Indochina War (or the American war in Vietnam). The others 
do not coincide with the matter and time period proposed in my study. More 
importantly, many researchers have recently argued that the role of colonialism 
together with the decolonization process “has long been neglected by traditional 
scholarship on Cold War diplomatic history.”31 It is also the case that we have not 
found any similar studies in Vietnam so far.    
1.4. Sources 
In my study, some typical methods of historical science, e.g., the 
interpretation of printed documents and memoirs, etc., will be used to trace 
primary sources and other evidence to research and then to write histories in the 
form of accounts of the past. The study aims to rely on several primary as well as 
secondary sources of information, which implies a theoretical basis to be 
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complemented with the help of evidential grounding and historical study methods. 
Primary sources may be used to settle discrepancies found in secondary sources or 
to conduct original research on a topic of interest. Archival work in both German 
and Vietnamese archives and libraries brought me a sea of information, i.e., 
printed documents, memoirs and newspapers, etc. Unmistakably, those primary 
sources must be carefully examined before use in order to determine the reliability 
of the evidence they contain.  
Also, I used secondary sources as a significant addition to the primary 
ones. These sources are comprised of books and papers published in English, 
German and Vietnamese. These two main types of source material were studied 
using systematic, comparative methods. A systematic method was applied during 
my research when I had to collect all kind of materials and arrange them in 
appropriate categories. When we have more than one source related to the topic 
then the comparative method was applied. This method aims to determine the 
most reliable sources which are most appropriate for use in the dissertation. In 
some cases, an interview method was used in my thesis to bring more insights into 
the issues involved. Last but not least, the application of deductive methods was 
also brought into my study. Deductive method implies moving from the more 
general to the more specific. One begins by thinking up a finding accompanied by 
a narrowing down into more specific hypotheses that one can test. Further 
observations and interpretations are collected to address the hypotheses.  
1.5. Structure of the research 
During my research process, using the available historical sources such as 
historical documents, books, newspapers, mass and media programs, etc. collected 
from German and Vietnamese archives and libraries, I have structured my writing 
in seven chapters as follows:  
The first chapter is devoted mainly to drawing a historical overview of 
Vietnam, West Germany, and France after WW II within the background of the 
emergence of the Cold War, the establishment of the two German states, the birth 
of the PRC and the Korean War. Also, the reason why France sought to return to 
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its former colony of Indochina was briefly discussed. It is also in this chapter that 
the main purposes of the thesis, the research methodology, the structure and the 
scientific sources are discussed. 
In Chapter 2, an overview of Vietnamese history in the period from 1945 
to 1954 will be given. In this part, the position and role of Vietnam and Indochina 
in Asian and global politics will be critically investigated. Also, the attitudes and 
aims of the great powers (the U.S., the SU and Britain) and Red China (since 
1949) towards the first Indochina War will be also briefly analyzed. The event of 
Dien Bien Phu in 1954 shall be fully examined, along with its impact on the world 
outside Asia and South-east Asia, especially on France and Europe as a factor 
leading to the end of French colonization in Indochina.  
Chapter 3 will be focused on the historical, political and social context of 
Germany and France after WW II. This is essential for the following chapters as it 
will elucidate the picture of those countries. Both countries shared a common 
sense that they were totally destroyed by the severe war just ended. They targeted 
to rescue their positions in Europe. The the western zones of Germany that were a 
consequence of the allies’ occupational policy were merged into the Federal 
Republic of Germany in 1949. While the ruling Christlich Demokratische Union 
Deutschlands (CDU) party chose to integrate the country into the West to develop 
its economy and gradually regain its sovereignty, others remained ambivalent or 
in opposition to this policy like the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 
(SPD) which favored unification first.32 Headed by the Chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer, West Germany anchored itself very closely to the West and gained 
much profit by being a key member of the ECSC in 1952 and a nearly full 
member of NATO in 1955, which caused a highly controversial political process. 
The controversy came from diverse reasons rooted both inside and outside West 
Germany. On the one hand, Germany’s vivid history under the Hitler regime did 
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 Integration into the West was a process which took many years. For more details on West 
Germany’s integration process into the West, see more: Heinrich August Winkler, Der lange Weg 
nach Westen, Bd. 2: Deutsche Geschichte vom “Dritten Reich” bis zur Wiedervereinigung, C.H. 
Beck Verlag, 2010. 
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not allow it to be involved in any future aggressions which could be used as a 
means for remilitarization; the emerging protest movements on West German soil 
were as expression of the public reaction to a rearmed West Germany which in 
their eyes could harm the possibility of a reunited Germany in the near future; and 
the requirement for a Basic Law (Grundgesetz) amendment.  On the other hand, 
occurences outside West Germany such as the decreasing tension between the SU 
and the Western countries after the death of Stalin in 1953, created space for this 
hotly debated issue. However, being a member of NATO brought West Germany 
its final final step in being integrated into the Western defense system and almost 
full sovereignty.  
At the same time, France opted to regain its former colony in Indochina in 
order to rescue its traditional prestige. This resulted in its fragile commitment in 
both European economy and security. Its deep involvement abroad made France a 
less significant player in the European economic and military arena. In addition, 
the fall of Dien Bien Phu in 1954 marked a turning point in French military 
history as well as political life as it no longer retained a “la Grande Nation” in 
Europe. The two rivals were now in two different stages of development but 
shared mutual and multiple common interests in Europe.  
In Chapter 4 we will discover the attitudes of the Federal Republic towards 
the first Indochina War. In the first phase of the first Indochina War, there is little 
evidence of the attitudes or engagement of West Germany towards it, because 
from 1946 to 1949, the Western part of Germany had to cope with so many social 
and political issues of its own post-war condition. The problems of Germany were 
hunger, destruction, moral decline and an extreme international isolation due to 
the war crimes of the Hitler regime. The escalation of the first Indochina War in 
which some superpowers were involved, concerned West Germany in certain 
ways. This is because the republic saw its interests could be more or less 
influenced by the war. Together with the outbreak of the Korean War, West 
Germany also feared the possibility of a World War III. Therefore, at the very 
beginning, West Germany took a position of standing not completely outside the 
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war.33 In reality, the Federal Republic could not imagine a way in which a war in 
the Far East could influence its political and social life. In this chapter, the 
positions of other political parties and social organizations in West Germany 
towards the conflict in Indochina will be also explored. Taken in conjunction with 
the official gestures of the Adenauer government, these views reflect a 
multifaceted politics of post-war Germany, at least in the Western part. 
The views of the West German public on the first Indochina War will be 
mentioned in Chapter 5. In the first half of the 1950s, the on-going progress of the 
Indochina battlefield caused a stir on the West German political stage and in the 
public view due to the country’s direct and indirect involvement in the war. As a 
result, with a focus on national security, West German leaders and the public 
would react differently towards the conflict. The problem that most troubled the 
West German public was the issue of German minors siding and fighting for 
French colonial interests in Indochina. The official attitude of West Germany 
towards the war was mainly observed by the two opposing political parties: the 
CDU and the SPD. It should be added that the fate of German minors fighting in 
the French Foreign Legion (FFL) in Indochina received huge media attention 
during this time. Daily and weekly newspapers, radio programs, memoirs, etc. 
discussed the matter widely and openly. More specifically, the West German 
press became more heated when the escalation of the conflict coincided with the 
political parties’ campaigns for the second term of the federal parliament 
(Bundestag). In this way, the engagement of Germans in a war sped up the 
German debate on rearmament and the neutralist versus integration into the West 
options.  
Chapter 6 will deal with the impact of French decolonization in Indochina 
and European decolonization in Asia from a broader perspective because the 
decolonization movement forced European colonial powers to re-define their 
positions in the post-colonial era. The process of decolonization did not directly 
affect West Germany as the historical colonies of Germany ended directly after 
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WW I. The decolonization process in Asia in the late 1940s and in Africa in the 
1950s and early 1960s required former colonial powers and West Germany to 
formulate their strategic policy towards the African and Asian newly independent 
countries, or the Third World. Consequently, the first Indochina War and the 
French decolonization that came of it provided the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG) with some crucial experiences and lessons, primarily in formulating their 
foreign policy in the new context of a new world order. The Franco-Germany 
rapprochement was marked by the Élysée Treaty in 1963. Naturally, the first 
Indochina War did not alone influence European integration, but together with 
other aspects that came at the same time, such as the European unification 
movement, American influence, the Soviet threat, the idea of controlling key 
industries internationally, etc., it did have a great impact on the movement. Thus, 
the first Indochina War was seen as one of the most important catalysts in 
speeding up that process. Last but not least, the echoes of the first Indochina War, 
alongside other events inside and outside Europe, such as West German 
rearmament in the 1950s and 1960s, were also fundamental reasons for the 
emergence of the peace movements which would go on to play a crucial role in 
West German political history in the latter half of the 1960s and the decades that 
followed. 
Chapter 7 summarizes the outcome of the research by pointing out that 
most previous research in this area focused mainly on the connection between the 
first Indochina War and France and some others, but not West Germany. 
Therefore, this study will make an attempt to fill this gap in the overall body of 
research. One can say that the history of decolonization in the 20th century should 
be linked with other important occurrences like the European integration 
movement, in which the triangle relations of the first Indochina War, France and 
West Germany might serve as an interesting case study. This relationship will be 
discussed again in detail in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER 2 
VIETNAM FROM 1945 TO 1954 AND THE IMPACTS OF 
THE DECOLONIZATION IN INDOCHINA ON FRANCE 
2.1. Vietnam from 1945 to 1954 
The August Revolution succeeded with the Declaration of Independence 
of Vietnam on 2 September 1945. This was the outcome of the previous long 
preparations led by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). The most remarkable 
note was that Vietnam had gained independence from having been a colony ruled 
by the French and then the Japanese. However, Vietnam remained important to 
the French in spite of the fact that worldwide decolonization trends became more 
evident after 1945. In other words, the French found themselves still interested in 
Indochina. The question is whether France could have kept a position in 
Indochina, or the situation was such that any path to reform was blocked? If so, 
why there was no way back to a (reformed) path? In this chapter, I will attempt to 
study these issues.  
2.1.1.  Historical background 
The most problematic issue after the independence declaration was that, 
while trying to build a post-colonial state and economy based on almost nothing, 
the new government had to face post-war occupation by the Guomintang in the 
North and British military forces in the South. According to the Potsdam 
Agreement, these forces were engaged in missions to obtain the Japanese 
surrender. In the meantime, Vietnam faced many enemies who aimed to pursue 
different objectives. In order to limit protests from its enemies as well as 
misunderstandings from the world outside, in November 1945, the Indochinese 
Communist Party was officially disbanded.34 In fact, the party continued to 
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operate in clandestine fashion. By doing this, the newly-born republic succeeded 
in avoiding many enemies at once so that the Vietnamese people had enough time 
to build the country and military forces to resist the French backed by the British 
in the South since the fall of 1945. The new regime had to confront an 
underdeveloped, war-ravaged economy and the results of a severe famine in the 
winter of 1944-1945.35 Additionally, the Indochinese Bank was still controlled by 
the French. Chiang Kai-shek military occupation force introduced its own 
currency that made the situation more serious. That is because “Quan kim” and 
“Quốc tệ” - two old-fashioned type of currency were introduced by Chinese 
occupiers. This aimed to destroy the financial market of the new regime. In fact, 
they used that sort of money to purchase goods in the market through the 
imposition of an extremely unreasonable price system. 
One more consequence of the French and Japanese occupation was that 
95% of the population of Vietnam was illiterate, social problems and diseases 
were fairly common. To solve these problems the communist-ruled government 
chose to implement some short-term solutions to the economic and social issues.36 
Nevertheless, none of the Great Powers recognized the DRV as a legitimate state. 
In a report dated 28 October 1945 to High Commissioner D’Argenlieu, Pignon 
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wrote, “the government of Vietnam was born in the context of no allies, no money 
and almost no weapons.”37 Tracing this back to the point when Japan surrendered 
to the allies in August 1945, Ho Chi Minh and his Vietminh fellows realized that 
an appropriate chance for them arrived at the same time. They used the power 
vacuum to launch the August Revolution and proclaim independence. 
Immediately, Ho and his comrades formed a provisional government in which 
multiple political parties were engaged to legalize their active gesture in order to 
welcome the allies who came to take the Japanese surrender. A government 
prepared and established in such a short period indicated that it was only a wise 
tactic of Ho. Many say that Vietnam was totally isolated. It still existed as a de 
facto state, however. The most dangerous problem for the new-born state was the 
French objective to return to Vietnam.38 
2.1.2. Diplomatic strategy and efforts of Ho Chi Minh 
The diplomatic program of the new government was first stated in Ho Chi 
Minh’s Declaration of Independence: “All men are created equal. They are 
endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; among these are Life, 
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness…” On 3 October 1945, the newly 
established government of the DRV proclaimed its diplomatic policies, in which 
main goals of the state were clearly out-spoken. Alongside other tasks, diplomatic 
strategies were “to lead Vietnam to an entire and long-lasting independence”. In 
the announcement it also pledged to cooperate with the allies “to rebuild peace for 
the whole world”. The basic policies as applied to the main four subjects in 
international relations can be briefly summarized as follows: 
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• To the world powers and allies which had been fighting against fascism: 
Vietnam would be very friendly and truthfully co-ordinate based on equal 
and helpful attitudes; 
• To France: if French people living in Vietnam would respect Vietnam’s 
independence then their lives and properties would be legally guaranteed; 
for de Gaulle’s government, if they intended to re-occupy Vietnam, the 
Vietnamese people would fight against this at any price; 
• To neighbors like China, Laos and Cambodia: the announcement stressed 
equal cooperation and friendship. The three Indochinese countries would 
develop side by side because they had economic relations; 
• To other countries, the Vietnamese government was willing to be friendly, 
closely cooperating on an equal footing in order to support one another in 
the course of building and maintaining their independence.39  
 With regards to the U.S., the new government tried to make contact with 
American representatives in Vietnam such as American Missions in Indochina, or 
some officers at the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Ho Chi Minh took 
advantages of what Franklin D. Roosevelt had proclaimed on the issue of self-
determination for colonial nations after WW II. This provides an explanation for 
why Ho Chi Minh sent many letters to the leaders of the Truman administration. 
However, as some newly declassified documents show, the Americans were not 
very much interested in Indochina as they had to concentrate on what was 
happening in Europe during the Cold War. Moreover, the U.S. refused contact 
with Ho Chi Minh because they were convinced that Ho Chi Minh was a 
communist rather than a nationalist. However, it was then clearer that the world 
was dominated by the U.S. and the SU after WW II. Initially, the U.S. had little 
interest in Vietnam and South-east Asia. Later on, the question of how to isolate 
communist movements in this region took on an increased importance. Their 
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concerns were ultimately formed into the doctrine of containment which had been 
first stated in 1947and domino theory thereafter.  
 On the other hand, Ho Chi Minh conducted many negotiations with French 
representatives in Hanoi on the unification of the entire country under the control 
of the DRV. However, the French attempted to maintain control of the South, 
which contained most of their economic interests. After many efforts, on 6 March 
1946 the two sides signed a Preliminary Accord, in which the French recognized 
the DRV as a free state of the Indochinese Federation and an association of the 
French Union.40 The Vietnamese pledged to maintain the French economic and 
cultural presence in the North, including 15,000 troops in this area to replace 
Japanese troops and protect French interests. A national referendum would be held 
to decide whether Cochin-China would rejoin the North and the centre in a 
reunited state or remain a separate French territory. Nonetheless, France did not 
seriously implement what it had agreed with Ho Chi Minh and postponed action in 
order to keep on negotiating with him. To illustrate Vietnamese good will, a 
parliament delegation led by Pham Van Dong41 paid an official visit to France 
from 25 April to 16 May 1946. In addition, another Vietnamese delegation headed 
by Nguyen Tuong Tam42 and a French delegation led by Max André joined a 
common preparatory conference in Dalat to discuss the main issues which would 
be discussed in France later on. But almost nothing was accomplished at the 
conference.  
 After that, Ho Chi Minh was invited to France to start the Fontainebleau 
Conference from 6 July to 10 September 1946 with the following agenda: the 
position of Vietnam in the French Union and its diplomatic relations with other 
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countries; the organization of the Indochinese Union; the unification of the three 
Kỳs (Parts) of Vietnam; a referendum in Cochin-China Vietnam; some other 
economic and cultural issues; and a draft of a Modus Vivendi. Ultimately, the 
Fontainebleau Conference failed, as the French firmly maintained its imperial 
standpoint. Once again Vietnamese good will was shown as, shortly before leaving 
France for Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh and Moutet, a French representative, signed a 
Modus Vivendi on 14 September 1946. This Modus Vivendi stated some 
fundamental points on economic and cultural relations between the two nations 
and agreed a ceasefire in the South which was seen as a gesture of good will on the 
part of the new government. Both sides also promised to return to the negotiating 
table in early 1947.  
 This Modus Vivendi, however, did not satisfy several members in the 
cabinet, even some communists. To conciliate them, Ho Chi Minh explained that 
“we need peace to construct our country so we were forced to make concessions to 
keep that peace... If France really wants a war and we cannot bear any more, we 
will fight.”43 In a word, the diplomatic policies of the new state were reasonably 
flexible, especially in harmonizing the two enemies at the same time. Many 
researchers agree that it was a sensible move for Ho Chi Minh to negotiate with 
France, and signing the two agreements was a great success. Ho Chi Minh chose to 
face France rather than China as his nation had experienced almost one thousand 
years living under the Chinese rule in the past. Once the Chinese were stationed in 
Vietnam it would not easy for them to withdraw. But France was another case as it 
came from the West and Ho Chi Minh believed his government and army would 
be able to struggle against the French and win one day.44 
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2.1.3. France’s return to Indochina and the outbreak of the first Indochina War  
 Supported by the British military force, on 23 September 1945, “French 
soldiers and civilians ran amok, beating and detaining almost any Vietnamese they 
encountered in the streets. This provoked a severe backlash the following 
evening.”45 Many discussions were carried out by related parties. However, after 
shelling the city of Haiphong in December 1946, the French re-enter Hanoi.  It is 
important to note that even when WW II was still underway, General Charles de 
Gaulle had clearly shown his will to restore the French empire in Indochina. To the 
French people, de Gaulle represented a national hero and on colonial issues, de 
Gaulle still retained his imperial mind. De Gaulle aimed to regain control of 
French colonial territories in an effort to restore French Greatness in “achieving 
political and economic recovery and security, two other important post-war 
objectives.”46 For many years, historians have conducted studies to investigate the 
reasons why France sought to regain control over Indochina after WW II. Different 
explanations have been given but most of them share the evaluations that France 
sought to regain Indochina to rescue its prestige and its empire.47 One of the most 
decisive tools to achieve its goals was economic restoration. Prior to WW I, France 
had had many interests and profited from many of their investments.48  
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 Returning to the outbreak of the Franco-Vietminh conflict in the South, 
after 23 September 1945, Vietnamese people living in Saigon-Cholon as well as 
everywhere in the South stood up to fight against the French. Southern forces were 
soon supported by the North with hundreds of thousands of Northern youths 
registering to side with the Southern Vietnamese. Additionally, food and medicine 
were sent to the South for the emerging anti-French resistance. The entire year of 
1946 witnessed the impotent efforts of Ho Chi Minh and his French partners on 
diplomatic issues. Finally, on 20 November 1946, armed clashes between 
Vietnamese and French military forces took place in the harbor city of Hai Phong 
and the Vietnamese-Chinese border province of Lang Son.  
 Although there were still negotiations between Vietnamese and French 
officials in early December 1946, no more positive results were reached. On 15 
December 1946 Ho Chi Minh sent a telegraph to French Prime Minister Leon 
Blum restating what the two states had confirmed and asking for further relations 
with France. No response was received. More seriously, on 18 December 1946, 
French officials in Hanoi sent an ultimatum requesting the DRV to disarm and 
hand over the right of control over the city to the French within forty hours. On 19 
December 1946 the Vietnamese made the decision to fight. At 20.30 the lights in 
Hanoi went out and the first Indochina War began. The war of resistance was not 
limited to the South but spread across the country. The newly born DRV was 
confronted with a decisive challenge. It was a war against a heavily armed 
imperialist power with far superior techniques and economics. In the evening of 19 
December 1946, President Ho Chi Minh made an appeal to the nation. 
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Picture 3: President Ho’s Call for nationwide resistance against  
the French colonialists on 19 December 1946. 
Alongside the on-going resistance against France, the new regime continued 
consolidating its political system, especially in the South. In order to widen the 
front for all Vietnamese people and to combat the French tactic of using 
Vietnamese forces to fight against other Vietnamese forces, the CPV established a 
new front called Mặt trận Liên Việt (Lienviet Front) - a new front uniting all 
Vietnamese regardless of who they were. Then, in 1951, the two fronts of 
Vietminh and Lienviet were merged into a single front called Lienviet.  
The so-called “people’s war” as viewed by the communist leaders might 
be long-lasting and the Vietnamese resistance against France could mainly rely on 
their own and the support of the other mass organizations who were united under 
the Vietminh. This is because other peoples in the world had suffered a very 
severe war so they did not want to engage to any other wars. Triumph in Northern 
Vietnam in the fall and winter 1947 played an important role in the first phase of 
the resistance. French forces were almost defeated in the cities but French military 
forces still occupied some life-line transportation roads. However, they failed to 
destroy Vietnamese leading headquarters in Thai Nguyen. Then the French 
carried out a massive offensive in the fall of 1947 in order to destroy the 
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resistance’s headquarters, block the Vietnamese-Chinese border line and even 
capture Ho Chi Minh and his high military command.49 All moves aimed to gain a 
stronger power in military forces, then to form a new government led by Bao Dai, 
and finally to end the war. But in the end, France failed to manage this and it was 
forced to adjust its strategies away from a quick victory strategy. From 1948 to 
1949 Vietnamese military forces promoted its guerrilla war at the back of the 
enemy. The main Vietnamese force was divided into smaller units to reach 
occupied zones to assist local guerrillas. Main forces and local guerrilla forces 
were getting stronger and stronger and ready for future offensives. 
 After the failure of the two arrangements with the French the government 
of Ho Chi Minh could find no way to negotiate with them and decided to fight. 
However, Ho Chi Minh always remained open to communication with French 
leaders in Paris or Hanoi over peace for Vietnam. From December 1946 to March 
1947, he sent eight telegraphs and letters to the French government, parliament, 
and even to President Vincent Auriol to ask for an immediate peaceful settlement 
to avoid both nations from losing human life and money. He also requested to re-
build friendly and cooperative relations between the two nations.50 Unfortunately, 
all these efforts did not bear fruit and the war continued to escalate.  
 From 1946 to the end of 1949, it was commonly accepted that Vietnam 
was partly isolated from world politics. Few other nations recognized Vietnam as 
an independent nation. During this time, Vietnamese diplomatic policy focused on 
Asian countries, most of which were resisting and gaining independence from 
European colonial control. With the aims of expanding international relations, a 
Vietnamese delegation was sent to the Inter-Asian Conference in New Delhi in 
March 1947 searching for support. A series of diplomatic activities were carried 
out thereafter. However, those efforts were not as fruitful as the DRV had 
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expected. At the international conferences and youth forums, the DRV only 
received basic support for the Vietnamese resistance, like in the establishment of 
representative offices or information centers, for instance.51  
 Regarding the U.S., in the first phase of the Franco-Vietminh War the 
Truman administration remained neutral in the years of 1945 and 1946. They 
repeatedly ignored Ho’s appeal for recognition. But after this point, the U.S. was 
aware of increasing nationalist movements in Asia in general and in Indochina in 
particular. They believed that the military conflicts in Indochina might lead to 
instability in the Far East. This was a result of the outbreak of the civil war in 
China with all its consequences from Korea to Malaya. Also, there was the 
context of the Cold War as France appealed to its Western allies to recognize 
French efforts in Indochina as a part of “containment policy” and urged for 
military and financial aid. In my opinion, France’s demands for U.S. aid might be 
regarded as new elements and strategies in French policy. Domino theory and 
containment policy were exploited as excuses to regain control over Indochina. 
Nevertheless, these calculations failed as other Western allies refused to take part 
in the planned “united action”. The Britons did so simply because they realized 
that the decolonization tendency was inevitable. The U.S. accepted these 
arguments and constantly backed France in Indochina but by urging France to 
accept the so-called “Bao Dai solution”. In line with this, the French and Bao 
Dai’s national armed forces were offered assistance to be organized. 
2.1.4. From a colonial war to an internationalized war 
 The emergence of the PRC in October 1949 after the Chinese communists’ 
victory over Chiang Kai-shek’s Guomintang led to new attitudes of the world 
powers towards Indochina. On 27 January 1950, American Ambassador-at-large 
Philip C. Jessup sent a note to Bao Dai declaring, “The Secretary of State, Dean 
Acheson, has instructed me to express to Your Majesty the gratification of the 
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U.S. Government at the assumption by Your Majesty of the powers transferred by 
the French Republic at the beginning of this year.”52 This note could be seen as 
the first sign of American engagement in the first Indochina War and afterwards. 
The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and the involvement of the SU as well as 
Red China proved that the communist bloc was gaining influence. These reasons 
forced the U.S. to follow up the first Indochina War to its end.  
 The American engagement in Indochina was gradually and clearly shown. 
Several weeks after the start of the Dien Bien Phu battle which steadily became 
unfavorable for the French troops, President Eisenhower at a press conference on 
7 April 1954 did not hide his policy while stating the importance of Indochina for 
the U.S. He explained that Indochina was a resource-rich area from which all the 
world had needs like rubber, tungsten and tin. Moreover, the “domino theory” 
could be real if Indochina fell into the communist bloc. If the first fell, the 
surrounding countries would quickly fall down too, such as: Myanmar, Thailand, 
Indonesia, etc. Then it would threaten Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia 
and New Zealand. Thus, hundreds of million people would be detached from the 
“free world”. In terms of economics, if Indochina fell, Japan would lose its trade 
area, which might lead it to collaborate with the communists to survive and retain 
its profits in the area. The arguments did not only imply a different ideology 
within the context of East-West tensions, but also a military purpose and an 
inherently pragmatic manner in terms of natural resources.  
American assistance to France in Indochina can be understood as an 
exchange in the framework of a broader “responsibility division”. Since mid- 
1950, France was considered not only the American frontier in Indochina, but in 
Europe as well while the American troops were in quagmire in Korea. Hence, the 
U.S. demanded that West Germany and France reinforce their defense 
contributions to European security, which was being threatened by the SU from 
the East. Unfortunately, France was in a great dilemma as it was short of military 
hardware sources due to Germany’s occupation or destruction in WW II. In 
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addition, by getting stuck in military activity in Indochina, France had been 
limited from contributing to security affairs in Europe.53 As the conflict escalated, 
France’s prestige rapidly declined after the heavy losses on the Indochinese 
battlefield. Moreover, the French political stage was complicated and suffered 
from a lack of stability. From 1950 to the end of the first Indochina War, nine 
governments were established in France. The shortest government lived only ten 
days (the government of Henri Queuille, from 2 to 12 July 1950) and the longest 
one served almost one year (the government of Joseph Laniel, from 27 June 1953 
to 18 June 1954). 
Despite this, France still did not change its policy of invasion and 
depended more on American assistance. The U.S. also did not let the opportunity 
slip of intervening in the Indochina battle for the purpose of preventing the 
communist movement from expanding to South-east Asia. In 1950, in a bid to 
combat the spread of communism, the U.S. began supporting France in Vietnam 
with advisors, and funding its efforts against the “red” Vietminh. These efforts 
continued in 1956, when advisors were provided to train the army of the new 
government of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).54 This involvement 
gradually led to the American War or the second Indochina War which has been 
seen as a part of the ideological struggle between the West and the East.  
The victories in the military field achieved by the Vietminh had great 
influence on Vietnam’s position and diplomatic relations with other countries in 
the world. In the early 1950s, most socialist countries recognized and established 
diplomatic ties with the DRV.  On 14 January 1950, Ho Chi Minh declared that 
“Vietnam is the only legal government of the whole Vietnamese 
communities…the Communist democracy government of the working class is 
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willing to establish relations with others who respect equality, territorial integrity 
and national sovereignty of Vietnam so as to preserve the world peace, establish 
and consolidate the world democracy together.”55 Following this declaration, on 
18 January 1950, the PRC recognized the independence of the DRV and the SU 
did the same on 30 January 1950. Then, Vietnam was recognized as an 
independent country by a series of countries with socialist systems, such as North 
Korea (on 31 January), the GDR (on 2 February), the People’s Republic of Poland 
(on 4 February) and the People’s Republic of Albania (on 13 March) and so on.  
It is essential to note here that as early as 1947, French representatives in 
Indochina and the ex-emperor Bao Dai had discussed the possibility of the 
establishment of a non-communist government which would merge all religious 
forces, nationalists and non-communist parties into a unilateral front. The Élysée 
Treaty signed by French President Vincent Auriol and Bao Dai in January 1949 
set the basis for the formation of the State of Vietnam. This state was an entity of 
the French Union and governed by Bao Dai. Actually, the State of Vietnam was 
used as a “backdoor” for France to counter the Vietminh-led government and 
request American aid. In this way, this would help France retain control over 
Indochina. However, from 1950 to 1953, the Bao Dai government was recognized 
by the U.S. and more than 30 countries of its Western allies.56  
As the nature of the first Indochina War changed, the scale of it was 
modified and upgraded. The hidden ruling Communist Party Central Committee 
in June 1950 decided to set up the 1950 “Autumn – Winter Border Campaign” 
which aimed to destroy partly of the enemy’s force. Also, this campaign aimed to 
open the Chinese-Vietnamese border which would pave the way for international 
communication with socialist countries. After more than one month of fighting 
(from 16 September to 23 October 1950), the Vietnamese army and local people 
wiped out half of the strategic roving forces of the enemy in Northern Indochina 
(3,500 troops were captured), confiscated many weapons, liberated five 
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townships, thirteen towns, many important areas and a line of demarcation which 
was 750 km in length and included 350 thousand citizens. The northernmost 
Vietnamese revolutionary base was consolidated to break through the “East-West 
corridor”.  
After four years of struggling, the Vietnamese government had 
strengthened its socio-economic condition and politics, especially in the military. 
In contrast, France was more impaired and depended heavily on American aid. 
The French internal government was unstable. In July 1953, France received more 
assistance from America and launched the Navarre plan which was to be 
implemented within eighteen months, with the main contents including 
concentrating strong troops in Indochina especially in the Red River Delta. This 
was also for the purpose of carrying out a strategic attack to annihilate the main 
Vietnamese forces and end the war in the most favorable condition for France. It 
can be said that the Navarre plan was ambitious and constituted the final effort of 
the American-French allies in Indochina.  
To cope with the new strategy of the Winter-Spring Offensive in 1953-
1954, the Vietnamese army made an attack on important strategic directions to 
force the enemy to scatter their forces in five directions: Dien Bien Phu, Se-No, 
Plei-Ku, Luong Phra Bang and North Delta which caused the Navarre plan 
initially to fail. Attempting to deal with this situation, France concentrated their 
military forces in Dien Bien Phu where they consolidated the group of strongest 
military bases in Indochina in order to smash up the main Vietnamese forces. 
Dien Bien Phu became the centre point of the plan. However, it was the biggest 
error of France in the last effort to save the situation of the war.57  
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 In order to bring about the complete failure of the Navarre plan, the 
Vietnamese army had to win victories in Dien Bien Phu. In December 1953, 
Vietnam chose Dien Bien Phu to be the strategic stronghold in which the decisive 
battles would take place. The campaign leaders reinforced their preparations with 
the slogan “All for frontline, all for victory”. For fifty-six days and nights with 
three spells of drastic attacks from 13 March to 7 May 1954, Vietnamese troops 
killed and captured 16,200 French soldiers, destroyed sixty two aeroplanes of war 
and confiscated all weapons and fighting devices of the enemy. 
 
Picture 4: General Vo Nguyen Giap observes the battle of Dien Bien Phu 1954. 
2.1.5. Influence of Dien Bien Phu as a signal of French decolonization in 
Indochina 
The victory of the Vietminh over France at Dien Bien Phu had a great 
influence on modern Vietnamese history. Firstly, this was the biggest victory in 
the course of a nine-year war of resistance against the French. One historian 
compared it to “French shameful defeats in the past like Sedan, Waterloo… or 
Nazi Germany’s defeat at Stalingrad.”58 The total collapse of the Navarre plan 
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contributed to the decision of forcing France to sign the Geneva Agreement which 
restored peace in Indochina. Subsequently, the North was completely liberated. 
Secondly, it was the first time within almost one hundred years of struggling for 
independence that Vietnam has swept away the foreign invaders. The new 
people’s democratic regime was consolidated. With this victory, the Vietnamese 
people proved that: a small nation could win a war against invaders. It is 
commonly accepted that, due to the specific situation since 1945, all attempts to 
establish post-colonial systems without the deep participation of the colonized 
would have to fail.59  
 
Picture 5: French troops surrender at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954. 
For France, the outcome of the Dien Bien Phu battle also affected France’s 
military and national images or identity. As Martin Shipway states, “Dien Bien 
Phu did not end the fighting in Indochina, but it destroyed the last vestiges of 
French determination to continue the war.”60 Evidently, the collapse of French 
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prestige in Indochina did not affect only its identity but also its economy. In a 
broader sense, the war in Indochina pinned France down financially and paralyzed 
its domestic and European development. The first Indochina War represented the 
failure of France’s colonial ambitions on the one hand, and on the other caused a 
large financial crisis since as long as the war went on, it remained burden on 
France’s budget. For instance, upto 1953 the first Indochina War cost 1,800 
billion francs, consituting 60% of its domestic budget.61  
During the nine-year war in Indochina, French political life under the 
Fourth Republic was constantly unstable. More than twenty governments were 
established and collapsed. Thus, it seemed to be impossible to rebuild a symbol of 
French grandeur under the instability of political life. Broadly speaking, the 
Vietnamese victory at Dien Bien Phu and the end of the Indochinese war changed 
French colonial policies as well. If France had previously established the French 
Union to create a framework for dominating over its colonies, then, four years 
after the failure of Dien Bien Phu battle, in 1958, France set up the French 
Community, the rules of which showed respect for each nation’s right to self-
determination and higher autonomy. France was forced to offer independence to 
many countries in Africa, especially in North Africa. Finally, it is widely accepted 
that France’s withdrawal from Vietnam was the first step towards the moral 
collapse of the colonial system. France had to end its colonial presence in Asia 
and return to Europe to deal with European internal issues and its own domestic 
affairs. If the fall of Indochina was perceived as the beginning of the French 
decolonization process then it could be argued that “the process of decolonizing 
the French empire became a painful, frustrating and demoralizing experience, 
which greatly weakened France on the international scene and contributed 
significantly to the collapse of the Fourth Republic.”62  
As for other colonized nations, the event of Dien Bien Phu for France and 
for the rest of the colonized world was understood as a remarkable point forcing 
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France to withdraw from Indochina and Asia. It was a tremendous encouragement 
for the struggling forces in the world which had been fighting against imperialism 
in the colonial countries and semi-colonized countries. It also marked a new stage 
to liberate Asian and African colonized nations. The Dien Bien Phu victory dealt a 
blow to France on the one hand and international imperialism on the other. This 
also led to the disintegration of the large colonial bloc of French imperialism. 
Consequently, France had to reconsider its position and tactics applied in Europe 
and throughout the world. The next consequence was Algeria’s uprising against 
oppression commonly understood as a chain of reaction. As a result, Dien Bien 
Phu itself and the end of the French colonial presence in Indochina very much 
inspired the newly formed Algerian National Liberation Front to wage another 
violent resistance to gain full independence. This victory had an obvious effect on 
other French colonies and encouraged self-liberating movements in countries such 
as Madagascar, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia and so on. These movements would 
initiate the collapse of old colonialism in the world. Therefore, from the above-
mentioned issues, we find that Vietnam was a pioneer country in awakening other 
colonized nations. This was also regarded as a landmark of French colonial 
history.  
In Europe, the collapse of French colonial rule and withdrawal from 
Indochina and Asia contributed to the balance of power. As we have seen, the 
EDC project proposed several years before aiming to limit German military power 
under a supranational structure had ultimately failed. In the French leaders’ eyes, 
“the defeat in Indochina was unequivocally accepted and the harsh consequences 
in terms of loss of blood and treasure were recognized. In that respect France 
seemed to handle the decolonization and France’s changing role in the world well, 
once it actually happened. The projected triangular balance in the European 
Defense Community, between German rearmament, British engagement in 
Europe and French military commitments in Indochina comes to nought.”63 
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The year of 1954 was a crucial turning point not only for Asia but for 
Europe in terms of the world’s changing face for years, even decades afterwards. 
Once Asia was important for the SU and the Western world, Europe was also 
crucial for the whole world. The most challenging issue in Europe in 1954 was the 
problem of German rearmament. German rearmament could be carried out 
through the EDC but, as discussed above, the outcome of Dien Bien Phu and the 
first Indochina War, as one of the main reasons, caused the failure of the project.64 
Thus, within its sphere of influence in colonial territories, it was considered a 
remarkable year in the history of conflict between the West and the East and 
international relations history in general. Because of these diverse elements, the 
world’s force balance also changed after 1954. This change was evident not only 
in diplomacy but also in the understanding of new concepts and strategic 
doctrines.65 
2.1.6. The Geneva Conference and its echoes 
The 1953-1954 offensives with their peak in the Dien Bien Phu campaign 
has caused the Navarre plan to fail completely and forced France to sit down at 
the negotiating table at the Geneva Conference (from 26 April to 21 July 1954). 
Initially, the Geneva Conference aimed to discuss peaceful resolutions for 
Indochina and Korea. However, the Korea issue was not settled satisfactorily. 
Consequently, from 8 May 1954, the conference shifted its focus of debate to the 
Indochina problem. Dien Bien Phu and the Geneva Agreement officially ended 
France’s colonial war with American assistance. According to this agreement, 
France had to withdraw its troops, the North was liberated entirely and proceeded 
to re-consolidate a socialist – oriented state which then became a firm support for 
the South in the battle for national reunification later on.  
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Picture 6: Foreign Minister of the DRV Pham Van Dong and  
France’s Prime Minister, Pierre Mendès France in Geneva 1954. 
 The outcome of the conference as well as successes on the battlefield 
created big waves on the international scene.66 It had deep effects on the national 
liberation movements. As one French military leader commented, “A gamble in 
Geneva appeared like a symbol of white people’s degradation and our civilization. 
Fewer than six months later, a rebellion broke out in Algeria, De Lattre′s 
prediction came true: withdrawing from Indochina would make North African 
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revolt in the shortest time... The termination of the war in Indochina would open a 
new era: right! But that was an era of failure, despair and national crisis.”67  
Regarding the impacts of the Geneva Conference on Europe and Germany, 
Nhan Dan newspaper stated: “Ceasefire and peace restoration accords in 
Indochina gained at Geneva contributed to calm down international issues and 
created favorable conditions to solve other international affairs which had not 
been solved not only in Asia but also in Europe such as arms race and nuclear 
weapons prohibition, European security and German problems.”68 
The Geneva Conference was meaningful not only for Vietnam and 
Indochina, but also for the political atmosphere in the Asian region and the world 
outside in the climate of the Cold War. One of the significances of the Geneva 
Conference was exactly what scholar Evelyn Colbert states: “the Indochina 
conference had reflected the urge on both sides for some degree of détente and its 
outcome encouraged hope in East-West negotiations... at least, there were 
encouraging signs of thaw – the lowering of voices on both sides, the return to 
politesse symbolized by the Geneva Summit of July 1955, the renewal of relations 
between the Communist bloc and an unrepentant Tito, the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between West Germany and the SU, and the opening of peace 
talks between the latter and Japan.”69  
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Picture 7: On behalf of the DRV’s delegation, Colonel Ta Quang Buu signs the 
Geneva Agreement on 21 July 1954. 
2.2. Impacts of the first Indochina War and decolonization in Indochina on 
France 
We cannot deny the importance of Vietnam or Indochina for France. 
However, it is necessary to investigate why Vietnam and the issue of colonization 
remained important to France even as decolonization trends became clear after 
WW II. French decolonization in Indochina in 1954 to some extent proved that 
European colonial power was over. During WW II, traditional European 
domination in many parts of Asia and South-east Asia was indeed replaced by the 
Japanese.  
As previously discussed, the process of decolonization took place 
intensively after WW II and in the decades afterwards. The charter of the UN also 
guarantees the right of self-determination of colonized nations. French 
decolonization in Indochina and European decolonization in Asia forced the 
European colonial powers to re-assess and adjust their current and future 
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strategies. For instance, in terms of economics, it is commonly agreed that 
European colonies had been the main suppliers of raw materials for industry. 
They were also customers for European producers. Clearly, the process of 
decolonization had a negative impact on European economics as France was no 
longer able to depend on colonial suppliers. Therefore, European countries had to 
attempt to restructure their strategic economic markets outside Europe. To deal 
with this question, they had to decide whether to retain interests in the newly 
independent nations, or return to the old continent of Europe. Any of the options 
would be hard, even confusing for France at the time.  
2.2.1. Impact on French domestic politics 
The French defeat marked by the downfall of Dien Bien Phu was the 
turning point of the French presence in Indochina and the European 
decolonization process. More importantly, the ending of the battle of Dien Bien 
Phu also caused increasing protests within France against continuing further 
military campaigns in Indochina. The government of Laniel had to resign as a 
result of the military and political crisis. This paved the way to the premiership for 
Mendès France, who had promised to find a reasonable and honorable settlement 
for Indochina within a month.  
One day after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, on 8 May 1954, the 
French National Assembly gathered to listen to Laniel’s notification of the failure 
of the Dien Bien Phu stronghold. At Geneva, in the atmosphere of sadness, all 
French delegates wore black uniform to attend the conference. The French 
Foreign Minister declared the bad news at Dien Bien Phu and suggested that 
France’s diplomats should fundamentally accept a ceasefire in Indochina. On 21 
July 1954, the Geneva Agreement was finally signed after seventy-five days of 
negotiation. However the success of the conference has been examined by 
scholars, one of the outcomes was that the East and West made several 
arrangements at Geneva leading to a phase of détente. Geneva was a compromise, 
rather than a victory for one side.  
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In fact, French decolonization in Indochina outed an end to France’s 
colonial ambitions. Its end has been viewed as the starting point for the entire 
period of French decolonization in Asia and North Africa. Despite its vain attempt 
to reform its colonial system after 1914, the old style of French imperialism in 
Indochina totally collapsed. Furthermore, this encouraged the fall of old-fashioned 
colonialism in the whole world and the rise of the political left in the decolonizing 
world.70  
The French defeat at Dien Bien Phu and its decolonization in Indochina 
was also perceived as the starting point for the following series of France’s crises 
in the second half of the 1950s, until the emergence of the Fifth Republic in 1958. 
The Dien Bien Phu defeat led to the failure of the EDC project, the outbreak of 
the Algerian war, growing financial deficit and the failure of the Suez adventure. 
All of these were considered the main factors shaking the stability of the Fourth 
Republic, finally, bringing it to an end.71 
Within thirteen years of the Fourth Republic, twenty-six cabinets were set 
up and fell apart. It has been argued that 13 May 1958 was a consequence of Dien 
Bien Phu.72 After WW II, France was completely exhausted, as it had exerted 
itself to the utmost in the war. Again after nine years of conflict with the Vietminh 
in Indochina (and later with the FLN in Algeria) its manpower and financial 
resources were overspent. Consequently, “Indochina and Algeria cost not only the 
lives of hundreds of thousands of Asians and Africans but eventually brought the 
collapse of the Fourth Republic as well.”73 Thus, French decolonization forced 
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France to re-define its domestic strategic policy in order to stabilize its chaotic 
political plight.   
2.2.2. Impact on military status 
Dien Bien Phu, where France had concentrated its strongest forces, was 
totally defeated. For the French leader, Joseph Laniel, the failure of Dien Bien 
Phu was seen as “one of the most tragic turning points in our history.”74 
Ironically, the French army did not calculate further risks when they again wanted 
to rescue the country’s traditional legend by entering a new and even bitterer war 
in Algeria a few months later. It was reported that around 100,000 were dead in 
addition to 20,000 Vietnamese, 15,000 Africans, 12,000 foreign legionnaires, 
many of whom were Germans; and 21,000 French were also recorded dead in the 
lost war against the Vietminh in Indochina.75 It was very hard to believe that the 
French army with its hundred years of long tradition, and then backed strongly by 
the Americans in the Indochina War, was entirely knocked out by a ten-year-old 
army of the Vietminh. It seemed unacceptable for a great power like France. The 
failure at Dien Bien Phu and then the loss of the Indochina War caused France to 
be more psychologically sensitive than ever before. Alongside some other factors, 
“this might call into question her Great Power status.”76 Accordingly, these bitter 
defeats would lead to the death of the EDC plan when the French Assembly 
refused a ratification on 30 August 1954 since France, understandably, was again 
concerned by a new European defense project in which France would lose its 
national identity in comparison with the West German priority in military 
potential. 
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Picture 8: De Castries surrenders at Dien Bien Phu on 7 May 1954. 
2.2.3. Impact on economics 
The French economy after WW II was nearly impoverished.77 Before the 
Marshall Plan was offered to France, in 1947, the “external investments were half 
of the value of those of 1914.”78 France’s post-war period seemed to be isolated 
from the wider world, especially in economics. Unfortunately, French strategic 
resources and political objectives did not fit with each other. It might be right to 
state that the deeper France engaged in the Indochina War, the more it had to rely 
on U.S. subventions from the year of 1950 onwards. In this situation, all political 
parties, even including the communists in France believed that “la France outre 
mer” would help “provide a complement of force and energy to compensate 
France for her reduced role in Europe and the wider world.”79 
As the colonial conflict in Indochina escalated, the French national budget 
spent on the war in Indochina increased year after year. It is easy to see that after 
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1950 France was increasingly dependent on American economic assistance, as 
France had been constantly arguing that the French colonial war in Indochina had 
become a the war of the free world against the expansion of communism in South-
east Asia.  
Unit: Billion Francs 
Year French contribution General cost French contribution (%) 
1946 108,00 108,00 100 
1947 117,30 117,30 100 
1948 130,00 130,00 100 
1949 169,50 169,50 100 
1950 241,20 285,20 85 
1951 292,60 379,30 77 
1952 334,00 568,00 59 
1953 285,00 589,00 48 
1954 142,00 687,00 21 
Total 1819,60 3033,30 60 
 
Table 1: The French total cost for war in Indochina.80 
The outcome of the first Indochina War (and later the Algerian war) 
caused France not only a great burden on its economy but serious inflation as 
well. The French economy was rather weak and expected to get worse as France 
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had to give up its traditional raw material supplier region of Indochina. Many 
researchers were suspicious of what France would be without colonies, as its 
economy mostly depended on colonial economic development. During the 
conflict and after the failure of its Indochina “the traditional deficit in her foreign 
trade could no longer be filled by the income from capital invested abroad.”81 If 
we turn back to the Conference of Brazzaville in January 1944 when Charles de 
Gaulle did not hide his ambitions to continue controlling France’s colonial 
territories, we will see that France would never easily abandon its will on 
possessing its traditional colonial countries. Theoretically and practically 
speaking, the process of decolonization must have affected the French economy 
badly since it would no longer be able to exploit its overseas colonial territories.  
On the other hand, the process of decolonization did not simply have a 
negative effect on the French economy; it also created something positive for the 
French political economy in terms of Western integration, by allowing France to 
tie itself to the strongest and most rapidly growing industrial economy in Europe 
at the time, i.e., the FRG. It can be argued that there was definitely a coincidence 
between French decolonization and European integration. In the course of this 
process, France understood that they should join such a move, as the French 
leaders soon realized that by integrating the country into Western Europe more 
quickly, coordinating closely with its core partner in Europe – West Germany, 
French national power could be restored.  
This was done under the pressure of domestic issues and other national 
interests such as French prestige. In a new world context of further cooperation 
and integration tendency, imperialism was no longer an opportunity for any 
economic increase of the French capitalists, if not a great burden to France as a 
whole. In the new scene of global economics, traditional products made from 
cotton and coal imported from colonized countries did not bring as much profit as 
it had done, in comparison with modern industries promising to benefit the 
France’s economic development more.  
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It is undeniable that French decolonization had an extremely positive 
impact on the French policy towards European integration. One can argue that the 
loss of the first Indochina War might be seen as one of the most powerful motors 
for France to sign the Treaty of Rome in 1957, just shortly after France’s colonial 
territories of Morocco and Tunisia declared independence. In reality, only by 
integrating itself into the Western integration process did France have hopes to 
rescue its position and prestige in Europe. As one author states, “European 
integration became the instinctive French response to her need to regain her 
seriously reduced influence.”82The war cost in Indochina comprising 10% of 
national income in the year 1953-1954, France was forced to reduce the burden in 
a bid to deal with economic difficulties in the home country.83 Accordingly, the 
problems of maintaining its empire or integrating into European community were 
now seriously questioned. In order to achieve these goals, the colonial question 
must be clearly solved. 
In comparison with the West German economy, experiencing the so-called 
“economic miracle” (Wirtschaftswunder), the French economy was more fragile. 
The better option for France was to seek economic cooperation with other 
European partners. Therefore, West Germany would be one of the best partners 
for France to reach such a goal. Now a New France without colonies was more 
determined to concentrate on regional economic issues which were actually rooted 
in the 1952 foundation of the ECSC (later upgraded to the EEC in 1957). As 
Derek W. Urwin argues that, “by the late 1950s more people were accepting the 
fact that Europe was better off without colonies.”84 This is because the post-
colonial period would lead to economic development. The same thing happened in 
Germany. Until the early 1950s, the West German economy was strongly 
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influenced by the dominating coal and steel industries with their close links to 
defense industries. Capital and consumer goods industries, until this point the 
foundation of the German economy, gained momentum in a process which was 
importantly influenced by political decisions and those of the industrial and 
business associations, BDI and BDA.85 To replace an economy based on colonial 
structures (import of low level products from colonies, export of low level 
commodities to colonies) with one depended on the industries of an affluent 
society is a strategy to modernize an economy and to create economic growth. 
Decolonization therefore became a key factor for economic growth in the 
most competitive countries. After 1945, Holland and Belgium faced the same 
problems. Another advantage was to transform formal obligations as a colonial 
power (occupation costs, etc.) into developmental co-operation which could be 
reduced or increased depending on the relations or tensions with the former 
colonies. 
2.2.4. Impact on French colonial and foreign policy 
The failure of Dien Bien Phu and the loss of Indochina have historically 
been seen as a great failure in which the bankruptcy of French grandness is the 
matter of concern. This obliged France to change its understanding as well as its 
policy on determining and solving the current affairs. In this case, the colonial 
question and international issue can be understood in a broader perspective. After 
1954, French colonial policy was based on a guide-line policy that aimed to 
narrow its colonial territories, in sharply contrast with its colonial policy seventy 
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years earlier.86 In other words, the decolonization process was to some extent to 
open to its former colonial possessions. For many French people, the Dien Bien 
Phu defeat and French withdrawal from Indochina had been seen as another bitter 
humiliation of France since 1940. It was also considered a turning point of 
France’s military in particular and French history in general. After 1945, although 
France had its own occupied zone in Germany, this did not mean that France had 
equal rights in comparison with the three other allied powers. Moreover, despite 
occupying a seat at the Security Council of the UN, France was no longer seen as 
a colonial power. However, France hoped to restore its prestige in the African 
continent by pursuing another military adventure in the northern African country 
of Algeria from late 1954. French nationalism more or less continued in the 
second half of the 1950s. Again, the French failed to succeed in preventing 
Algeria from gaining full independence in 1962.87 
To conclude, Vietnamese history through the end of WW II to the year of 
1954 must be studied in diverse aspects. Clearly, we get a better picture if we 
study it from the broader perspectives of the very complicated regional and world 
context of the first half of the 20th century. After nine years of resistance against 
French colonialists, Vietminh’s military victories forced France to come to the 
negotiating table at Geneva in May 1954. The Geneva Agreement on armistice 
and peace resettlement in Indochina was an interpretation of the power balance of 
all participants in the battlefield as well as of the great powers in ther international 
arena. This also involved extremely complicated issues in international relations 
and the strategic plans of Vietnam’s allies, the SU and Red China at the final stage 
of the Geneva negotiation as they planned to end the war in Indochina. At the 
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time, Red China opted for co-existence which was seen to be suitable with its 
long-term interests. According to the Geneva Agreement, Vietnam was 
provisionally divided into two halves with two different political regimes. A 
general election was promised to be held nationwide two years later. However, 
this never came to pass under the leadership of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime and its 
successors. After 1954, the North was entirely liberated and pursued a socialism-
oriented system. Meanwhile the non-communist South was still under the 
dominance of the U.S. and its allies. The communists in the North then both 
reconsolidated half of the country and raised a new resistance against the U.S. and 
its followers in the South in a bid to reunite the entire country as we can see in 
April 1975. 
 
          Picture 9: Indochina 1954. 
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CHAPTER 3 
GERMANY AND FRANCE AFTER WW II TO THE EARLY 1960s 
The main purpose of this chapter is to give a better understanding of the 
situation in Germany and France after 1945, and a down grading of nationalist 
ideas, sentiments, and motivations, talks about countries, father- and motherlands, 
etc. In both countries, the idea of national grandeur was seriously put down. In 
Germany there was a strong opposition to another build up of military power, the 
“Ohne mich-Bewegung”88, and Schelsky already claimed a cooling down of the 
“Bewegung zum Unbedingten”, which deeply influenced Germany between 1900 
and 1945.89 Nationalism was not the first priority on the West German agenda; 
nor even was it national reconstruction or re-unification, but rather a non-political 
feeling for peace, prosperity, justice and rational ways of behavior better than 
national enthusiasm. To a certain degree the situation was the same in France and 
in other parts of Western Europe. In France there was a strong opposition to the 
colonial wars, high numbers of deserters, and famous artists like Boris Vian 
expressing the sentiments of those who deserted.90  
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Also, politics after 1945 focused significantly on practical issues such as 
building up infrastructures, housing, traffic systems, etc. In Germany there was a 
strong debate on national shame and guilt, which significantly damaged not only 
the image of the Germans but also the national paradigm as such. For many, the 
national idea as such had been proved to be wrong. The German Chancellor 
Adenauer never spoke about the past, only about the future, and he attacked the 
lack of human and civil rights in the GDR. This, together with rapidly recovering 
industry, especially with the third federal election, made him a prominent figure in 
Germany. Also in France, nationalist sentiments cooled down, the talk about 
national greatness was proved to be absurd for many: the result of the wars in 
Europe and elsewhere was blood, destroyed cities, nonsense talking generals who 
survived because people died for them and before them. In the following chapter, 
the relations between West Germany and France after WW II will be discussed. 
This discussion will then be linked to what happened in Indochina and Europe in 
the 1950s. 
3.1. Europe from the end of WW II till the early 1960s 
The Yalta Conference took place in February 1945 with the participations 
of the government heads of the U.S., Britain, and the SU, represented by President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and General Secretary 
Joseph Stalin respectively. The main theme of the conference was to discuss the 
issues of Central Europe’s reorganization after the war. Also in August 1945, 
another meeting, the Potsdam Conference, was opened to debate how to control 
Germany after the unconditional surrender of the German army.91 In the post-war 
period of Europe, many important issues had to be solved including signing peace 
treaties among the rivals and cooperating among them.92 But these policies 
seemed not always to be successful. Let us take Germany for consideration. One 
of the most important factors leading to the establishment of the Bizone and then 
Trizone (with the extra participation of France) was economics, as sharing the 
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task would reduce the costs of occupation. Although there was no discussion and 
acceptance from the SU, the SU policies towards post-war Germany were not 
always clear. It is absolutely right to state that, for Europe, 1945 was a remarkable 
year in defining European and global political structure. More precisely, 1945 was 
the formal end of the war in Europe. From then on a process of polarization 
occurred, which in 1946 and 1947 continuously polarized the “West” and the 
“East”. During this process, theories about the situation also emerged, e.g., 
Containment, Domino, Two-Camp Theory (Zwei-Lager Theorie) by Zhdanov.  
Given this context, one of the most crucial points of these policies was to 
demarcate the border lines between European states. In 1946, the world powers 
were preparing to sign peace treaties with Finland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria 
and Italy. At last, these treaties were signed in Paris in February 1947. The 
Potsdam Conference delegates agreed to regulate provisional solutions to the 
problem of Germany. The SU would directly control the Eastern part of Germany 
including the swamp areas such as Petsamo and East Karelia as well as the three 
Baltic countries of Estonia, Litvia and Latvia; the northern part of East Prussia; 
the Eastern part of Poland, etc. Czechoslovakia, Italy and Yugoslavia and other 
pre-war border lines were also originally restored. 
In the Western part of Europe, the Saar area was established as an 
autonomous zone in 1947 in economic union with France.93 As a result of 
different occupational policies between the U.S. and its allies in the Western part 
of Germany, and the SU in the Eastern part of Germany, the two states of 
Germany were founded.94 The FRG was founded in May 1949 and the GDR was 
then established too in October 1949. The main driving force behind the statehood 
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of the FRG was the Americans. They were by far the most active force in German 
policies after 1945 compared with the Britons and the French. The city of Berlin 
was also divided into West and East Berlin. West Berlin then became a “free city” 
of the Federal Republic.95 
The policy of the allies in post-war period was also to create newly-
ordered political structures for European countries. In most of the freshly liberated 
countries, new governments were formed with a combination of Communist 
Party, Socialist Party, Christian Democratic Party or Agrarian Party. In most of 
the Western European countries, including France and some other Eastern 
European countries like Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, these governments 
were formed through free elections.96 New governments indeed successfully 
conducted crucial reforms such as land redistribution, industry nationalization or 
social welfare programs. However, these reforms were significantly distinct from 
country to country. 
The Cold War emerged in 1946 with the appearance of an “iron curtain” 
between the two blocs dividing Europe into separated areas.97 The two blocs acted 
differently in forming their own political structure and carrying out socio-
economic programs. They aimed to achieve their own sphere of influence. 
Military alliance within each bloc was seen as the most crucial task to guarantee 
security. Consequently, NATO was established in April 1949 with its first 
members, i.e., the U.S., Canada, France, Britain, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Netherlands, Italy and Portugal. Then came Turkey 
and Greece in 1952, and the FRG became a member in 1955. Also, in May 1955 
the Warsaw Pact was signed as a counterpoise in the Eastern part of Europe with 
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its first members: the SU, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Albania and the GDR. 
After WW II, the European economy was completely devastated. Besides 
this, Europe had recently experienced human suffering on a disastrous scale. In 
1947, the U.S. launched a program called European Recovery Program (ERP), 
commonly known as the Marshall Plan. It was not difficult to see that the goals of 
this four-year program were to rebuild or restore Europe’s economy (but mostly 
for Western Europe as the SU and its allies refused to join or they were forced to 
refuse to join this program).98 In retrospect, the European economy had to be put 
under American control because the Americans were trying not to repeat the 
mistakes of 1919.99 With a well - planned solution on the German problem, it 
would help to lessen the country’s influence in the context of post-war Europe. 
Together with the new-born Cold War, this program aimed to protect Europe from 
a potential Soviet expansion into Western Europe.100 Also, the emphasis of the 
Marshall Plan was to stabilize the European economy not only for economics 
itself but also for political and social-political reasons. The SU and its satellites 
also set up their own economic union called the Council of Mutual Economic 
Assistance (Comecon) in 1949. This union’s economic programs were driven by 
this organization until the year of 1991. 
Evidently, the systematic formation of a new European order in the mid- 
20th century would create new relations among nations in the continent as well as 
among Europe, Asia and Africa. During the 1950s and 1960s under the influence 
of WW II, the process of European decolonization spread out from Asia and then 
hit Africa. The turning point of the decolonization process was the breakdown of 
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British control over India, and the defeat of the French army in the first Indochina 
War in 1954 marked a further step in this process afterwards. Former colonized 
territories regained their independence from colonizers either by violence or 
peaceful means and joined the UN as equal members. From this point forward, 
Asia has been playing an important role in international political stage. Under 
these circumstances, the polarization between the West and the East as well as the 
decolonization problem created a new situation with which the Europeans had to 
deal with. It forced the European countries to unite and develop politically and 
economically. Some organizations were founded like the ECSC in 1952, the 
Western European Union (WEU) in 1954, and the EEC and EURATOM in 1957. 
However, the economic recovery of European countries, especially West 
Germany with the economic miracle, seemed to end after labor productivity 
peaked up to a higher level than ever before in the early 1960s.  
It is widely accepted that though West European countries built a strong 
economy, they did not integrate completely. For Germany, long division and 
occupational status prevented it from returning to its former position. Nationalism 
in France pursued by Charles de Gaulle during the years from 1958 to 1969 more 
or less weakened the EEC. The security plan of EDC demonstrated the uneasy 
consensus between France and Germany. Additionally, there was the fact that 
during the 1960s the influence of the U.S. and the SU on this continent was 
getting more evident and then it was increasingly strengthened through the arms 
race between the two superpowers. Europe was, in essence, no longer as powerful 
as it had been prior to 1939. In addition, another powerful force that could not be 
ignored was the PRC in Asia, established in 1949. Its creation was intended to 
bring a balance of power between the West and the East. Soon after the birth of 
Red China, the country constantly sought its own sphere of influence in which 
Indochina played a crucial role as its geographical and ideological ally. 
Subsequently, there were three complex adaptation crises amalgamated 
between 1949 and 1957 before they finally defined both the new European and 
the new transatlantic architecture: “firstly, the Cold War and Soviet expansionism 
– followed by the wars in Korea and Indochina as well as the Suez Crises that 
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made France and Britain painfully realized the limits of their global role – 
facilitated the American guarantee for Europe’s security; secondly, functional 
European integration through the ECSC turned out to be the highly successful 
way of matching a host of conflicting integration ideas and national interests of 
rebuilding Western Europe as a society of affluence and freedom, based on a law-
based Single Market; thirdly, NATO as the strategic and military insurance policy 
for rebuilding Western Europe, the Council of Europe as a loose community of 
European values and the EEC as the first step to political integration in Europe 
mutually reinforced a new and sustainable European peace order.”101  
3.2. Germany after WW II 
25 April 1945 was known as Elbe Day and marked an important step 
towards the end of WW II in Europe. It began a new episode in the war when the 
Russian and American armies gathered in Torgau, located next to the bank of the 
Elbe River on German soil. Being aware of an upcoming defeat, Hitler appointed 
General (Grossadmiral) Dönitz the Premier of the “Third Reich” and killed 
himself on 30 April 1945. On 2 May 1945, the Red Army occupied Berlin and the 
German army’s defeat was inevitable. Shortly after that, on 7 May 1945, the 
German army was forced to surrender unconditionally. On 5 June 1945, the allies 
officially controlled Germany. After this, it can be said that the allied powers 
brought a complete end to the European battle.  
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           Picture 10: Germany 1945. 
The legacy of WW II waged by Nazi Germany from 1939 to 1945 was 
seen as the most horrible conflict in the modern world war history. One-seventh of 
the 110 million soldiers who served in the war died, between 20 and 30 million 
civilians lost their lives, including 5.5 million Jews in Nazi Germany’s 
concentration camps. The German army was forced to surrender on 9 May 1945. 
Without doubt, Germany had to take responsibility for causing the war. The 
country had no right to decide its own future fate but depended completely on the 
allies’ policies. The allies’ common aim was to find strict solutions on how to 
totally annul German aggressive potential and to protect the world from another 
war. It could be seen that post-war Germany faced a difficult situation such as it 
had never suffered before, as around six million Germans were dead and millions 
more were injured. Additionally, from four to six million Germans considered 
prisoners of war were still in prisons somewhere in the SU and elsewhere. 
Thousands of houses in most cities had been destroyed by the allies’ bombing. 
Starvation and disease were threatening the inhabitants.102   
It is noted that policies towards Germany after the war had been debated 
and decided by the allies long before WW II ended. The SU, the U.S. and Britain 
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had gathered many times to talk over the issues of Germany’s unconditional 
surrender as well as its future under the control of the allies. Many important 
meetings were held between Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill in 
Casablanca in February 1943; the Foreign Minister Conference in Moscow in 
October 1943; the Governor Summit in Teheran in November and December 
1943 between Joseph Stalin, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill; the 
Yalta Conference in February 1945. The final meeting was the Potsdam 
Conference in July-August 1945. In these meetings all the representatives mostly 
talked about post-war Germany. 
The Potsdam Agreement signed on 2 August 1945 aimed to prevent any 
new war launched by Germany as world war history had witnessed. In order to 
achieve this aim, the allies decided some fundamental issues as follows:  
• to totally destroy German militarism and fascism so that Germany 
would have no opportunity to threaten its neighboring countries as 
well as the world’s security;  
• to create good conditions for Germans to restart their new lives 
based on democracy and peace and have a suitable and equal 
position with free nations;  
• to entirely change German industry into a peaceful one, all sole 
industrial groups had to be abolished as they had been the 
dangerous hotbed of aggressive militarists; light-industry was 
encouraged to develop;  
• to consider Germany a sovereign nation in economics;  
• to encourage free trade unions to develop, to ensure free speech in 
order to help democratic forces develop;  
• to regulate Germany to pay damages to the allies; to stipulate the 
court to judge war criminals;  
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• to establish an administrative system to govern Germany, free 
elections would be held at local level; no central government 
would be set up.103  
In Germany, there were no central government or any central 
administrative offices which had the ability to guarantee social security and run 
the administrative system as well as carry out the demands required by the allies. 
Therefore, the governments of Britain, the U.S. and the SU, along with the 
Provisional government of France proclaimed control over Germany from central 
to community level. As previously decided by the Potsdam Agreement, Germany 
was then divided into four occupational zones. Each zone was occupied by the 
individual power’s army. The High Military Commander of each power 
individually had full rights to rule its occupied zone. The Ally Control Council 
was founded on 30 August 1945 with headquarters in Berlin which functioned as 
the single office controlling the whole of Germany. The Potsdam Agreement also 
stated that the German economy, especially agriculture, must be developed, and 
the economy in four occupational zones must be structured in a united form and 
thus also solely controlled by the allies. 
All in all, despite different points of view, all the allies to some extent 
agreed on common policies towards post-war Germany. They agreed to allow for 
the things they did not agree on by allowing each power to control its own zone 
according to its plans and something like a co-ordinated effort for Germany 
regarding its economy and the payment of reparations. However, it can be seen 
that there were still differences among the allies which could not be easily solved 
afterwards. Followed by the Yalta Agreement, the Potsdam Agreement was a 
solution against aggressive empires that caused WW II. Additionally, the Potsdam 
Agreement put an end to WW II in Europe. This also set the basis for the new 
world peace on the one hand. On the other hand, the Potsdam Agreement 
provided the Germans a chance to start again after Hitler’s regime had been 
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totally dismissed. As we have seen, WW II altered the power balance in Europe 
and the whole world.  
Then two superpowers emerged, however: the SU and the U.S., whose 
differing policies on post-war Germany fundamentally led to the division of 
Germany four years after the war. At the very beginning, these two powers 
oscillated between coordination and confrontation. Confrontation stemmed from 
different standpoints connected to each one’s interests. Doubtlessly, they were 
affected by anti-Soviet theory put forward by the Western world. It is true to note 
that the SU had to suffer a severe outcome of the war: the economy was almost 
destroyed; cities and villages were in ruin, more than 20 million soldiers and 
civilians died in the war. According to the Potsdam Agreement, the SU would 
receive compensations from the Western part of Germany. But the U.S. actually 
did not hold to this agreement. Because of dispute on American loans for the SU, 
it opposed the SU dismantling German factories in its occupied zone and 
prevented them from removing machines to the SU from May 1946. 
More importantly, the U.S. was concerned by the possibility that if their 
army was no longer stationed in Europe, the continent would be immediately 
dominated by SU armed forces. There is no doubt that the U.S. saw this trend as a 
potential obstacle against its global strategies. We can recognize here that there 
was a paradox in the minds of the Western allies. On the one hand, they were 
aware of an aggressive Germany, but they were also concerned by the advantage 
of the emerging international communist movements on the other. Those attitudes 
made Western allies confused about the question of whether to allow Germany to 
be reorganized as a state and curb the SU influence in Europe. In conclusion, in 
both the Yalta and the Potsdam Conference the allies could only agree on 
fundamental policies towards Germany but failed in deciding detailed regulations 
to fulfil those policies due to each country’s security interests. 
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3.2.1. The policies of the Allies towards Germany after 1945 
3.2.1.1. The U.S. with the “open door” policy 
U.S. policies towards Germany after the war seemed unclear and the 
Americans were sometimes confused about defining their policies for Germany. 
As pointed out above, each victor in WW II had its own intentions in controlling 
Germany. As Hermann Josef Rupieper explains, “the policy of both the Truman 
and Eisenhower administration toward Germany was the result of three 
interconnected problems: the development of the East-West conflict and thus the 
global U.S.-Soviet confrontation; any solution of the German problem was of 
crucial importance for the stabilization of Europe and the concept of Western 
European Integration, which had started with the Marshall Plan; and considering 
Western experiences with a united Germany and especially U.S. intervention in 
two world wars to prevent the domination of the continent by Germany, the future 
of Germany also affected U.S. national security interest.”104 
Based on arrangements agreed by the allies in the Potsdam Agreement, 
Germany would be Denazified, Demilitarized, Decartelized, Democratized (the 
4Ds). Nevertheless, the Americans were also pursuing their own goals in terms of 
security, economy and forestalling communism.105 In February 1943, in 
Casablanca, both America and Britain stated that the Atlantic Charter would not 
be applied to Germany, Japan, Italy and their followers.106 Despite the Atlantic 
Charter, the allies still had full rights to plan their own policies towards post-war 
Germany. Article 4 of the Atlantic Charter mentioned that trade barriers were to 
be equalized in the whole world after the war. This proved the nature of the 
American policy and was understood as American global strategy in diplomacy or 
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the so-called “open door” policy. The American strategies were to use this article 
to guarantee its broad influence in meeting its export demands and material needs 
with a hope that America would be a great superpower in economics directly after 
the war. In an effort to implement this policy, the U.S. strived to avoid reaching 
an agreement on each country’s sphere of influence, which both the SU and 
Britain wished to discuss. Also, America itself postponed many detailed plans for 
post-war Europe. The American attitude, in some ways, blocked many agreements 
which had been previously reached by the allies. By signing the Atlantic Charter 
the Americans were paving the way for their global domination, as we have seen 
in the following years. 
Nevertheless, one of the most important subjects in which the allies were 
interested was the territorial organization of Germany after the war. In Casablanca 
when the war was still underway, the allies established their requirement that Nazi 
Germany must unconditionally surrender. Many solutions had been conceived. 
One of them was Morgenthau’s idea which represented the American thought. As 
early as 1944, he proposed that Germany’s industry must be entirely abolished, 
and agriculture must be restored, or “Germany’s road to peace leads to the farm.” 
By doing that no more war could be launched. Morgenthau’s idea was to 
cooperate with the SU so that the American army could be completely withdrawn 
from Europe. 
In order to do this, the Directive JSC 1067 delivered by the U.S. clearly 
stated its policy towards Germany from 1945 to 1947. The main content of the 
document stated that the Germans could not forget their responsibility for what 
they had done in the past. In this case, Germany would be occupied as a “defeated 
enemy nation” with the hope of eliminating the Nazism. Occupation status would 
prevent it from waging any future war, and make it become a democracy-based 
state. That also meant the German economy and military would be strictly 
controlled. In spite of that, those countries devastated by the Nazis would receive 
reasonable compensation from Germany, the Directive continued.107 
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As we have seen, not only did the American implement their military and 
economic policies, but they also tried to control German politics. However, 
indeed, the “theory of collective guilt” of all Germans was a tool to minimize the 
influence of the groups which most strongly resisted the Nazis, the communists in 
particular, as Desmond Dinan states: “If all Germans had been equally guilty for 
the rise of the Third Reich, this theory went, then in the post-war reconstruction 
no political group could be given preference, not even the antifascists, socialists 
and communists who had been in the forefront of the struggle against Hitler.”108  
3.2.1.2. The British policy 
Winston Churchill’s signature on the Atlantic Charter did not completely 
mean that Britain could not follow its own policy towards Germany compared to 
the U.S. and the SU’s perspectives. Britain agreed that the border issues would be 
discussed after the war as top priority because this had been the main cause of the 
formation of aggressiveness and fascism. At first, British policy seemed similar to 
that of the U.S. but clear distinctions gradually appeared between the two allies. 
We can see that the more the SU proved their role in military and politics, the 
harder Britain sought some arrangements on territory. Britain and the SU were 
highly concerned with their sphere of influence in South-east Europe. Even when 
the war was still on, Britain talked frequently about border lines between Poland 
and Germany. After 1943 when the SU halted diplomatic relations with Poland, 
Britain suggested to the government-in-exile of Poland that it should accept the 
border line in East Poland as the SU had demanded. Germany then had to 
compensate the government-in-exile of Poland with a part of German territory in 
the Western part of Poland. This suggestion was strongly opposed by the 
Americans and then by Poland, however. 
Once the U.S. wanted to be a dominant world power, Britain hoped to rely 
on its principles to re-organize the power balance in Europe. First post-war 
elections in Britain brought a victory for Clement Attlee’s Labour Party. Britain’s 
interests in Europe could be threatened from two sides: one from the SU potential 
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to influence the West, and another from America attempting to influence in 
Europe likewise. Britain consistently opposed the Oder-Neisse border lines from 
the moment they were demarcated at the Yalta Conference and maintained this 
point at the Potsdam Conference due to the worry over SU influence in the West. 
In this case, Britain sought a detailed arrangement with the SU before 
withdrawing its force.  
After the war, Britain saw that Morgenthau’s model could satisfy its 
economic interests. It supposed that Britain’s capital would then be strengthened 
by dismantling Germany’s industrial factories. British policies were not always 
consistent with those of the U.S., but rather had different directions in each period 
of time. This can be demonstrated by their contradiction on economic and 
political interests. Both saw that if they intended to destroy the German economy 
for a long period it would be in turn a burden for the allies. Britain was also 
severely devastated in the war so surely it would not hope to share this hardship. 
Moreover, both Britain and the U.S. wanted to use Germany as a dam preventing 
any menace from the Soviet threat. Paradoxically, if the German economy 
recovered it would be a danger for political security and violate the previous 
arrangements among the allies. 
The British government preferred to construct an effectively 
administrative system or a “political clean” system. However, they still made use 
of those officers who had served in the Nazi regime. The British stopped on its 
own initiative the re-education of fascists by mid-1947. In fact, British politicians 
were always suspicious of the implementation of the Potsdam Agreement and 
Germany as a united entity. British policy makers even foresaw the future division 
of Germany before the U.S. did. In a word, British policies towards post-war 
Germany were consistent as after the Potsdam Conference, Churchill and the 
Tories were no longer in power, and Attlee and the Labour Party drove British 
politics at that time.109 
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3.2.1.3. The SU’s policy 
Immediately after being attacked by German troops, the SU signed the 
Atlantic Charter in 1941 and pledged to join the common front against Japanese 
fascists. At the Teheran Conference in 1943, Joseph Stalin, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and Winston Churchill agreed upon an overall plan for post-war Germany. 
Basically, the SU shared the view of the Western allies in controlling Germany 
after the war with some fundamental matters like the abolishment of fascism, 
demilitarization and strict control over the German economy, etc. At the very 
beginning of its occupation of Eastern part of Germany, the SU worked out some 
sort of democratization program which seemed different from what the U.S. and 
Britain did in their respective occupational zones. Nevertheless, for the Russians, 
democratization meant something different from the Western terms. The Soviet 
occupiers supported German communists in building up action programs of 
democratic groups hoping to form a democratic force against fascism in the whole 
of Germany. It was hoped that the Communist Party would lead Germany; all 
democratic forces would be united in order to form a democratic republic state in 
which the German people would be guaranteed freedom and democracy. This 
was, in the Russians’ eyes, considered an important step towards socialism. 
Nonetheless, the first elections in the Soviet Zone of Occupation were disastrous 
for the German communists. As a result, the East German SPD was forced to 
unite with the KPD to form the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische 
Einheitspartei Deutschlands - SED). 
One of the most ambitious objectives of the SU was to consolidate 
communist forces and to make use of democratic forces so that it could broaden 
Russian influence in mid and East Europe, and even South-east Europe. This 
could be interpreted to mean that the SU desired to expand the power of the 
communist bloc after WW II. It could also be argued that what the SU did was 
only to serve its primary goal which was to guarantee its national security, as it 
had fully experienced two world wars in the past. More than any other country, 
the SU did not want to become involved in any new war and, as the leaders  of the 
SU repeatedly stated, it did not have any plan to invade any other countries. 
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However, what the Russians acted in some Eastern European countries such as 
Czecholovakia and Hungary in late 1948 and 1956 proved the differences 
between their policies and real actions. 
Another issue that made the SU worried after the war was the border 
problem. This was regarded as crucial and a point of contention between the SU 
and the Western powers. When signing the Atlantic Charter, Stalin demanded that 
Soviet’s border line remain as it had been in 1941. At Yalta in February 1945, the 
SU strongly recommended that any arrangement must accomodate the SU-Poland 
border line of 1939 which was exactly the same as the former one in 1918.  After 
the Hitler-Stalin-Pact, Hitler attacked Poland first. A couple of days later the 
Russian occupied the eastern part of Poland. What followed after WWII was that 
the entire State of Poland was shifted to the West.  
The allies also agreed that all ethnic groups would be transferred to their 
respective new territories such as the Poles would be moved to Poland, the 
Ukrainians would be moved to Soviet Ukraina. The Germans were expelled to the 
zones of occupations, the Polish from the eastern part of Poland were forced out 
too and had to settle in those areas, where the Germans have been expelled from 
east of the Oder-Neisse-Line. Together with the different status of the 
Siegermächte (Victorious Powers) from the matters of how to control post-war 
Germany and Austria, the territorial and ethnic reorganization of Middle Eastern 
Europe after WW II became a huge disputed problem among Siegermächte, who 
were pursuing their own calculations and related countries. However, more than 
any country involved in the territorial reorganization process, Germany lost a 
large part of its territory. 
3.2.1.4. The French policy 
For France, “the German occupation of France created a hatred of 
Germans and Germany that left little room for forgiveness or reconciliation. The 
Germans were guilty not only of military aggrandizement and economic 
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exploitation, but a sadistic savagery.”110 At the Yalta Conference, based on 
Stalin’s suggestions, Britain and the U.S. agreed to invite France to join the group 
of post-war Germany occupiers. And France really deserved to join.111   
Very soon after becoming a member of the occupiers’ alliance France 
established its own designs. More than ever France did not want to see a strong 
and aggressive Germany again. Therefore, a divided Germany was exactly what 
France had hoped for, because a unified Germany would be a visible threat to 
France’s national security. As France had been taught through many lessons in its 
history of an unfriendly relationship with Germany from the German-French War 
of 1870 to WW II, France could draw wise and suitable diplomatic strategies 
towards a defeated Germany in order not to be threatened again. Accordingly, 
France opposed any ideas on a central control authority for the whole of Germany. 
Its own occupational zone was more or less strictly separated from the others.  
For economic reasons, the Saar area was cut off from the French 
occupational zone in the hope that it would be integrated into French territory. In 
the French occupational zone, Germans had to endure a hard life under a very 
harsh control policy. Reparations were made at the highest level and German 
prisoners of war had to work very hard for years. Thousands of Germans were 
recruited into the FFL and sent to Indochina or North Africa.112  
Legally, each member of the allied force had the right to veto. France took 
advantage of this to break up many arrangements offered by other allied members. 
There was no doubt that France did whatever it could to take revenge on Germany 
in its occupational zone by exploiting both natural and human sources. The 
French military authority in Germany “at the same time sought to re-educate and 
democratize the German people. This aims to make them worthy of a place in the 
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moral and cultural community of Europe, notably by cathartic acquaintance with 
the best of France’s own cultural heritage. The mother of arts, arms, and laws was 
willing to raise a foster-child.”113  
  However, France also shared with Britain and the U.S. feelings of fear 
about future Soviet influence in the West. France believed that the left bank of the 
river Rhine should be a natural border commonly shared by Germany, 
Switzerland and France. If French troops were forced to withdraw from that area 
France would feel completely unsafe for its national security. As for Ruhr area 
with its high production quantity of coal per year, Germany was not allowed to 
exploit this for its national heavy industry exclusively because of the danger of 
Germany again becoming a great economic power and a danger to France.114 
At the Potsdam Conference, France was only interested in dismantling 
German factories and industrial equipment and moving them to France. Regarding 
other plans in governing post-war Germany, France acted perfunctorily as they 
knew that France could not gain more profit from Germany. We know that post-
war French foreign policy must be understood in the context of economic and 
military crisis. More importantly, French colonial policies towards Indochina and 
North Africa were gradually becoming an economic burden for France. During 
the German occupation period in France from 1940 to June 1944, most French 
colonial territories and interests fell into German hands or under the control of 
Japanese fascists. Under the Potsdam Agreement, the allies sent their troops to 
those territories to attempt to force surrender. Followed by British troops, France 
returned to South Vietnam to disarm Japanese with the intention to retake control 
over Indochina. We have seen that France initially intended to isolate Germany. 
Was France hoping to achieve a position of continental dominance? Would this be 
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possible for France? All these matters will be discussed in more detail in the 
following chapters. 
To sum up, it is not simple to reconstruct and analyze the allies’ policies 
towards post-war Germany. In fact, although the allies had fought side by side as 
part of the anti-fascist front, they also faced unavoidable ideological 
contradictions as they represented different political and ideological trends. They 
were only united in one goal: to defeat Germany, Japan, Italy and their allies. 
Once this goal was achieved, conflicts came up. On the one hand, their 
agreements were certified by signing many common documents related to re-
organizing Central Europe and Germany after the war, but on the other hand, 
differences among the allies were also increasingly displayed. As we have 
analyzed, each member of the allied force had its own intentions in protecting its 
interests by planning strategic policies towards post-war Germany. Finally, after 
the war the allies’ policy on defining the occupational zone of each ally in 
Germany was rather a “technical solution” than a “political solution.”  
3.2.2. Germany in the four occupational zones 
Clearly, Germany was in utter ruin or at the so-called “Stunde Null” (Hour 
Zero) after the war.115 No central government was established and administrative 
activities were entirely governed by the victors. These administrative activities 
can be categorized in the fields of structuring the four occupational zones; 
chastising war criminals; democratization; and economic recovery.  
Actually, the frontier of each zone was chosen at random and did not 
depend on socio-economic and cultural conditions. It even cut through particular 
economic structures: The German economy prior to 1945 was structured by an 
axis of the most important industrial areas: the Ruhr, Middle Germany, Berlin and 
Silesia. The socio-spatial structure of the West German economy would be 
significantly different: the economic center shifted to the West and South. 
Nevertheless, there were some differences in the occupation policies of each zone 
leading to distinctions in the development of economics and politics thereafter. 
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Theoretically, the most powerful force in generally controlling the whole of 
Germany was the Allied High Commission placed in Berlin. Each occupier’s 
control office was set up at the levels of Land (state), region and city. The head 
office of the U.S. military control was the Office of Military Government U.S. 
Zone – OMGUS; of Britain was the Control Commission of Germany, British 
Element – CCG/BE; of France was the Conseil de Controle de la France pour 
I’Allemagne; and of the SU was the Sowjetische Militäradministration in 
Deutschland – SMAD.  
Regarding the mission of chastising war criminals: based on the agreement 
released after the Ministerial Conference in Moscow in 1943 an International 
Military Tribunal for chastising war criminals would be installed in Nürnberg 
from the fall of 1945. Accordingly, the trial committee was convened by the 
representatives of victors. The inductees were heads of the Nazi party, Gestapo 
(Geheime Staatspolizei), the SS (Schutzstaffel), the Nazi government and the 
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces). After 
one year’s activity, 12 out of 22 criminals were sentenced to death by the court 
including: Göring, the second leader of the Nazi regime after Hitler; Ribbentrop,  
Foreign Minister from 1938; Keitel, Chef of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht; 
Kaltenbrunner, Head of the SS force. 
According to the Potsdam Agreement, the victors would dismantle all NS-
organizations to stop NS-propaganda; especially in the American zone of 
occupation, the dismantling was carried out and combined with a huge re-
education effort.  This process was implementd differently in each occupied zone. 
In the Soviet zone, the process was closely connected to economic and social 
reform, for example through land reform in September 1945, when the former 
regime’s properties collection and industrial foundation were nationalized. 
However, the Soviets also acted at random in their attempts at denazification; 
ultimately, they were as totalitarian as the Nazi-Germans had been. Thousands of 
women were raped in the Soviet zone; thousands of Germans were brought to 
Russian forced labor camps, etc. 
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In terms of democratization: political democratization was one of the most 
important objectives of the allies despite dissimilar view points on democracy and 
democratization. This process could be done by re-establishing political parties, 
trade unions and people’s organizations, which would serve as very significant 
elements for a new Germany in political and economic recovery and development 
after the war. After the dismantling of NS-Organizations, a new system of 
political parties was emerging after WW II. Some parties which had already 
existed in the Weimar Republic were re-organized, first of all the SPD but also the 
KPD, whereas in the center and right of the political spectrum, new parties were 
founded. They were the CDU, with centers in Berlin and North-Rhine Westphalia 
which gathered the Christian working class movement, together with moderate 
conservatives and liberals, and the FDP as a united liberal party combining the left 
and right wing of the liberals which had been split into several organizations since 
the Deutsches Kaiserreich. Also new parties in the right of the spectrum were 
founded, but they were rapidly marginalized. 
In the Soviet occupation zone, the SMAD promulgated a decree allowing 
the establishment of democratic parties in Eastern part of Germany in June 1945. 
The two first reformed parties were working class parties: the Kommunistische 
Partei Deutschlands - German Communist Party (KPD), first led by Walter 
Ulbricht, and the SPD. The KPD made an appeal which had much in common 
with the “German Popular Front” of the 1930s.116 The main content of this appeal 
was the KPD’s criticism with regards to the Nazi regime’s crimes to humanity. 
The party also called for the establishment of a new anti-fascist union and a 
democracy-based state. After that, the SPD’s leader Otto Grotewohl also made an 
appeal, with its program heading towards democracy in the state and in society, 
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approaching socialism. Despite the refusal of the SPD leader Kurt Schumacher to 
merge the SPD and the KPD, both were forcibly united under the single name of 
Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands or the Socialist Unity Party of 
Germany (SED) in the Soviet zone.117 
Subsequently, Kurt Schumacher re-established another version of the SPD 
in Hanover. He rejected being put under the leadership of the central executive 
committee in Berlin in combination with the KPD because he thought that the 
KPD, rather a non-democratic party, controlled by SMAD would rule a new 
Germany. Moreover, he feared that the communists would take control of the 
SED, which is indeed what happened. Kurt Schumacher later opposed Konrad 
Adenauer’s policy in integrating Germany into the West with the view that the 
process of integration would separate Germany for a long time. 
Another political party that was set up at that time was the CDU which 
later played a decisive role in founding and leading the FRG after 1949. Under the 
leadership of Dr. Konrad Adenauer, its fundamental stance was widely “critical of 
the capitalist economic system.”118 The CDU first put with Ahlener Program more 
emphasis on “Christian Socialism”, and shifted the focus of its program until 1949 
more to social market economy (soziale Marktwirtschaft).119 Thus, the CDU was 
and still is a combination of different political groups, e.g., the liberals, the 
conservatives and the Christian socialists. Konrad Adenauer was elected the chair 
of the CDU in all the Western occupation zones in the fall of 1950. 
In terms of economic recovery: Germany immediately had to deal with 
starvation after Stunde Null. In addition, the situation became worse as more 
Germans arrived after being forcibly expelled from their homes in what are today 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Serbia, Hungary, etc. Food production was not 
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sufficient. It was distributed unfairly among the occupation zones due to the 
different resources in the respective zones and different numbers of incoming 
refugees. Only people with contacts, having something to sell on the “black 
market” and having responsible entrepreneurs or well working solidarity in 
companies, etc. were able to supply themselves with enough food. The unbalance 
and shortage of supplies led to the development of a “black market” where almost 
everything could be sold and purchased.120 
With significant differences in the respective zones, from 1945 and 1946, 
the occupying powers gave the full right of settling the affairs of supplying food, 
necessaries, dwelling, health, school, etc. to the Länder. The number of people 
who died of starvation and illness, including children increased. The military 
authorities, especially the Americans, had to call on their home citizens to support 
and relieve the Germans. Moreover, bad weather in the winter of 1946 - 1947 
caused a decline in agricultural productivity.  
However, the most crucial task at this time was to find solutions for 
adjusting the economy in the occupational zones. This meant that the occupiers 
had to unite the German economic zones defined in the Potsdam Agreement in 
order to form a central office to proceed in this task. Also, they had to set up a 
complete administrative system, notably by forming commissions in the states, 
which were considered a basic step to reaching an inter-regional arrangement on 
the economy. The French military government, not the SU, objected to the 
forming of such a central office. On 3 May 1946, General Clay ordered the 
postponement of dismantling industrial bases in America’s occupational zone in 
the hope that France and the SU would agree on the issue of economic unification. 
In fact, this influenced French economic interests more than Soviet interests. 
Consequently, France vetoed what General Clay had intended to do. 
The second barrier which General Clay had to face came from the U.S. 
The American State Secretary believed that, establishing a limited inter-regional 
economy or Bizone, composed of the U.S. and Britain, was the best option to 
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develop the German economy. This Bizone would be developed into a non-
communist state later. But German politicians strongly opposed this proposal as 
they feared that the move would lead to a future division of Germany. The SU and 
France at first thought it would break up the Potsdam Agreement but finally 
France agreed to join the Bizone, thus the Trizone was formed. 
In the Eastern part of Germany, the owners were expropriated. All big and 
important enterprises were managed by the SU.  The SMAD directly controlled 
production processes, from which the SU deducted part of production as 
reparation. This practice lasted until 1953. The U.S. and Britain estimated that, by 
dismantling equipment from its occupational zone, the SU had taken around ten 
billion US dollars. It should be well understood here that the Russians had 
demolished German infrastructure and the Americans then had to sustain the 
German population. Also, the Russians did not use the reparations to pay back 
their American loans, but rather to reconstruct and strengthen Soviet military 
potential. This was the key economic issue. 
On 4 July 1947, the German Economic Commission (Deutsche 
Wirtschaftskommission - DWK) was established by the SMAD under Decree 138. 
The commission functioned as the central office of the government in the Eastern 
part of Germany and a consulting organ for the SMAD. In March 1948, the DWK 
was renewed to act as a planning organization in the economy for the whole of 
East Germany.  
In late September 1946, plans for establishing a combined economic 
region of the U.S. and Britain were carried out. The two most important 
administrative organs of the whole economy and the agricultural sector were set 
up. However, due to the inconvenient and devastated infrastructure, goods 
transportation was restricted. Additionally, the distribution of industrial and 
agricultural products was carried out unfairly between cities and rural regions. 
This situation evidently forced the U.S. to consider promoting German industrial 
productivity without consulting France or the SU. To finalize this plan, the U.S. 
and Britain discussed and agreed on the formation of an inter-region Economic 
Commission containing 52 members selected from the parliament of each state.  
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3.2.3. The establishment of the two German states in 1949 
All the calculations of the allies finally led to the formation of the two 
German states.121 All three Western allies knew that they simply could do nothing 
to influence or to gain the upper hands over the SU even when they had formed an 
inter-regional economic zone in Western Germany. They determined to found a 
state in the Western part of Germany. Thereafter, this state would integrate into 
the Western club. This might also become a strong force against the SU and other 
socialist states in East Europe. As a realistic and anti-communist politician, 
Konrad Adenauer strongly supported these ideas.  
On 1 July 1948, the Military Commanders of the U.S., France and Britain 
handed over three important documents commonly called the “Frankfurt 
Documents” to eleven state heads in their occupation zones. These were the legal 
foundation for the promulgation of the later Basic Law. The most important 
document was the third one which mainly outlined the most fundamental 
principles of how the allies would control the new-born state in West Germany. 
Those were: 
• to keep control over the new-born state’s foreign policy; 
• to control, if necessary, foreign trade activities and other domestic 
trade which might limit German foreign trade activities; 
• to restraint those arrangements related to the Ruhr region, 
reparations, industry, disarmament, demilitarization, and some 
scientific activities; 
• to secure occupying forces by all means; 
• to respect the approved Basic Law. 
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Historians and researchers have seen that the occupying powers still 
controlled the most important sectors in terms of domestic and foreign affairs. 
According to the content of the third document, the most important domestic and 
foreign affair of new Germany (West Germany) would still be controlled by the 
occupying forces. It also meant that the new West Germany was not only an 
occupied country but also an independent state with limited souvereignty. This 
formed the substance of conflicts around domestic policy and the foreign 
orientation of the FRG in the years to come. No sooner than 1955, when West 
Germany signed and joined military pact of NATO did the allies hand over almost 
full governing rights to the federal state.  
Therefore, it could be argued that Germany was supervised by the High 
Commission, and that Western Germany had to prove its compliance with 
international law and human rights. Step by step, then, in the West the supervision 
was replaced by international cooperation. But indeed, many strategies, which 
were imposed on Germany, were similar to those in the colonized world, for 
example the denial of legal rule and government in Germany. We should keep in 
mind that the allies by legal theory had not fought a nation or a state but a 
criminal gang in illegal possession of a territory with no legal government. All 
occupying powers had experience in colonial rule. 
During the formation process of the two German states, the Ministers of 
the allies gathered to hold a final session in Paris from 23 May to 20 June 1949. In 
the meeting, all the allies confirmed the end of the Berlin blockade and invited the 
Soviet occupied zone to join the new West Germany state legislated under the 
regulation of article 23 of the Basic Law. The SU unsurprisingly rejected this 
invitation. The West German state announced that anyone living in the Eastern 
part of Germany who wished to move to West Germany would be accepted and 
would have the same rights as others living in the Federal Republic. Following 
this, the GDR was formed relatively in October 1949. Both states considered 
themselves the sole legal representative (Alleinvertretungsanspruch) for the whole 
of Germany because they both served all of Germany’s interests. This debate 
lasted until 1973 when both states became equal members of the UN. 
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All in all, the birth of the two German states depended a great deal on the 
allies’ calculations and interests and was being influenced by some major political 
and economic factors like the emergence of the Cold War, the Marshall Plan, the 
creation of the Bizone, then the Trizone, the Berlin blockade, currency reform and 
so on. The federal state was structured differently from the Third Reich and the 
Weimar Republic formed after the November Revolution in 1918. The Weimar 
Republic had a liberal constitution. Meanwhile, the FRG has a democratic one. 
From experiences inferred from the Weimar Republic and the “legal” installation 
of the Nazi dictatorship the new federal state renewed some basic elements in its 
political structure such as the relationship between government and parliament, 
the federal president’s capability and, most significantly, the position of the 
federal Chancellor (Bundeskanzler), the strong position of the states (Länder), the 
welfare state (Sozialstaat), defensive democracy (wehrhafte Demokratie) and the 
State of Law (Rechtsstaat), etc. These changes contributed to a very crucial sense 
that the FRG was constructed with the aim of building up a welfare state. This 
proved true, as for a long time West Germany was deeply influenced by social 
market economics, corporatism, the strong influence of trade unions, and a 
vertical and horizontal integration of interest groups.  
After the establishment of the two German states, all the leaders of both 
the FRG and the GDR tried to implement each state’s political and economic 
policies to develop the country. In the GDR in the summer of 1952, the SED 
announced its intention to lead the country to socialism. With Konrad Adenauer, a 
typical West German Catholic, things went differently. He believed that if 
freedom, social justice, human and civil rights were not to be achieved in a united 
Germany, he himself clearly favored them over nationalism. Therefore, he and his 
government chose to anchor the state in the West as their first priority.122  
3.2.4. West Germany in the 1950s 
Economics was then considered the most influential factor on the 
development of each state. However, in West Germany the economic recovery 
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process had much more success than that of the Eastern part of Germany because 
from 1946 it received American foreign aid under the GARIOA Program.123 This 
was then reinforced by another program offered by the Americans, too – the 
Marshall Plan – to combat “hunger, poverty, despair and chaos”, which provided 
the crucial boost for the country’s economic recovery (1.4 billion dollars between 
1948 and 1952).124 However, the Marshall Plan was not the “silver bullet” to 
boost West Germany’s economy. The country’s economic growth resulted from 
varied reasons such as modernization, the social market economy, social reforms, 
compromises between entrepreneurs and trade unions, strong trade unions, the 
destruction of monopolies and oligopolies, migration of the elite of East Germany 
to the West, population boom, immigration, innovation, freedom, initiative and 
determination. 
As a result, the German “economic miracle” in the 1950s reached heights 
that no one could have thought before. After the war, as “the wartime destruction 
of much of Germany’s industrial plant had paradoxically proved beneficial; the 
new plant was built with the latest technological equipment. The Allied High 
Commission gradually abolished control over German industry, saved for atomic 
energy and certain military restrictions. It provided economic aid and scaled down 
pre-war German debts. By the early 1950s West Germany had a favorable balance 
of trade and a rate of industrial growth has obtained as high as 10 percent a year. 
The GNP of West German increased from 23 billion USD in 1950 to 103 billion 
USD in 1964, with no serious inflation.”125  
It is also believed that one of the reasons leading to the German high rate 
in development was that for a long time Germany did not have to spend its budget 
on arms, so much of its capital was used to construct big plants with modern 
equipment. In West Germany a postponed development also took place, the 
                                           
123
 GARIOA (Government and Relief in Occupied Areas) was a program formed after 1945 by the 
U.S. which aimed to deliver emergency aid, notably food, to the occupied regions in order to 
lessen the starvation situation. 
124
 Facts about Germany, op.cit., p. 93. 
125
 Robin W. Winks and John E. Talbott, op.cit., p. 57. 
84 
 
introduction of already existing but not yet realized innovations, cars, electro- and 
electronic commodities like the fridge and the TV, overall a boost in the industries 
of the third wave. From 1945 to 1963 when the Berlin wall was constructed, 
millions of eastern Germans immigrated to the West hoping to find jobs and enjoy 
a better life. Adenauer’s Westpolitik led West Germany to integrate gradually into 
the Western club and was marked by German membership of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT in 1948, the ECSC in 1952, and WEU in 
1954, EEC and EURATOM in 1957 and so on. 
In the early 1950s, economic development in West Germany changed 
remarkably its position in the continent. However, in foreign policy-making, it 
was still restricted because it was still led by the allies as regulated in the 
“Frankfurt Documents.” For West Germany, this was not always easy to accept. 
However, being a defeated country and an occupied state, it had to follow any 
conditions offered by the allies to get as much support as possible. In other words, 
West Germany had to be humble and struggle gradually for its independence in 
diplomacy. Karl Kaiser in his book states that, “the context of Germany’s foreign 
policy of the 1950s was characterised by the three essential features: the 
environmental origins of this foreign policy; West Germany’s place in the 
structure of the international system and the ensuing patterns of interaction 
between German and international politics; and finally, the balance between gains 
and sacrifices, stability and instability…the Federal Republic was not a regime 
that created a foreign policy but a foreign policy that created a regime… and … 
Bonn’s foreign policy became an integrated part of the ‘policy of strength’ whose 
objectives  were identical with regards to East Germany and Eastern Europe: the 
collapse of Communist rule.”126 In exchange for its division West Germany was 
accepted to be full a member of Western club “through the multilateral integration 
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of their country in the transatlantic alliance with the U.S., Canada, and other West 
European powers.”127 
It is significant to add that after 1955 West Germany unofficially 
announced its theory in diplomatic policy, driven by the Hallstein Doctrine with 
its confirmation that the Federal Republic would not establish or maintain 
diplomatic relations with any state that recognized the GDR. It is commonly 
accepted that the most effective diplomatic success of West Germany in this 
period was that it established diplomatic relations with Moscow in 1955 even 
though this more or less violated the Hallstein Doctrine. All the same, Konrad 
Adenauer achieved much more than success in diplomacy itself by securing the 
release of the last 10,000 German prisoners of war and about 20,000 civilians.128  
Although the borders to West Germany were closed by the GDR in 1952, 
this could not prevent people from fleeing to West Germany. This was also the 
reason for the construction of the Berlin Wall, built by East Germany on 13 
August 1963 to impede the flood of refugees. The relations between the two states 
that this indicates changed gradually only after they signed the Basic Treaty in 
1972. This was the time when West Germany under Brandt's Ostpolitik was 
determined to abide by the concept of “two German States in one German Nation” 
while still remaining firmly anchored in the Atlantic alliance.  East German 
leaders also changed their outlook on their internal and international political 
view. As a result of the mutual recognition, both Germanies joined the UN 
equally in September 1973. 
Thus, the first decade or so after WW II was an important period for the 
German nation to cast off its dark past and overcome its faults. A new epoch in 
German history was started. It rooted itself by reintegrating into the future Europe. 
This period was seen as a self-division of the German nation due to the paradoxes 
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and contradiction in political and economic interests among the political traditions 
and divisions, which existed since WW I. So, Germany was not only passively 
divided by superpowers, it was actively split by a conflict which existed already 
since WW I. German division was not just a product of the Cold War, which was 
in fact no more than a catalysis which contributed to it, but also another division 
between Germans and Germans in the post-war time. One political faction, the 
former KPD, later the SED, sided with the SU, whereas the others (Social 
Democrats, Liberals, Conservatives and political Christians) chose other options. 
Ideas about the fundamental goals of societal organization became more important 
than the nation state. This was a fundamental difference to the Nazi period, when 
the nation and its expansion was the main goal of governmental politics. So, 
Germans demonstrated that there are more important political goals than the 
nation state. All changes in socio-economics and politics during this period would 
be crucial elements that caused different directions in each German state in terms 
of defining and promoting each state’s future in the following years. 
3.3. France after WW II 
3.3.1. Internal issues 
During WW II, Free France sided with the other allies including Britain, 
Northern European countries, the SU, the U.S. and China to resist the fascist axis, 
i.e., Germany, Italy, Japan and their allies.129 In the first phase of the war (1939-
1942) the fascist bloc successfully attacked and occupied most of the European 
territories. Britain and France declared war on Nazi Germany on 3 September 
1939. Then France set up a defense line called Maginot line. However, until May 
1940 there was no real battle in that region. Historians have called it a “phoney 
war”. When France was attacked by Nazi military forces, it was quickly defeated 
within a couple of weeks. As a result, the French government had to move 
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southwards. On 14 June 1940 the French capital, Paris was occupied by Nazi 
Germany. Marshal Pétain signed a ceasefire agreement with Nazi Germany and 
accepted the fact that France would be divided into parts.130 The very North came 
under control of the Military Commander for northern France and Belgium. The 
rest of the North came under direct military control. Italy occupied some smaller 
parts in the South East and the State of Vichy, Alsace-Lorraine, was occupied and 
annexed by Germany.  
On 10 July 1940, parliament deputies assembled in Vichy where Pétain 
was appointed chief of state and given all rights of leading the country. This 
government closely collaborated with Nazi Germany and launched many policies 
which were strongly opposed by many French people. These policies included 
forcing youths to be laborers in Germany, collaborating in deporting Jews to death 
camps, firing communists and fighting the French working class movement. They 
also changed some principles of the republic such as “Liberty – Equality – 
Fraternity” into “Labor – Family – Fatherland.” Vichy France was also a result of 
the deep political conflicts in France before 1940 between the Front Populaire and 
the political right. 
Actually, Nazi Germany had all rights in controlling the whole of France 
by occupying the remaining southern part of France from November 1942. During 
this period, many patriotic resistance forces were formed. Even so, at the 
beginning, resistance in France was rather weak. It only became stronger when the 
likelihood of German defeat became more obvious. One of the key figures of 
those resistant movements, General de Gaulle escaped to London in June 1940. 
There he called for gathering all internal and external forces to resist against Nazi 
Germany. In order to build a common front, he decided to form a “Free France” 
force and supported the allies in the struggle against fascism. In France, many 
resistance movements were raised under the influence of various political 
ideologies, such as communist, socialist, nationalism-oriented right wing, etc. In 
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1942, all the forces combined to form the National Resistance Committee led by 
Jean Moulin.131 The committee had contacts with overseas forces led by de 
Gaulle. From the fall of 1942 to September 1945, the allied forces turned to 
counter attack and rapidly won on many battlefields. Italian fascist leader 
Mussolini was brought down in September 1943. On 2 June 1944, French 
resistance forces formed a provisional government governed by General Charles 
de Gaulle with its capital in Algeria. The government was assembled by 
representatives of all resistance forces including communists. On 6 June 1944, the 
allied troops landed in Normandy and on 25 August 1944, Paris was liberated. 
Despite being a victor in WW I, France had had to deal with huge losses in 
both property and human resources that made it weaker in the years following. 
Although a lot of reforms were conducted by the government of the People’s 
Popular Front in the 1930s, it failed to rebuild an image of the great French 
empire. This was proved by their quick and shameful defeat by Nazi Germany in 
June 1940. The Vichy government’s policy in collaborating with the enemy 
irritated many French people and forced them to form Free France forces outside 
French territory and resistance groups on French soil. France was finally liberated 
by the allies almost at the end of WW II in 1944. Ironically, France was not seen 
as a power which had stood in the anti-Hitler front because France had let 
Indochina, the French colonial pride fall into the Japanese defense system in 1940. 
France’s shameful concessions in giving up French Indochina to the Japanese 
fascists seriously challenged the prestige of France. This was definitely 
considered a contrary act to the common cause of the allies.132  
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There were serious problems that France had to deal with right after WW 
II. The most severe issue was that the whole country was badly ruined and “the 
economic situation of France was disastrous. The country had suffered 
enormously during the war. And that France’s material losses from physical 
destruction and spoliation were 4,895 billion francs (1945).”133 Moreover, French 
infrastructure was also totally in ruin, having suffered from heavy bombing during 
the war, in which “several cities were badly damaged… the extent of damage the 
French War Damage Commission estimated the bill as costing France 45% of its 
total wealth.”134 Industrial productivity was three times lower and agricultural 
productivity was two times lower compared to the period of time before the war. 
From 1945 to 1950, the French economy recovered very slowly mainly because of 
expenses for the war in Indochina. Under the umbrella of the Marshall Plan, from 
1948 to 1952, France received 3.1 billion US dollars.135 Therefore, French 
economic recovery became faster after 1950, as shown by its increased GNP in 
the period of 1950 – 1955 it was 4.3%; during the period of 1955 – 1960 it was 
4.6%.136  
After WW II, the provisional government carried out a series of policies 
aiming to stabilize the country. These included punishing the collaborators and 
war criminals. Also, the provisional government introduced many reforms, 
including women’s suffrage, a social security system, reform of the constitution, 
nationalization of key industries and of the property of collaborators, and as early 
as 1945 it held elections to the national assembly. A new parliament was formed 
with the inclusion of all political groups. As a result, a new cabinet was 
established in November 1945 governed by General de Gaulle. Representatives of 
the socialists, communists and other political groups joined this government. Not 
only did the newly liberated France under the leadership of the various 
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governments of the Fourth Republic have to contend with difficulties in the 
economy and psychology, but it also had to deal with much social instability.137 
These issues obviously influenced many French policies towards its colonial 
territories in Indochina and Algeria which soon had a backlash effect, threatened, 
and even brought down the Fourth Republic.  
Socialist and communist forces had a great influence on the French 
political stage after WW II. In the parliamentary election held in October 1945, 
the communists came out as the winners with more than five million votes. After 
the elections of October 1945, de Gaulle reformed his government. This period 
was known as the “government of national unity” in the history of France. The 
cabinet contained five Communists, five Socialists, five members of the Popular 
Republican Movement (MRP), three of the Democratic and Social Union of the 
Ressistance (UDSR) and one Radical-Socialist.138  
The new government provided a space for the two working class parties, 
i.e., the communists and socialists to form a democratic government. The right-
wing leaders inside the socialist party rejected a coalition with the communists to 
form a united government. But the communist influence did not last long when 
the French prime minister blamed the communists for destroying solidarity and 
the communist ministers were expelled from the cabinet in May 1947. However, 
the main factor leading to the absence of the communists in the French cabinet 
was another matter. It can be argued that the participation of the five communist 
ministers in the cabinet actually prevented the capitalists from carrying out their 
plans in managing the economy. After this, the communist force lost many 
chances to regain their power and influence in France’s political and economic 
movements.139  
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The referendum in October 1946 on the new consitution paved the way for 
the formation of the Fourth Republic, which lasted from 1947 to 1958. The 
constitution of the new republic prescribed a more progressive form of rule which 
would limit presidential power compared to that of position before the war. It also 
confirmed the right to work of every citizen, the right to establish trade unions and 
freedom of demonstration. Last but not least, workers’ rights in controlling 
enterprises were also mentioned. These moves might have created many 
possibilities to carry out economic and social reforms in the regime of the new 
republic. However, in January 1946 de Gaulle resigned due to different arguments 
among his party and others on France’s political and economic issues. 
From 1947 France started to rebuild with the financial support from the 
Marshall Plan. The main aims were to nationalize important enterprises, set up 
some committees protecting workers’ rights and ensure social insurance. In the 
meantime, the Cold War emerged and influenced the ideologies of all political 
parties. It is important to mention here that France between 1945 and 1947 had 
two national assemblies and two proposals for a new constitution. It is also a 
common hypothesis that the constitution of the Fourth Republic was a 
misconstruction, especially because of the overextension of the balance of power 
in favor of the legislative. The Fourth Republic had a weak executive branch. 
Thus, the structure of parliament was difficult to operate. General de Gaulle 
stepped down because he understood that the constitution was a misconception. 
Moreover, rapidly changing cabinets led to an unstable situation in the economy 
and society. At the same time, France had to cope with the resistance movements 
waged in colonial territories, of which Indochina served as one the most 
interesting cases. 
The Dien Bien Phu battle and its downfall in May 1954 did not prevent 
France from beginning a further military adventure in Algeria where the colonized 
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people were strongly provoked by the victory of the Vietminh. Finally, in 1962, 
after another eight years of violence and negotiations, France had to grant 
independence to the colonized Algerian people led by the National Liberation 
Front (FLN). However, compared to Indochina, French extraction from Algeria 
was more difficult. The collapse of the French empire in the 1950s and 1960s – 
the decolonization – had a huge impact on French politics and the entire society 
was profoundly influenced. France’s experiences in the colonial rule over African 
and Asian countries for more than hundred years taught it numerous lessons. 
These have been drawn mainly by French intellectuals who have made France the 
center of European philosophy again.  
Traditionally, the French political leaders, who had long been convinced 
by the legitimacy of their empire, believed that the West had to undertake the task 
of educating the “backward natives”. In the 1960s, with “the wind of change” 
spreading over former European colonies and regardless of how actively French 
intellectuals played their role in French political life, most of them started to 
believe that France needed to redefine its national identity and international role. 
This could be done only by reassessingn the country’s traditional ideologies. By 
accepting the ironic fact that French decolonization was considered a defeat, 
French intellectuals tried to help minimize this unpleasant result.140  
Two decades of post-war France witnessed many interesting 
developments. The economic boom in the 1950s and early 1960s made France 
one of the most developed capitalist countries in the world. De Gaulle’s economic 
policy was to allow capitalism to speed up the reform of the existing production 
apparatus. This resulted in the rapid increase of the number of workers working in 
the industrial sectors. However, workers had to work very intensively with an 
average of forty-six hours per week, while their wages did not reflect this level of 
commitment. Workers started feeling that they were being cheated. In line with 
the increasing number of workers, French youth from lower backgrounds to upper 
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classes had the opportunity to enter university. This new generation rejected the 
moral order of Gaullist society. At that time, various far left groups appeared. 
Nevertheless, the hesitation of the French Communist Party in backing the 
Algerian people split them from the politicized students.141 
Similar to what was happening in West Germany at the same time, French 
society and political life changed remarkably in the year 1967/68 notable by the 
large number of strikes and demonstrations. Triggered by workers and students, 
those movements then spread out the entire country. Many factories and 
universities such as Rhodia in Besançon and some others in Caen, Lyon and Paris 
were occupied. In the course of the two years, demonstrators confronted the police 
and were suppressed. Student strikes broke out from early May 1968. This was 
because of their feelings of dissatisfaction with the existing bureaucracy system 
which controlled the university’s funding, added to by the situation of class 
discrimination in French society. Interestingly, similar to the situation in West 
Germany, demonstrations were also provoked by a spirit of solidarity with the 
National Front for the Liberation of the South of Vietnam (the Vietcong) against 
the American intervention, especially after the Tet Offensive.142 Although the 
student movements were reluctantly supported by the French communists, they 
received more backing from outside – for example from American artists.  
Student demonstrations were later joined by millions of workers who were 
pursuing their own political agenda: to demand de Gaulle’s resignation, to dismiss 
the current government and even to run the factories by themselves. Negotiations 
between the administrators of universities and government and demonstrators 
failed because they could not find common interests. Therefore, demonstrations 
and strikes escalated in the following days. This context produced a chaotic 
situation between different political groups like the Socialists, Communists and 
the Gaullists. A new government, if formed by Pierre Mendès France, might 
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include the presence of the communists. This meant that more than twenty years 
after being kicked out of the government, the communists would have a chance to 
re-emerge within the new would-be government. 
During the crisis, de Gaulle, founder and president of the Fifth Republic 
chose to solve unexpectedly the problem. On 29 May 1968, he disappeared from 
his office without notification and fled to a French military base in Germany 
seeking consultation with General Jacques Massu who successfully convinced 
him to return to France to deal with the situation. The situation was then 
surprisingly settled. Workers returned to the factories, students went back to the 
universities when they were reopened. The Union of Democrats for the Republic 
(the Gaullists) finally won the legislative elections in June 1968.143  
To conclude, French decolonization in Indochina strongly shook the 
empire. The Algerian war broke out immediately after that and its outcome 
officially put an end to the French imperial course. The decolonization process 
affected not only the political elites, but also had a profound impact on French 
intellectuals. A series of debates on the inter-relations of the colonial influences 
on the colonized in general took place both in speeach and writing by French 
intellectuals forming what historians call “postcolonial theory”. This explanation 
has helped to answer questions on developments in France, West Germany and 
elsewhere in Western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s. The events of May 1968 in 
France with the participation of different political groups including the non-
orthodox left or non-Marxists and non-communists have been considered a 
catalyst for the appearance of a new political generation in French society. Those 
developments in France in the 1960s forced French philosophers and elites to 
rethink the French international position or French universalism in the new 
context of postcolonial supranational cooperation. 
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3.3.2. France’s foreign policy 
France’s foreign policy in the post-war period aimed to rescue by any 
means possible its imperial prestige. This seemed difficult for France because it 
had at once to solve post-war French political and economic problems both inside 
the country and in its colonial territories. Additionally, the cost of maintaining the 
army at the level of her ambitions was somewhat beyond French capacity. One of 
the key French foreign policies in the decade after WW II was to request 
controlover the area of Saar in order to master, or at least to balance German 
economic development.144 Therefore, it was France who proposed to establish the 
ECSC by which it could control and exploit Germany’s natural coal mines.  
With regards to its traditional enemy Germany, France had to find 
effective ways to subdue it. This was made clear by what French representatives 
said at the Moscow Conference on 17 January 1947, “that the Rhineland be 
separated from Germany and internationalized; that the industrial potential of the 
Ruhr be put under international control, as later appeared at the conference, that 
the Ruhr itself be detached from Germany; that the Saar mines be made the 
property of France and that the territory be included in the French customs and 
financial system; that Germany be organized on a federal basis, as a union of 
existing Länder; and especially that full economic advantage be derived from the 
German economy, both by exacting reparations and by providing the guarantee of 
a steady supply of German coal.”145 Obviously, this proposal was strongly 
supported by the French communists as by doing this France aimed to achieve 
two objectives, the first of which was to achieve its own secure, and the second to 
restrict and exploit mines in this area. However, France finally failed to do this 
successfully.146 
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Post-war France also witnessed the foundation of the French Fifth 
Republic in 1958 which was born in a different context from previous republics. 
This is because it was founded not by a revolution or foreign aggressors or civil 
war, but by the impacts of decolonization.147 In the French Fifth Republic, central 
authorities were handed over to the President.148 Charles de Gaulle was invited to 
head the government and establish a new republic. He was also the statesman who 
formulated the direction of France’s foreign policy thereafter. During the first 
period of his presidency, Charles de Gaulle decided to maintain the French 
colonies and he himself as a French president was one of the two architects of the 
Franco-German reconciliation and partnership in the early 1960s. Under his 
leadership many regional and international problems were successfully solved, 
notably Franco-German reconciliation emerged as a priority of de Gaulle 
government. The Paris-Bonn axis became a motor for continental integration 
thereafter. 
It is also necessary to add that during this period de Gaulle’s policy tended 
to be separate from the U.S., as Franco-American relations had been damaged by 
their cooperation in solving international problems, of which the Indochina War 
serves as a striking example. Moreover, in the 1950s and 1960s France advocated 
building an independent Europe, through which American influence would be 
gradually lessened. However, the EDC was not a successful model for the 
European military integration effort. Having failed to build a common defense 
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with European partners, France sought stronger economic cooperation and the 
ECSC was actually a good example of that.  
After WW II, the hotly-debated topic in French politics was the country’s 
position on the world stage. It is commonly agreed that France was indeed not as 
great as a victor compared to the U.S. or the SU. In general, after the war, France 
had to deal with two main problems that made it no more an image of Frenchness. 
These were: France’s collaboration with Nazi Germany; and the decolonization 
process with the mass loss of its colonial territories in Indochina in 1954, 
Morocco in 1955, Tunisia in 1956 and Algeria in 1962. Post-war France was 
forced to psychologically re-consider who and what it was and should be. For a 
long time after the war France attempted to regain its prestige as a great empire as 
it had been. To answer these questions France had to settle its unstable political 
atmosphere and adjust its diplomatic strategies. It cannot be said that France was 
always successful in this, however. They also drove the de Gaulle government to 
re-define its relations with the U.S. and its neighboring country Germany as we 
have seen. 
 French decolonization and other influential events on the continent as well 
as outside it, such as the Suez crisis urged leaders of the Fourth Republic to rescue 
its images as a great country. They also realized that the Americans at that time 
were concentrating more on the European stage in the context of the Cold War, 
notably on Germany, as it held their core interests. France had to seek solutions to 
“the way of political and economic recovery, straining economic and fiscal 
resources to the limit and causing domestic turmoil; and it damaged France’s 
international image because of the organized brutality that accompanied French 
attempts to retain control over the colonial territories.”149  
3.3.3. French dilemma in Europe and in Indochina 
One of the French security concerns after the wartime was how to control 
Germany, alongside the problem of what to do to regain prestige in colonial 
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territories. Indochina was considered a symbol to rescue its traditional empire. 
This explains why soon after WW II, France decided to return to this former 
colonial possession. Nonetheless, in a new condition, the Indochinese people 
hampered French ambition by declaring its resistance against France on 19 
December 1946. In the first half of the Franco-Viet Minh war, France had to 
manage alone in the battle, as the U.S. did not clearly show its interest in the 
region. After 1950 and the outbreak of the Korean War, the Americans intervened 
directly in the Indochina War with financial assistance to France.150 
As a result of the emerging Cold War and hot war in the Korean Peninsula, 
West Germany was urged to rearm. The idea of German rearmament caused huge 
debates among European countries in which France found it the most disturbed. 
This explains why France proposed a common defense plan among West 
European allies with the hope of mastering a potential German army. The U.S. 
strongly advocated this plan as they believed that such a European defense 
structure managed by Europe could lower the defense burden of the U.S. in the 
continent. French-American relations in the meantime were influenced 
significantly by the EDC project and the Franco-Vietminh conflict in Indochina. 
For the U.S., there was a close connection between Indochina and the EDC 
project and that connection was directly linked with each other. In fact, that 
relationship was a logical outcome of the internationalized Asian conflicts. 
However, the Eisenhower administration was faced with a paradox in 
implementing foreign policies because the U.S. simultaneously wanted Paris to 
continue the war in Indochina and to be an active member of the EDC project. 
This is explained by Evelyn Colbert in the author’s work: “the U.S., its own 
strength engaged in Korea, was increasingly apprehensive about Asian 
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vulnerabilities and more anxious than ever that the French stay the course in 
Indochina. But because Europe also seemed vulnerable, its defense too required 
increased resources, and a German military contribution now seemed 
inevitable.”151 This placed France in a great dilemma. Many deputies in the 
French parliament suggested that only a victory in Indochina could help France 
have a high position within the EDC, meaning, France could control Germany as 
it desired. They even believed that their victory in Indochina would be 
symmetrical to German remilitarization. Therefore, France needed to gain a 
victory in Indochina in order to impose its points of view on the EDC profile. Yet 
the question was how France could do this, if it did not reduce its troops in 
France? As a matter of fact, by doing this France’s Western allies would suppose 
that France had violated its pledges to maintain a strong military force in Europe. 
The problem now for France was whether it should focus on Europe or the world? 
In other words, between the Elbe River and the Red River which was more 
important in French strategies in the post-war period? 
Being aware of the country’s lower military ranking after WW II, French 
leaders were driven at an early point to entreat help from the allies for the purpose 
of coping with the battles in Indochina. Yet at the beginning of the Cold War 
when Western Europe carried out its defense plan within the framework of the 
Brussels treaty (signed in 1948) and Atlantic ally (NATO in 1949), France 
seemed separated by undertaking strategic missions in South-east Asia and 
Western Europe. Western Europe’s challenging problem was how to persuade 
America, the most powerful ally, to offer help and only one method could solve 
this problem, which was “to sell Indochina down the river”. To achieve that goal, 
from 1948 to early 1950, France made every effort in diplomacy. After this, the 
Indochina battle was regarded as a crucial element in the free world’s strategy to 
protect the rest of the world from the communist expansion. In other words, a 
traditional colonial conflict was declared to be a part of the defense of the free 
world. 
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However, if America’s support reached a certain level, the global 
community, most notably China would have a drastic reaction. De Latre de 
Tassigny152 once shared his ideas with his counterparts at the Pentagon on the 
Indochina issue. These were if Indochina fell into the communists’ hands the rest 
of Asia and then Suez would be lost. René Pleven also speculated that if more 
troops were sent to Indochina the European internal defense would be greatly 
influenced. He would prefer to use American aid to pursue the European defense 
mission.153 Yet his arguments were strongly opposed by Georges Bidault, who 
constantly saw Indochina as “an active European member.” He even went further 
when describing the battle in Tonkin as a part of the French defense contribution 
on the Rhine River as well as the Atlantic community. 
The U.S. and the other countries in NATO demanded that France increase 
both its military and economic contribution to NATO for the purpose of 
protecting Europe from communist expansion (officially alarmed by the outbreak 
of the Korean War). However, France could not fullfil the task due to its post-war 
economic crisis and the fact that most of France’s military forces were stationed 
in North Africa and Indochina. Therefore, “in 1953, the government finally 
accepted that it could no longer afford the Indochina War in light of its 
commitments in Europe and, increasingly, in North Africa.”154 France also 
demanded that the U.S. recognize the conflict in Indochina as a resistance against 
the communist threat in South-east Asia. They also suggested that their 
contribution had to be seen as the French share in the free world’s efforts to 
prevent communist expansion all over the world. Based on such arguments France 
had reasons to restrict military contribution to NATO and requested American 
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financial support. In fact, “the Americans, French and British had decided that in 
1952-1954 the German contribution would have to be increased to 12 or 13 billion 
marks – that is, after deductions for occupation expenses, about 7 billion marks 
for the EDC. At that time the French budget amounted to 950 billion francs. If 
deductions are made for the funds required for the Indochina War and for 
overseas and domestic forces, only 290 billion francs at most remained for EDC, 
accounting to 3.5 billion marks.”155 It was finally estimated that the “French 
expenditure between 1947 and 1954… was roughly equivalent to the amount of 
Marshall Plan and military aid the French received from Washington.”156 
Furthermore, in 1950, a law restricting the use of draftees to French 
homeland territories was passed by the French parliament. This meant that the law 
itself limited the number of French troops within the country and obviously in 
Indochina and North Africa as well as its occupational zones in Germany and 
Austria. There were no options for France rather than to recruit troops who had 
other nationalities of Germany, Morocco, Poland, etc. This consequently 
strengthened the French military on the one hand, but caused a burden in terms of 
finance on the other. This is because France had to use the national budget to pay 
for the recruitment, training and maintenance of the foreign legion abroad. As a 
matter of fact, “France would not or could not go ahead in Europe while its 
expenses in manpower and money were so heavy in Indochina... if France 
fulfilled her part of the unwritten bargain and approved the EDC, would its 
concern for the new German military presence on the continent, dispite 
safeguards, instil such fears that neither the European nor the Asian efforts would 
be maintained?”157  
Now the answer was clear that France had to make a clear-cut settlement 
on the Indochina battle. Evidently, the French commitment in Indochina made it 
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confused about how to deal with the problem of German rearmament because “the 
thinner the French forces in Europe, the less likely that France would accept a 
German force under any auspices.”158 Even French Minister of Defense René 
Pleven, a strong supporter of both the EDC project and the Indochina effort, did 
not believe a victory in the Indochina battle could prevent the approaching 
German rearmament. This was shown when he told Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles that the dissipation of French forces in Vietnam “is causing the greatest 
concern about the EDC …, even if we succeed in the end, all it means is that we 
will get out.”159  
But what France did not realize was that the U.S was playing a two-sided 
game with France. On the one hand, the U.S. promised to side with France in the 
course of the on-going EDC plan and NATO as a security protection against West 
Germany as well as the SU. On the other hand, the Eisenhower administration 
threatened to cease its aid program if France opposed a common Western defense 
system in which West Germany would be an equal partner. In contrast, France 
also considered the EDC project a card to play with the U.S. because the U.S. kept 
on urging French parliament to ratify that project and Paris made a clear condition 
of no aid, no ratification.160  
Even if the EDC plan was resolved, in French military leaders’ minds, the 
German contribution to the defense of Europe could not be allowed to outweigh 
that of the French. However, France could no longer dominate on the issue of 
German rearmament within the framework of European security. This is 
illustrated by the fact that the French military had a presence at once in Indochina, 
Algeria and Europe. The French military dilemma is precisely what Evelyn 
Colbert delineates: “General de Lattre’s demand for reinforcements pointed up the 
French dilemma: to send conscripts to Indochina was not politically feasible; to 
take troops from Europe would reduce the French contribution to NATO; to take 
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them from Africa – as it was decided to do – would weaken the French hold 
there.”161  
From 1952, France received NATO’s assurance that it would support 
France in the war against communist expansion in Asia. Despite this, France 
shifted its attitudes towards Indochina as it foresaw that France would not be able 
to win on the Indochinese battlefield. It would be more reasonable and pragmatic 
for France to return to Europe where German military prominence might be 
restored. If France wanted to maintain its military superiority over a rearmed 
Germany it had to do so. Otherwise, a new Bundeswehr would replace the French 
contribution to the European defense framework. 
Although the EDC plan was not ratified by the French parliament in 
August 1954, this did not mean that France succeeded in preventing West 
Germany from rearmament. Additionally, from 1950 the world context had 
changed rapidly, benefiting West Germany and France could not control this. 
Paris had pledged to provide 24 divisions to NATO but finally could muster only 
three divisions in West Germany and six in France. The problem for France at this 
time was “the flower of the French army was dying in Indochina.”162  As a result, 
“German rearmament thus seemed to promise substantial savings for France and, 
above all, to strengthen a forward NATO strategy in which not France but 
Germany would stand on the first line of defense.”163  
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As analyzed, France had to face dilemmas both in economic and military 
fields in the two different continents. Historians have asked whether or not French 
predicaments produced any chance for West Germany to rise up in Europe after 
WW II. The EDC card could not help France control West German rearmament. 
Actually, the fate of the EDC plan was not the failure of the West German 
rearmament project. Under the umbrella of the U.S., West Germany was rearmed 
and joined the Atlantic Alliance club in 1955. West German membership of 
NATO and its economic development created a new regional order which was not 
at all pleasant for France. 
After being defeated at Dien Bien Phu, France bitterly realized that the 
Americans were hesitating to assist France on the battlefield because they wanted 
to replace France in Indochina.164 In the new climate of international politics, the 
U.S. had to re-evaluate its global containment. Together with the maintenance of 
security strategies in Europe, U.S. policy-makers also realized the increasing 
importance of Indochina. From what they had experienced in Korea, they feared 
that if they engaged more intensively to assist the French at Dien Bien Phu, the 
Chinese communists would also directly intervene. More importantly, the U.S. 
foresaw that the failure of Dien Bien Phu was inevitable.  
The hope of rescuing French prestige by regaining Indochina was no 
longer realistic. The best option for France was to come back to Europe to 
concentrate on its internal issues resulting from the “dirty war” in Indochina, such 
as tens of thousands of French’ deaths in the war, domestic problems including 
social changes, the new social movement of women and other social groups. 
French public opinion became more impatient with the “dirty war” in Indochina. 
At the same time, some French newspapers, intellectuals, individuals and trade 
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unions increasingly expressed their attitudes asking the French government to end 
the colonial war.165 
Moreover, the need to reconstruct Western Europe demanded France's 
highest effort as a leading country. European reconstruction and integration would 
improve the French image and relations with other European nations.166 If not, 
France would be a stranger in its own land of Europe compared, next to Germany 
when it had marvellously recovered and would really be a new potential power 
after the war. France’s former policies towards its colonial possessions and 
Germany were outmoded. Only European integration would profit the continent in 
general and France in particular. To achieve this aim France had to collaborate 
with its neighboring country of Germany which now gradually became stronger 
under the premiership of Dr. Konrad Adenauer. Therefore, a Franco-German 
rapprochement would be the most suitable move for both in solving their 
contradictions in the past as well as calming down the tensions of the Cold War in 
the continent. Finally, European integration was a great and equal playground for 
all members to achieve common objectives.  
3.3.4. Relations between Germany and France after WW II 
It is commonly accepted that Germany and France have a long common 
history, both being heirs of the Frankish Empire. But while France became a 
territorial state already in early modern times, it was not until 1871 that a so-
called German Empire emerged which then assembled only a part of the German- 
speaking population of Europe. The further development of the two nations was 
deeply influenced by the way in which the German Empire of 1871 was 
established –as result of a humiliating defeat of the until then leading power on 
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the European continent, France. The burden for the future became even heavier, 
as after the war of 1870-1871, a large square of French territory was annexed by 
the German Empire, Alsace-Lorraine. Simultaneously, France had to pay the sum 
of five billion marks for reparations.  
First World War was first and foremost a war between Germany and 
France and their allies. In the war, France was the winner but it had to pay a very 
high price: huge loss of human life, main provinces severely destroyed, war 
expenses reaching up to more than two hundred billion francs. France asked for 
huge compensations and enforced significant ones. It can be concluded that 
France suffered more from the casualties than of the lack of prestige. Regarding 
the latter it was rather overestimated.167 
After having been easily defeated by the Germans in 1940 in WW II, half 
of French territory was occupied by Nazi Germany. As a result, the Third 
Republic collapsed, and French nation and identity were divided when the Pétain 
government speedily surrendered and collaborated with Nazi Germany. Charles 
de Gaulle then had to form a resistance government in Britain. The French image 
and prestige were damaged again after this. As a result, French colonial territories 
were threatened and narrowed. France was definitely not a powerful ally in the 
course of the war against fascists. In a word, within seventy years France had been 
invaded three times by Germany. Therefore, many in France and Germany were 
used to seeing each other as eternal enemies. The relations between the two 
nations were discordant due to the nature of their past conflicts in Europe. 
For France, learning from the past, Germany was still seen as one of the 
first security threats. Were there any tendencies towards revenge for what the 
Third Reich had carried out? In spite of differences in relations between France 
and Germany, the two countries had similarities in the post-war period. They had 
the same feeling of shame. Some Germans felt guilty for what happened in the 
two world wars in Europe especially in WW II, fired and driven by Hitler’s crazy 
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ambitions. Others saw themselves as victims; many were paralyzed, however. 
France was easily defeated by Germany and surrendered shamefully in summer 
1940. As stated above, the Vichy government even publicly collaborated with 
Nazi Germany until France was liberated when Charles de Gaulle followed by the 
allies approached Paris in 1944.  
Another similarity was the ambition to rescue each country’s power and 
image within the continent and on the world stage as well. Pursuing that goal 
required both states accept the grants offered by  the U.S. under the umbrella of 
the Marshall Plan from which West Germany received 1.4 billion and France 
received 3.1 billion US dollars from 1948 to 1952 to aid the recovery of each 
country.168 Germany gradually recovered and confirmed its close relationship with 
the Western allies led by the U.S. In addition, the governments of the nations after 
the war individually tried to pursue their own objectives and achieve them in 
different ways.  
Besides, there actually existed a French hostility to the Germans, as the 
French had experienced in their historical relations with their neighboring 
country. Consequently, France particularly after 1871 wanted never to see a 
strong Germany because it had been a visible threat to French and European 
security. So, a divided Germany after the war was absolutely agreeable with the 
French purpose. This also explains why France strongly advocated the 
establishment of the two Germanies in 1949. France realized that the possible 
threat of communization could harm the whole of Germany. Furthermore, the 
establishment of a West German state could thus serve as a barrier protecting 
France from such a security threat.  
France thus attempted to pursue its aim in preventing fascism in general 
and a resurgent Germany in particularly. To achieve these aims, French politicians 
believed that the Rhineland region must be separated from Germany. Another 
French requirement was to put an international trusteeship on the Ruhr region 
with the hope of exploiting its coal to meet French economic demands. Excessive 
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French claims on Germany can be claimed as  France saw that “Germany should 
be exploited economically for the benefit of its neighbors, by exacting reparations, 
controlling the distribution of its coal and steel, and maintaining a low ceiling on 
its industrial production; that by a thorough process of demilitarisation and 
denazification, Germany should be made incapable of menacing its neighbours; 
and that Germany should be re-educated and re-organized as a democratic, federal 
state.”169 It is clear that initial French policies towards post-war Germany were so 
strict as to prevent any potential revenge on ther part of Germany. On the 
contrary, it is also understandable that a new Germany could not exert over the 
country with aggressive governments as it had done before. 
Although France made every effort to implement its foreign policy, not 
everything was successfully achieved. In this case, rapid changes in the European 
continent and in the world after WW II restricted France’s ability to contain West 
Germany. Particularly in the context of the Cold War, West Germany became the 
centre of the conflict between the two blocs, one led by the SU and the other led 
by the U.S. Considered a dam or a frontier in Europe to limit, or at least to curb 
the communist expansion on the continent, West Germany was strongly backed 
by the U.S. and other Western allies in economic recovery and then rearmament. 
It would be wiser for France to incorporate with Germany to deal with the 
problem of West German rearmament. The EDC project proved a simple example 
of this, as on 24 October 1950, the French prime minister proposed the plan, 
firstly aiming to satisfy Americans, “and to much lesser degree German, pressure 
for German rearmament, and the call from members of the Council of Europe for 
the extension of European integration to the sphere of European defense.”170 If 
this project went forwards its operation would likely be the same as the model of 
the ECSC proposed by France itself one year before. This meant that the EDC 
project would be a way to rearm West Germany but the process would be 
controlled by a supra-national structure under which France could still master 
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West German military forces. As a result, the French government was reluctant to 
allow West Germany to rearm.  
One of the most significant successes in Franco-German relations in post-
war Europe was in economic cooperation. From the early 1950s, economic 
relations between France and West Germany improved remarkably. This move 
pushed the two countries closer together and helped the European integration 
process proceed faster and more effectively. Many researchers in European 
studies agreed that the ECSC proposed by Robert Schuman, the French Foreign 
Minister, was the first crucial step towards European integration. His famous 
declaration in May 1950 marked the historical reconciliation of France and 
Germany. In the end, the understanding and reconciliation between France and 
Germany during this time actually ended the Franco-German hostility once and 
for all and would lead to “a Europe organized in democracy, liberty and peace.”171  
To summarize, both France and Germany shared a common sense after 
WW II, e.g., having been severely ruined and experienced moral shame during 
wartime. They both followed their own objectives in restoring their own images in 
a new world order. While France searched again for the position of a great 
colonial empire, the West German political elites seemed more pragmatic in tying 
the Federal Republic to the Western world where most state members refused to 
continue the old-fashion model of colonization. However, orientation to the West 
was also a process of political debate and France learnt the lesson that colonialism 
had no future. The German elites learnt that the only chance for West Germany 
wasto follow the Western, democratic model of societal development. Adenauer 
and his allies brought the idea forwards. Both processes of modernization in 
France and West Germany occurred at the same time and were interrelated.  
Although France proposed and in fact implemented many strict policies 
towards Germany after WW II, it finally had to recognize Germany’s special geo-
political position in Europe in the context of the emerging Cold War. Another 
reason which might lead to the reconciliation of the two nations was the weakness 
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of France’s economy due to the financial burden being spent on the war in 
Indochina. France considered the Franco-German rapprochement simply in its 
political perspective. However, the economic aim could be also seen as one of 
France’s motives in reconciliation with Germany.  
The policies of the allies implemented in the four German occupational 
zones were the reasons to form the two states of Germany and to shape their 
policies in the following years. A series of emerging events inside and outside 
Europe related to the Cold War conflict, such as the Berlin blockade, the Korean 
War, the Indochina War, the Soviet expansion, etc., forced France to reform its 
foreign relations with other countries. In the early 1950s, the relations between 
these two nations renewed firstly by the ECSC project and then the EDC plan 
became much warmer as they each sought to find mutual benefits. French 
dilemmas in Europe and Indochina could be seen as a chance for West Germany 
to regain German power both in the economy and military. These developments 
were proved by West German memberships in the ECSC in 1951 and NATO in 
1955. Finally, the Élysée Treaty signed on 22 January 1963 officially ended the 
status of enmity and opened a new era in relations between the two European 
nations. 
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CHAPTER 4  
THE ATTITUDES OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY  
TOWARDS THE FIRST INDOCHINA WAR 
4.1. The diplomatic relations between the FRG and Indochina172 
During the first Indochina War, West Germany was undecided as to 
whether to be an “observer” or “actor”. After the fall of the Third Reich, Germany 
was an occupied land controlled by victorious powers. In such a situation, 
Indochina apparently did not hold any vital interest for West Germany during its 
formative period (1945-1949). After its establishment in 1949, West Germany had 
to focus on its own domestic affairs. The only problem of the Germans in the FFL 
in Indochina would then be a huge public topic in the early 1950s. In Adenauer’s 
eyes173 Indochina was seen as a hotbed fired by the SU, and in certain ways, the 
outcomes of the first Indochina War might have decided the fate of the EDC plan 
as it was determined in August 1954 following the event of Dien Bien Phu. 
Geopolitically, West Germany did not have any direct political interest in 
Indochina other than economic and cultural interests. If there were any, they 
would appear in the following years. Furthermore, the problem of colonies was 
not an important issue for West Germany after the end of WW I.174 One of the 
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factors that caused West Germany to observe the situation in Indochina was its 
neighboring and former enemy country of France, with its military and economic 
engagement in its colonial possession in Indochina.  
However, West Germany’s concern with Indochina rose steadily and 
reached at its peak with the Geneva Conference in 1954. This might be explained 
by the fact that the world’s new political atmosphere had an influence on West 
Germany. In this context, the future of Indochina or Vietnam might also be 
decided by superpowers. West German analysts speculated on whether Vietnam 
would be another image of Germany. This speculation proved correct, as both 
Vietnam and Germany were divided into two halves. Accordingly, the attitudes of 
decisive participants at the Geneva Conference towards Indochina and the 
outcomes of that conference were to be seriously observed and analyzed. This is 
because they might help West Germany to re-define its own position in the new 
world’s political scenario. 
According to the Potsdam Agreement, Germany was occupied and 
controlled by four great powers. From the Stunde Null until 1949, the two 
Germanies experienced many historical upheavals leading to the establishment of 
two German states. Until 1955 the Federal Republic was not be able to enjoy the 
full right to establish diplomatic ties with any foreign countries. Instead, this was 
completely supervised by the Allied High Commission. This meant West 
Germany could not have any direct diplomatic ties with Indochina, while still 
belonged to the French Association. Therefore, upto 1954, if West Germany 
wished to set up diplomatic relations with any of the Indochinese states, it had to 
consult France as their “mother country”. This kind of principal would be 
abolished when France had to withdraw its military troops according to the 
Geneva Agreement. 
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On 13 March 1951, West Germany recognized Bao Dai’s non-communist 
government backed by the French and the Americans.175 This move could be seen 
to prove West Germany’s ambition to moderately pursue independent foreign 
policy with an eye to a further strategy: that West Germany would be soon 
recognized internationally. In 1953, the State of Vietnam requested a discussion 
about trade agreement and exchange in Bonn and Paris with official 
representatives. Nevertheless, the federal government reacted to this with 
hesitation.176 This gesture implies that in 1953, the fate of France in Indochina 
was not completely finalized. West Germany needed more time to observe what 
would happen next in Indochina and to watch out the American actions.  
From May 1950, although the Americans supported Bao Dai both 
financially and militarily on the one hand, they still remained skeptical about the 
credit and stability of Bao Dai’s French-backed regime on the other hand.177 Even 
though in the “List of German diplomatic representatives in foreign countries” 
announced in 1954 and 1955 by the West German Foreign Office, Indochina or 
Sai Gon was named, there was no further information about the establishment of 
any Embassy or High commissioner in that land. The West German embassy in 
Bangkok, Thailand (from December 1952) and other West German diplomatic 
offices in some other cities such as Tokyo and New Delhi (from April 1952), 
Jakarta (from June 1952), Paris (from July 1950), Hong Kong (from July 1953), 
Washington (from July 1951) acted to cover some trade relations with Sai Gon. 
This is because it was the center of the colony of Cochin-China, whereas Tonkin 
and Annam were formally protectorates. They also collected much information 
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about development in Indochina as a whole.178 Other archival sources also proved 
that West Germany’s attitude towards the first Indochina War was gradually 
shaped from the beginning of the 1950s and then it was changed or adjusted in 
relation to the realities happening in Indochina. In terms of the defense issue, the 
West German political elites saw visible connection between that conflict and the 
outcome of the EDC plan.  
Not until December 1955 was a trade office opened and run in Sai Gon 
under the leadership of a diplomat, Albert Tobias Tafel. One and half years later, 
South Vietnam firmly anchored itself to the West, as demonstrated by its rejection 
of holding a general election in the whole country in 1956 as the Geneva 
Agreement had stipulated. From 12 June 1957, this office was upgraded to 
become the West German Embassy in South Vietnam.179 
4.2. The attitudes of the FRG towards the first Indochina War 
4.2.1. West German policy on the first Indochina War 
4.2.1.1. Background for West Germany’s “Indochinapolitik” 
Since its foundation in 1949, the FRG was always concerned by the 
security threat from the East, mostly called “the SU aggression”. Clearly, the 
newly born Federal Republic government was very limited because of its 
occupation status, ruled by great powers both in domestic and international policy. 
Despite this fact, West Germany proclaimed its own foreign policy as it “always 
pursues those programs to preserve peace in the past and future.” (Die deutsche 
Außenpolitik ist immer in der Kontinuität dieses konkreten Programms der 
Erhaltung des Friedens geblieben, sie bleibt es auch künftig).180 Undoubtedly, the 
most important interest for the newly established state of West Germany was to 
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quickly recover what the past war had left. Economic development was 
considered West Germany’s top priority. The Marshall Plan was a significant aid 
offered by the U.S. and thus, West German foreign policy was mostly driven by 
the U.S. In addition, West Germany needed to regain its prestige in the eyes of the 
allies. Other international relations outside Europe, to some extent, were therefore 
narrowed. It was believed by West German leaders that only strong power in the 
economy (and then in the military) would guarantee the country sovereignty and 
make it possible to integrate into the West. Finally, there still remained the 
German question when the two German states announced themselves as the 
unique legal representatives (Alleinvertretungsanspruch) for the whole of 
Germany. All of these matters restricted West German actions both in Europe and 
the world outside. Consequently, this would define, and in turn dominate West 
Germany’s Indochinapolitik. 
The escalation of the Indochina War with the engagement of some powers 
like the U.S. and Red China concerned West Germany in some certain ways.181 
The reason for this was that the young republic saw its interests could be more or 
less influenced by that war. Therefore, at the very beginning, West Germany took 
a position of standing not completely outside the war.182 However, it was not easy 
for the Federal Republic to foresee how and in which way a war in the Far East 
could influence its political and social life as matters behind the war gradually 
affected the society in the years to come. Even directly or indirectly involved in 
the first Indochina War in the first half of the 1950s, the West German political 
stage and public opinion were roused by the on-going progress on the Indochina 
battlefield and its following impacts. As a result, with a standing point of national 
security, West German leaders and the public reacted differently towards the 
conflict. 
Together with the intensification of the conflict which attracted more 
concern from the free world, West German interests were gradually touched as 
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well. From the 1950s onwards the conflict in Indochina shifted and became 
internationalized when the two blocs entered the proxy-war. Consequently, West 
Germany watched very closely the attitudes and actions of those powers such as 
the U.S., the PRC, the SU and even Great Britain, and of course the fate of the key 
player on the battlefield – France. 
From 1949, France recognized that it could not cope with the expenses of 
Indochina war on its own. Furthermore, under intense pressure from the domestic 
opinion on the war and some other political and economic problems France 
started seeking American assistance.183 From 1950 to 1953, financial aid was 
given to the French colonialists as they struggled to re-establish control of 
Indochina in the face of opposition from Vietnamese communists and nationalists. 
It could be argued that, up to 1953, the U.S. commitment was no more than a 
financial assistance to its ally.184 Being convinved that the war in Indochina was 
not only a colonial war but a part of the free world’s campaign against the 
expansion of communism in Asia, this was viewed as a confrontation between the 
communist and non-communist bloc with the engagement of the two opposition 
bloc leaders. Such a severe conflict would concern related countries, including 
West Germany, one of the potential allies of the U.S. in Europe.  
Looking at the West German political and public view, we can see that 
West Germany from 1950 onwards was much more concerned by the war than 
ever before due to the problem of Germans in the FFL185 in Indochina. More 
surprisingly, West German concerns about the war at first did not come from 
politicians but mainly from public opinion. The flow of young Germans 
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registering and joining the FFL provoked huge debates originally amongst the 
public, which then had a great effect on the federal parliament and government’s 
policy.186 Many Germans who fought with the legion in Indochina immediately 
after WW II were not really volunteers, but had been recruited more or less 
forcibly in the POW camps. Many fought bravely in the legion, some others 
deserted to the Vietminh. They stayed in Indochina fighting on the other side and 
were then repatriated to (East) Germany mostly and encouraged to participate in 
anti-western propaganda.  
At the very beginning the problem of young Germans joining the foreign 
legion only came about and was debated because many Germans saw that post-
war West Germany needed manpower to reconstruct the country. Those young 
Germans, however, chose another future by joining the foreign legion, and 
fighting overseas for foreign interests, in this case, for French interests. The 
destiny of the German legionnaires in Indochina, notably after the French defeat 
at Dien Bien Phu – a sad story for many Germans – was another chapter of the 
Indochinapolitik of West Germany. West Germany judged the Franco-Vietnam 
conflict in the following terms: “for most West German citizens there was no 
question that German freedom and Berlin’s security were being protected in the 
jungles of Indochina.”187 (Für die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung in der 
Bundesrepublik stand außer Frage, daß die Freiheit der Deutschen und die 
Sicherheit Berlins auch im Dschungel Indochinas verteidigt würden). 
Undoubtedly, the fall of Dien Bien Phu was considered one of the direct causes 
leading to the failure of the EDC plan pursued by West Germany for such a long 
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time. Even after its breakdown, the story continued when Vietnam was partitioned 
into two halves, which was almost the same as the German nation. This common 
characteristic would lay the foundation for West German Indochina policy, 
Indochinapolitik, in the 1950s and 1960s, when the second Indochina War broke 
out. Afterwards, West Germany again considered that “Berlin wird am Mekong 
verteidigt”.  
4.2.1.2. West German federal government and parliament’s attitudes towards the 
first Indochina War 
As one can imagine, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and the 
intervention of world powers in the first Indochina War attracted more 
international concern to the area. West German diplomatic representatives in 
South-east Asia and in France increased their observations and analysis in every 
aspect related to Asia and Indochina. On 9 July 1951, the West German Consulate 
in Paris sent a report to the West German Foreign Office analyzing the 
complicated situation in Indochina. In the report, it was predicted that the war 
would be gradually internationalized. France was in a position in which they had 
no other option than appealing to the U.S. for financial and military assistance, the 
report continued. In other words, France was more and more dependent on 
American financial and military aid because it was unable to act alone in the war. 
The situation, in the West German official view, would be more complicated and 
unpredictable if Red China intervened in the war. If any direct intervention from 
Red China occurred, the U.S. would immediately respond by sending its air force 
and then land troops to Indochina. Therefore, it would not just be a French War in 
Indochina, but a war of the Western world in South-east Asia.188 In line with the 
free world’s point of view, West German leaders in general and Chancellor 
Konrad Adenauer personally regarded “the war in Indochina as an attempt to curb 
communist expansion.”189  
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As previously discussed, the federal government and Konrad Adenauer 
personally showed the attitude of an “observer” until the end of the Indochina 
War. By following the conflict’s progress in Indochina as well as the moves of the 
involved partners such as the main players France, the U.S., Red China and the 
SU, West Germany carefully reacted and adjusted her diplomatic strategies. 
Meanwhile, the new republic was keen on regaining an image of a peaceful 
Germany and aimed to be an equal member of the Western family. Therefore, any 
relations with the communists should be absolutely avoided and no evidence of 
such a connection in Indochina had been found so far. West Germany chose to 
recognize Bao Dai’s government as a signal to please the French. Hence, the 
French could easily understand that, at least, West Germany did not side with the 
communists in Indochina but in some way backed the French in the conflict 
against the “rebellion communists”.  
In this case, although both West Germany and France were among the key 
players in WW II, no peace agreement between the two countries had actually 
been signed so far. Nonetheless, West Germany did not choose to act according 
tot the old oriental saying that states “Our enemy’s enemy is our friend”. West 
German leaders were pragmatic enough to understand and respond flexibly to the 
new context of the European post-war period, notably through West Germany and 
Adenauer personally trying their best to regain full sovereignty and to integrate 
into the West. This forced the West German authority not to make itself an enemy 
of any of the Western allies. One should keep in mind that, if the Indochina 
question (Indochinafrage) was not West Germany’s main concern, the question of 
the Saar (Saarfrage) would be a barrier for the relationship with France. Only 
once the Saar problem was solved would West German sovereignty be almost 
fulfilled. Any more barriers – such as Indochina – which could badly influence 
German-Franco relations would be carefully considered by weighing the pros and 
cons. 
 Nevertheless, the problem of the Germans in the FFL (Fremdenlegionäre) 
was always the core issue that affected West German policy towards the war very 
profoundly. Were the Germans really a majority in the Legion at Dien Bien Phu? 
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If many of them were recruited from POW camps at the end of WW II, their five-
year contracts were ended. Did many Germans sign up for further service after 
their initial contracts? Many sources have proved that the opposition political 
groups in the Bundestag took advantage of this problem to elicit Adenauer’s 
policy. These groups even used the issue of the Germans in the French legion in 
Indochina to prevent West Germany from setting up any relations with France.190 
It was Adenauer who took the opportunity of this problem to proclaim his 
official attitudes towards the war in Indochina. It was considered a clear sign of 
solidarity with France in the conflict when on 29 April 1954 he spoke at the 
Bundestag: “The soldiers who are sacrificing their blood and lives in Indochina 
are doing so not only for France but for the freedom of the whole world.”191 (Die 
Soldaten, die in Indochina Blut und Leben opfern, tun dies nicht für Frankreich 
allein, sondern im Dienste der Freiheit für die ganze Welt). This attitude was once 
again affirmed when Dien Bien Phu collapsed. In a telegraph to French Prime 
Minister Joseph Laniel, Konrad Adenauer expressed his “deepest compassion as 
well my admiration for the heroic defenders of the free world in Dien Bien 
Phu.”192 (... den Ausdruck meines tiefsten Mitgefühl… und gleichzeitig meine 
Bewunderung für die heldenhaften Verteidiger der freien Welt in Dien Bien Phu.) 
These moves show that by the end of the war, West Germany felt that it had at 
least partly contributed to the French war in Asia against communist expansion. It 
was the right time for Adenauer to officially proclaim his attitude towards the war. 
One can also imagine that the wish for the EDC ratification still remained in his 
mind. A statement like this would help further the plan. Also, it showed Konrad 
Adenauer to be a very realistic politician in defining and adapting his political 
point of view. In other words, with the presence of young Germans in the French 
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legion in Indochina, West Germany was a crucial part of the conflict, and surely it 
had to be counted as part of the Western world.  
At the 21st conference of the Foreign Committee of the Bundestag after the 
French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, Deputy Becker from the FDP raised the issue of 
whether the French would continue to stay in Vietnam as the French army was 
still stationed there to protect its economic and cultural interests.193 In addition, he 
warned the Bundestag that even though France had fallen in Indochina, the West 
German Bundestag should not think that France would be totally weak. In the 
meantime “the psychological connection between France and the U.S. were still 
very strong.”194(Die psychologischen Verbindungen zwischen den USA und 
Frankreich sind von früher her sehr stark.) This meant that West Germany should 
not take further action until that kind of connection was made clearer. The end of 
the Dien Bien Phu battle and then the Geneva Conference attracted a lot of 
attention from the West German leaders because the outcomes of those events 
would clearly influence the future of the EDC plan.  
One should understand that the connection between the EDC and the first 
Indochina War was closer than ever, especially from mid-1954 onwards, which 
explains why West German politicians were so concerned by the war. In the 3rd 
meeting of the foreign ministers to discuss the financial issue of the EDC project, 
Dr. Walter Hallstein agreed that the financial contribution to NATO under which 
the EDC was controlled in the transitional period between France and West 
Germany would be counted equally. This meant that West Germany recognized 
the “French cost in Indochina was equivalent to the West German budget for the 
protection of the federal border and (West) Berlin.”195 (... so würden z.B. für 
Frankreich die Kosten für den Krieg in Indochina und für Deutschland 
wahrscheinlich die Kosten für den Bundesgrenzschutz und Berlin.) 
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Before the ratification of the EDC in the French parliament, on 30 June 
1954, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer analyzed the situation and stated that the EDC 
now had a new sense in the American eyes.196 This demonstrates Adenauer’s 
strong hope in France’s decision on the EDC profile which now would be more or 
less dependent on American influence. He also stressed the importance of 
American troops in Europe as he suspected that the EDC plan might be vetoed in 
the French parliament. In his eyes, “the failure of the EDC was the great success 
for the SU in the context of the Cold War.”197 
Only one day after the collapse of the EDC, on 1 September the West 
German cabinet held a special meeting to discuss the issue and the government’s 
next moves. Not all cabinet members had the same assessment of the failure of the 
EDC plan. The Minister of Labor, for instance, evaluated the problem differently 
from how people might have thought that, i.e., it would be a shock for the West 
German government if the EDC failed. He said that “he heard the news of the 
EDC’s failure with a “relief” and that the failure ended the era of the so-called 
“concession”. This would lead France to provide proof of its strength reacting to 
European problems. What West Germany should do at the moment was not to 
give any statement, but wait.”198 (... dass er die Nachrichten aus Paris mit einer 
gewissen Erleichterung gehört habe. Sie bedeuteten das Ende der Politik der 
Vorleistungen. Die Einstellung der Regierung Mendes France zur EVG ist nach 
Ansicht des Bundesarbeitsminister damit zu erklären, dass die französische 
Regierung nach Indochina und nach den Ereignissen in Nordafrika den Beweis 
der Stärke habe erbringen wollen. Er empfiehlt, keine Stellungnahme abzugeben, 
sondern abzuwarten.) The failure of the EDC project also made some other 
members in Adenauer’s cabinet think about the future status of West Germany, 
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for which the Minister of Finance suggested three possible scenarios: firstly, West 
Germany would be subjugated by the SU; secondly, it would be neutralized; 
thirdly, it would keep on attaching itself to the West. Finally, he advised that the 
third choice would be the most favorable solution for West Germany.199  
With regard to the matter of security, the collapse of the project in fact had 
greater impact on West German political life when the foreign committee of the 
federal parliament continued discussing what West Germany should do after the 
failure of the EDC. Should it wait longer to see the next moves of the superpowers 
such as Great Britain and the U.S.? Deputy Becker of FDP raised the issue of 
West Germany’s direct or indirect membership in NATO, to which Adenauer 
firmly answered “I believe I have stated very clearly: direct.”200 (Ich glaube, ich 
habe sehr klar gesagt: direkte). However, earlier in 1953, stressing the importance 
of Indochina at the first meeting of the second election held on 12 November, 
Deputy Becker of FDP suggested the EDC’s ratification might be decided by four 
factors: the Indochinafrage, the Saarfrage, French Union and British attitudes 
towards the EDC. Additionally, he emphasized the close link between the two 
questions of Saar and Indochina as he believed that even if there was a solution on 
the Saarfrage, the problem of Indochina would still have a great effect on the 
EDC’s ratification.201 In Adenauer’s eyes, France would be nothing but a 
medium-sized power in Europe and he believed that “once France accepted it was 
one of the players in the process of Western integration, then France had to give 
up its leading role and French foreign policy would surely be influenced by other 
powers in the game.”202 (Wenn Frankreich in der europäischen Integration ist, 
dann ist Frankreich nicht mehr die führende europäische Großmacht, sondern 
dann werden andere Faktoren die Außenpolitik Frankreichs und auch die der 
anderen großen Mächte stark beeinflussen.)  
                                           
199
 Loc.cit. 
200
 Der Auswärtige Ausschuß des Deutschen Bundestages 1953 – 1957, Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf, 
2002, S. 283. 
201
 Ibid., S. 17. 
202
 Loc.cit. 
124 
 
During the Geneva Conference and the debate over the EDC in July 1954 
in the French national parliament, Adenauer judged the conference itself a great 
success for the communists, since it included Red China and the Vietminh as 
participants. The conference would be a decisive moment in which the balance of 
power among the participants would be established. He may have foreseen that if 
the EDC failed then this would be a huge victory for the Russians as the plan had 
always been considered by the Russians unacceptable.203 Evidently, Adenauer 
himself saw that after what had happened to France in Indochina, a French veto 
against the EDC was only a final move in the bid to save its prestige if France still 
wished to retain the its greatness.  
On the other hand, the collapse of the EDC project could not actually 
block West Germany from uniting with the West in the field of defense. Instead, 
West Germany was able to pursue a more independent and active European policy 
than to be cemented with France in solving any European matters. This also meant 
that France could not simply be the only driving force for European integration, 
but had to act in cooperation with West Germany, as observers have noted 
thereafter. 
After the fall of Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, West German politicians 
kept on watching the war in Indochina and French moves in the nearly ended 
conflict. According to a report submitted by the West German Embassy in 
Bangkok on 2 June 1954, France’s military condition in Indochina was almost 
hopeless. The prestige or the traditional strength of the French army was no more. 
The bad condition of the military was blamed on the French army leaders in 
Indochina including generals Navarre and de Castries. More importantly, it was 
reported that the American attitude towards Indochina was very serious. The 
Americans controlled the use of goods and military materials and influenced 
military leadership.204 West German observers in Hong Kong, London, the U.S., 
Tokyo, New Delhi, etc. also reported comprehensively about the evolutions in 
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Indochina, such as the attitudes of Red China, France, political development in 
South Vietnam, the future of Bao Dai, and notably the American moves during 
the first half of 1954. They soon realized that the U.S. would later replace France 
in Indochina. This helped West Germany define its diplomatic strategies in 
Europe as well as in Indochina in the forthcoming years. 
4.2.1.3. West German politicians’ attitudes towards the first Indochina War 
Regarding the official West German official attitude towards the first 
Indochina War, researchers should be aware some West German politicians’ 
actions of resistance. Otto John, President of the West German Federal Office for 
the Protection of the Consitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz), is a striking 
example. On 20 July 1954, after a ceremony remembering the conspirators of 
1944,205 he disappeared. He re-appeared three days later in East Berlin where he 
explained the reason for his escape and criticized Adenauer's policies of 
remilitarization. In his opinion, the EDC plan covered under the umbrella of the 
EDC would hamper German reunification.206  
Another politician, Karlfranz Schmidt-Wittmack, a member of the 
Bundestag, quit office and escaped to East Berlin where he announced that he had 
been convinced by the Americans to rearm West Germany. Nevertheless, the 
outcomes of the Geneva Conference had a great effect on him and his comrades’ 
opinions. He opined that the German problem could not be solved by rearmament. 
Instead, he believed only negotiations could make it possible. The EDC, in his 
opinion, would not meet German expectations on the matter of reunification but 
would lead to a deadlock.207  
The new world politics and European internal transformation in the mid- 
1950s was marked by the escalation of the Cold War and the urgency for 
European defense and economic unification. This was also the period when it was 
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thought more than ever the role of France should be more active. Obviously, West 
Germany observed and analyzed every move on the French political stage. On 14 
June 1954, at the 15th meeting of the Bundestag, Adenauer evaluated the fall of 
Laniel’s cabinet as a foreseen failure of the West world to communism. He judged 
that the Geneva Conference was the most important event that had ever been. If it 
still considered itself a great power, France had to have its say at the decisive 
conference, at which the presence of the Vietminh rebellion’s leaders of 
represented a bitter defeat for France and the Western world.208  
Again at the 17th meeting of the Bundestag on 6 July 1954, the 
Indochinese situation was reviewed much more intensively. The federal 
parliament acknowledged that the French situation in Indochina was quite 
hopeless and their rule there would be soon overthrown. The West German 
Bundestag also evaluated the price France had paid for this as France recognized 
the Chinese participation at the Geneva Conference. More seriously, France then 
had to join an on-going plan for the South-east Asian Treaty Organization 
(SEATO). Being defeated at Indochina and deciding to join SEATO proved that 
France was absolutely worn out after the war in Indochina and evidently, at least 
in the West German view, the total defeat of France in Asia was undoubtedly 
visible.209 Joining SEATO seemed to be a real solution for France to continue its 
presence in South-east Asia. So, did this have any influence on the EDC plan in 
Europe?  
For Europe in general and West Germany in particular, there was a crucial 
connection between the Indochina problem and European issues, especially the 
EDC and even the matter of German unity, Dr. Walter Hallstein affirmed.210 Only 
one week later, in the next meeting of the Bundestag on 13 July 1954, the 
Indochina problem was again debated, this time focusing on the destiny of 
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Germans in the Vietminh’s prison camps who would be treated equally to French 
soldiers as regulated by international law.211 Close connections among France-
West Germany-Indochina and the EDC was once again on the debate agenda of 
the Bundestag when on 9 September 1954 Deputy Becker (FDP) put a question 
about what West Germany should do in the new context of Europe as the French 
had announced its refusal to ratify the EDC plan. These reasons for that were: 
firstly, the Frenchv were stuck in the mud (in terms of finance, military and 
human loss) in Indochina, this was the most important reason; secondly, troubles 
in North Africa; thirdly, its weaker economy compared to West Germany’s 
advanced economy.212 As we can see, in the months following the fall of Dien 
Bien Phu and during the Geneva Conference, the Bundestag held meetings almost 
weekly to discuss European issues and matters outside Europe, like the Indochina 
War, for instance. It is understandable that West Germany felt anxiety about the 
Geneva Conference, as these were circumstances in which the destiny of 
Indochina would be discussed and decided, not by itself but by great world 
powers. Could history be repeated and the same things happen as to the German 
nation nine years before? 
These activities informed the attitude of the West German regime towards 
the first Indochina War, which altered gradually from a position of observation to 
a more active one. Obviously, when the world as well as the regional political 
structure dramatically changed, West Germany could not stand outside. By 
following and adapting itself to what happened to France in the process of 
decolonization in Indochina, French ambition in maintaining colonial possessions 
in Africa, its independent tendency on the U.S. etc., West German foreign policy 
was shaped and proved itself to be on the right in the following years. However, 
one should keep in mind that the West German basic policy towards the Indochina 
War was no more than being an “observer”, as the Chancellor Adenauer stated 
“we can only observe… Since we are still an occupied country and we are only 
spectators in Asia, we have no choice other than to wait for the next developments 
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there.”213 (Wir können nur beobachten... Da wir noch immer ein besetztes Land 
sind und in diesen Asienfragen wirklich nur Zuschauer sein können, bleibt uns 
nichts anders übrig, als den Lauf der Entwicklung dort abzuwarten.)  
4.2.2. West German policy on the Germans in the FFL  
Up to now, no one knows exactly how many Germans served in the FFL 
but it is believed that more than half of the French troops in Indochina were of 
German origin or were German-speaking soldiers with origins in Austria or 
Switzerland. German youths joined the FFL with a variety of reasons. Many of 
them were escaping their current lives in Germany after WW II when Nazi 
Germany was defeated by the allies. Historically, some of them moved to France 
when Hitler came to power in 1933 and during WW II. During and after the war, a 
lot of them were caught and became war prisoners, kept in allied captivity. After 
being released they joined the French legion. Some of them were reported former 
SS officers. The majority of them grew up in German soil and had to face 
difficulties in life in Germany after the severe war. They could find no job, no 
food, and no future. They were forced to join the foreign legion as they thought 
that they could earn money from that to support themselves and their families. 
Besides, many of them were attracted by the spirit and images of adventure 
(Abenteuer). As a result of French propaganda, however, they were also 
convinced that joining the legion would bring them a chance to fight the 
communist expansion in Asia.  
Where young Germans were recruited for the legion was fiercely debated 
by the West German public (mostly in the media). It was commonly agreed that 
young Germans were employed in the French occupation zone, even in West 
Berlin and other occupation areas. In fact, a lot of laws of the German Reich were 
repealed by the Allied Control Council.214 The French authorities set up many 
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agencies in many cities and French camps to advertise their recruitment activities. 
Applicants would then be brought to France to be trained in how to survive and 
combat in the jungle. After that, most of them would be sent to Indochina. In 
addition, the way they were forced to sign a five-year contract serving in the FFL 
was hotly disputed by the West German public. It was suggested that young 
Germans in the French occupation zone were invited to drink alcohol at bars in 
the Ruhr region or elsewhere in the Bundesgebiet. After getting drunk, they were 
forced to sign a five-year contract promising to serve for the FFL during which 
they had to serve at least two years in the Indochina battlefield. After signing the 
contract they would be transported to the harbor city of Marseille, then to Algeria, 
and finally to Indochina. The French authorities even sought out German 
prisoners of war in the French camps and encouraged them to join the legion. If 
they had been in the prison for five years then they would be released.215  
When serving in the FFL in Indochina, hundreds of them including their 
former comrades turned to side with the Vietminh front and fight against the 
French armed forces. These deserters who followed the Vietminh originated from 
different countries, i.e., Czechoslovakia, Poland, Serbia, and Greece, etc. Still, the 
majority of them were Germans. The first ever known deserter to the Vietminh 
front was Erwin Borchers, a Private of Bataillion 3, Foreign Regiment No 5 (5e 
R.E.I) who went to Vietnam in 1941. Furthermore, he persuaded some of his 
comrades such as Schröder (German), Frey (Austrian) and Golvald (Czech) to 
form a communist cell inside the legion. Moreover, they even contacted with 
some French officers who followed de Gaulle. 
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As early as September 1945, Borchers, Schröder and Frey left the French 
troops and sought the office of the Cờ Giải phóng newspaper216 asking to 
cooperate with the party. Ernest Frey then served in the Vietminh army where he 
later became a colonel and took over responsibity for the security of the An toàn 
khu or Security Zone in Viet Bac.217 Erwin Borchers worked for the newspaper Le 
Peuple or Nhân dân as a political commentator under his pen-name Chiến Sỹ 
(Kämpfer). Under the pen-names Lê Đức Nhân and Kerkhov, deserter Rudy 
Schröder wrote many articles criticizing international issues. After some time, 
Borchers and Schröder produced a series of propaganda pamphlets in German in a 
bid to mentally influence Germans in the FFL, and then they published a 
newspaper, Waffenbruder.218  
 
Picture 11: German deserters to the Vietminh in Viet Bac (from left):  
Duong Bach Mai, Frey (Nguyen Dan), Truong Chinh, Le Van Luong,  
Wachter (Ho Chi Tho), Schröder (Le Duc Nhan). 
Another study argued that there were two groups of Germans joining the 
FFL. The first group was made up of those who escaped from Germany and 
Austria after January 1933. They were active in anti-fascist movements but then 
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they had to take refuge in France where they were later arrested when the Franco-
German war broke out in 1940, at which point they were recruited into the FFL. 
After some time in the FFL in Indochina, they went over to the Vietminh to 
struggle against the colonialists. This group included only twelve people who had 
been well-educated and were politically motivated. However, researchers assert 
that they do not represent the majority of deserters. When the Franco-German war 
broke out, every German from the age of seventeen to sixty-five including 
fascists, anti-fascists, tourists and businessmen in France was arrested. Most of 
them chose to join the French legion to fight against fascism. From 1939 to 1940 
the number of recruits rose to more than 3,500. France was defeated in June 1940 
and required to return those Germans serving in the French legion at the time back 
to Germany. Nevertheless, a French commander in North Africa, General Maxime 
Weygand, decided to rescue those who did not want to go back to Germany as he 
could see that they would be punished by the Nazi regime. Therefore, around 100 
Germans were sent to Indochina before the expelling order came into effect.  
The second group was those young Germans who lost their orientation 
after the fall of the Nazi regime. The main reasons for young Germans from 
seventeen to twenty-five years old (in 1945) joining the legion was that they were 
homeless, separated from their families, illiterate and jobless. They saw the legion 
as a new chance providing them with a new home or at least a community. They 
went over to the Vietminh due to many reasons but politics was definitely not the 
most important one. During the first Indochina War, there were about 1,325 
deserters to the Vietminh front, half of whom deserted to the Vietminh between 
1946 and 1948.219  
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The presence of Germans in the FFL was primarily due to the fact that “the 
FFL had had a long tradition of using German mercenaries. French authorities 
believed Germans were highly trained and instilled discipline.”220 If we look back 
in French history at the recruitment for its foreign legion, we find that in 1830 
“Louis Philippe created the Foreign Legion in order to circumvent new 
restrictions on the service of foreign troops in the French army.”221 But after WW 
II, German membership in the FFL became more problematic, notably from the 
end of 1950 when the French authorities in West German territory took advantage 
of their power as an occupying force to recruit legionnaires for their army.  
The West German public was concerned about the increasing number of 
Germans serving in the FFL. Moreover, the tactics of the French authority in 
recruiting those young Germans worried the West Germans very much. Finally, 
the most psychological matter was the issue of German minors (under eighteen 
years old) recruited and serving in the FFL. At the same time West Germany 
needed manpower more than ever for the reconstruction of the state after the 
devastation of the war. Those German minors had been recruited without any 
consultation from their parents. Furthermore, the French authority also spent large 
amounts of money taken from the German contribution to the French occupation 
rulers to enlist Germans into the legion.222  
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After WW II, the French army was exhausted and young French men were 
kept back to serve in their own domestic missions. Some West German politicians 
argued that France’s action endangered, even set back the relationship between 
West Germany and France that was being reconstructed after WW II. The press 
called attention to the visible lack of young men in West Germany and predicted 
great trouble for the federal government. Also the press called for closing all 
recruitment agencies and their operations in Landau, Offenburg and elsewhere in 
West Germany. The public went further demanding that it was time for the 
government to ask for its full sovereignty. The most urgent task the federal police 
had was to warn young Germans about the reality of the recruitment activities. 
The next measure was that the government must immediately improve social 
policies like job creation and a better education system.223 Not until after the 
French defeat at Dien Bien Phu did the problem come to an end, but the West 
German public was more concerned by the destiny of German legionnaires. 
According to many primary and secondary sources, about 46,000 Germans died 
on the Indochina battlefield. At Dien Bien Phu alone 1,600 Germans were 
engaged. By 1954, there were 5,000 to 6,000 Germans still serving in the FFL in 
Indochina.   
Konrad Adenauer and his government were at first a little disconcerted 
when dealing with the problem. They wondered whether Germans in the FFL 
were being treated according to German law compared to other German citizens. 
They even trusted that as soon as the occupation status was lifted the problem 
would be completely resolved. By asserting that “we cannot and will not support 
colonial wars of others”224 the West German official attitude still remained neutral 
towards the war in Indochina up to 1952. This would be altered by the end of that 
war. This can be seen to show that after the creation of the Federal Republic, an 
image of a peace-loving state should be firmly shown in West Germany. And in 
the formative years of the Federal Republic, West German officials were doing 
their best to prove themselves part of an anti-colonial state.  
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Moreover, if West Germany were to show any negative attitude towards 
the French colonial war in Indochina (in this case, in terms of the German 
legionnaires), it could be suggested that West Germany stood at the SU’s side. 
This would violate its principles in foreign policy in closely tying with the West 
and anti-communist ideology. Even when West German attitudes shifted from 
neutral to support for the French war in Indochina in April 1954, it should not be 
understood that West Germany was backing French colonial interests, but rather 
as a gesture of West German confirmation of its ties with Western allies. 
The West German government was criticized by opposition political 
groups including the communists after the first election of the Bundestag. 
However, at first it reacted patiently and blamed the country’s occupation status 
under which government leaders could do nothing drastic. Behind this move, we 
can recognize that West Germany did not want to risk any sensitive relations with 
France. In the meantime, by exploiting this issue the GDR kept on launching 
propaganda criticizing Adenauer in order to protest against the ratification of the 
EDC plan. 
In fact, the West German Foreign Office was sincerely concerned by the 
matter of German minors in the legion and negotiated with the French authorities 
to release them.225 During early 1950, many Germans in the legion in Indochina 
quit their service in the French legion and went over to the Vietminh. Hundreds of 
them were then released and came back to Germany. Many of them moved to 
West Germany, where they were caught and punished by the French military 
authority. This caused disquiet amongst the West German public and made them 
worried for sons or relatives who could be in the same position. In the Bundestag, 
too, the communists asked for resolutions on the issue of German deserters who 
might be punished by the French authority. After that, on 6 August 1951, the West 
German Foreign Office sent an official dispatch to the Allied High Commission 
and French authority to ask for the release of some sixty other cases.226  
                                           
225
 Volker Berresheim, op.cit., S. 148. 
226
 Loc.cit. 
135 
 
The West German government’s concerns on the issue of the 
Fremdenlegionäre went further than one might have thought. The Foreign Office 
on 10 April 1952 addressed an official letter to the General Consulate in Zürich 
asking it to investigate Swiss reactions towards the problem of foreign 
legionnaires. Such questions should be answered: Were young men younger than 
eighteen years old recruited? How did the Swiss government react to this issue? 
Was there any law in Switzerland controlling the issue?227 Also, the West German 
embassy to the Netherlands reported to the Foreign Office on 26 March 1952 that 
the FFL in the Netherlands only recruited young Dutch people over eighteen years 
old.228 This can be seen to show that the West German government was evidently 
concerned by the issue. The Foreign Office tried to consult other countries on 
their experience with that problem so that the government could define its own 
policy on the matter. 
In fact, according to the report of the West German diplomatic officers to 
Argentina, the problem of Germans in the FFL to some extent influenced West 
German interests. In a record sent to the Foreign Office on 1 November 1953, 
Albrecht Boehme clearly warned that French colonialism and imperialism would 
soon end. He added that in the new world context, West Germany would be in a 
better position. Only one aspect influencing Germany’s position and interests was 
the problem of Germans in the FFL as they were backing France to maintain 
colony. He also accused Adenauer of acting immorally by letting Germans serve 
in the maintenance of a foreign colonial rule.229  
A German called Franz J.R., who had worked for the French military 
office in Marseille since 1948, submitted a report to the West German General 
Consulate in Marseille as he had been required. In the report, some facts on 
Germans in the FFL were described. According to his report, in 1954 there were 
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14,501 Germans in the FFL in general. 6,000 Germans were missing in Indochina. 
From 1946, about 18,900 Germans died in the Indochina War. However, these 
figures were still lower than those of other sources. The Germans occupied 44.5% 
in the FFL. He knew that on German soil there were three main advertising 
agencies in Koblenz, Landau, Freiburg and some interim agencies in 
Kaiserslautern and Marburg. He also added those Germans who were working as 
advertisers such as: Sergeant-Chef Kratochiwil (Koblenz), Sergeant-Chef Kiel 
(Landau) and Sergeant Maiworm (Freiburg). About 200 new legionnaires were 
transported weekly from Strasbourg to Sidi Bel Abbes via Marseille,230 according 
to his report.231  
The Criminal Code was amended for the second time on 6 March 1953 but 
it still stipulated that any recruitment for the foreign army was strictly prohibited. 
West Germany cotinued to believe that the problem of the Germans in the legion 
would be settled once the EDC plan was passed and the problem would no longer 
be a question for West German state policy or the public view. Supporters for the 
recruitment would be punished as well. Despite this, the issue remained on the 
debate agenda of the Bundestag until 1955. 
4.3. The attitudes of West German political groups towards the first 
Indochina War 
The first Indochina War was one of many topics causing heated debates 
among West German political groups and organizations. As previously discussed, 
in its formative years West Germany did not have any direct interest in the politics 
and economics of Indochina. West Germany’s recognition of Bao Dai’s 
government, not the Ho Chi Minh-led government, showed only the diplomatic 
gesture of an ally to France. If West German political groups and other social 
organizations were interested in the first Indochina War it was with regard to the 
matter of Germans in the FFL in Indochina. This problem served as the core 
reasons for many political debates and movements in the post-war West Germany.  
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From 1950, the problem of Fremdenlegionäre concerned different political 
groups in the Bundestag. The SPD was consistently the group that opposed the 
CDU led by Konrad Adenauer on this issue. As early as 1952, the SPD judged 
that since the war in Indochina was escalating with the intervention of some other 
powers, and France was not receiving much assistance from the Western allies in 
the Western world’s struggle against communist expansion in Asia, West 
Germany was contributing a great number of young men for the cause of “defense 
of the Western culture in the Asia-Indochina front”. The SPD mentioned the 
unbelievable number of 80% young Germans in the French legion in Indochina.232  
In a question document entitled “Kleine Anfrage 67 der Fraktion der 
SPD” of 26 May 1954, the SPD group demanded that the federal government 
make clear the following issues which had attracted very attention from the West 
German public: firstly, the number of Germans in the FFL who had died or were 
missing in the Vietminh’s prisons in Indochina; secondly, the proposals of the 
federal government to solve the issue of German prisoners and lost fighters in 
Indochina – the POW/MIA issues; thirdly, the federal government’s measures to 
stop the advertisement for the foreign legion on West German soil.233  
Then, on 15 June 1954, more than a month after the fall of Dien Bien Phu, 
the State Secretary of the Foreign Office, Dr. Walter Hallstein, responded: i. 
German diplomats in Paris had asked the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 
the number of German citizens in the French legion in Indochina but no exact 
number had been given so far as the French classified the Fremdenlegionäre by 
the languages they spoke, not by nationalities. Therefore, the Swiss and Austrians 
were counted as well. In Dien Bien Phu, around 1,600 Germans had been 
engaged, most of them caught and held as prisoners of war in Vietminh camps; ii. 
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before the fall of Dien Bien Phu, the Federal Republic’s General Consulate was 
sent to Geneva to take responsibility and cooperate with the International Red 
Cross to discuss the future of the Germans in the French legion in Indochina but 
as the Geneva Conference was still going on, there had been not any final results 
so far. After the fall of Dien Bien Phu, West German diplomatic representatives in 
Paris did the same, too. Furthermore, the German Red Cross was committed to 
pursuing every international route to save the Germans in the legion. Finally, the 
federal government promised to make every effort to return them home; iii. since 
the second amendment of the Criminal Code on 6 March 1953, article 141 was 
applied to deal with any advertisement for the foreign army on West German soil. 
So far sixty-eight cases had been investigated, of which only two cases had been 
condemned, no evidence of guilt had been found with forty-eight cases. Some 
other eighteen cases were under investigation.234  
Surprisingly, the French High Commission in the Federal Republic 
reaffirmed there was no official office in Germany recruiting Germans for the 
legion but there might have been people who individually did the job of 
advertising. Dr. Walter Hallstein also suggested not only that the federal 
government should do something to improve social welfare for the young 
Germans but also that the government of each state should share the burden with 
the federal authorities. In the previous years reinforced the federal budgets for the 
youth and creatied a number of institutions devoted to the integration of the young 
Germans who were homeless and jobless in West Germany.235  
At the 18th meeting of the Foreign Committee of the Bundestag on 13 July 
1954, in response to the SPD’s questions on the fate of Germans in the FFL, 
Deputy Walter Hallstein said that according to international law they would be 
treated like other French prisoners of war.236 In the internal document passed 
within the Foreign Office between Referat 302 and Referat 500 on 24 July 1954, 
the issue of Germans in the legion as prisoners of war was also mentioned. The 
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West German Foreign Office had two concerns: firstly, where German prisoners 
of war were being kept in Indochina; secondly, was the return of German 
prisoners of war to the GDR in accordance with international law?237 Many 
former German legionnaires returned to the GDR after being released by the 
Vietminh in the early 1950s onwards. They were used as a propaganda tool by the 
GDR to criticize the federal regime and the Chancellor Konrad Adenauer 
personally. Furthermore, in the context of both two German states attempting to 
be internationally recognized as the unique legal representative for the whole 
German nation, this problem caused more trouble than ever before. 
Even one year later, the destiny of Germans in the legion was once again 
talked over at the 27th meeting of committee in which the FDP group again raised 
the question of the exact number of Germans in the legion and what the German 
Red Cross and Geneva Conference could do to deal with the issues of German 
prisoners of the Indochina War after they were released.238 One should know that 
it was not only the CDU’s political opponents that raised those debates against 
Adenauer’s government, even inside the CDU there were many concerns about 
the issue. This is proved by many speeches given by Konrad Adenauer during his 
talks with CDU members in 1954. Konrad Adenauer stated at a CDU meeting on 
26 April 1954 when the Geneva Conference had started that the Geneva 
Conference and the end of the Indochina conflict were being counted by hour. He 
added that the outcome of the first Indochina War was very influential for world 
politics, as the U.S. engaged in that war. Once Indochina fell, other states in 
South-east Asia would fall also. No one could predict what would happen in 
Indochina, he argued, because at first, it was only a colonial war or a limited war 
but then it became internationalized with the engagements of other world 
powers.239  
From 1954, Adenauer’s government and he himself became less patient on 
the issue of full West German sovereignty. Without French consultation on the 
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issue, the West German goal would be hard to achieve. But ironically, at the exact 
moment when West Germany needed full national sovereignty, the French cabinet 
was deeply involved in the Indochina question and it was impossible for Laniel’s 
government to deal with any other issues including the Saarfrage.240 
 West German social organizations also reacted to the first Indochina War 
in their way since the war was still underway. Before a meeting of the German 
Youth’s Protection Organization (Aktion Jugendschutz) held in May 1952, some 
leaders demanded from the Foreign Office documents related to the issue of 
advertising for the foreign legion. The documents should make clear the 
following: 
• The federal government’s actions towards the issue 
• Where people could find the advertising agencies 
• What impact the advertising campaign would have 
• Reports on the results of the advertising activities 
• Reports on the age, social background etc. of the applicants 
• Statistics on the reasons or motives for registering for the legion 
• Living conditions of legionnaires 
• Number of Germans in the legion 
• Fates of legionnaires after finishing their time in the legion.241 
Also, religious associations calculated different numbers of young 
Germans in the FFL. According to the statistics of the Protestant church, up to 
April 1954, 25,000 Germans had died on the Indochina battlefield.242 But earlier, 
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from 1952, some young members of the SPD had raised awareness as they 
protested against the French authority’s recruitment activities in the South-West 
area of Germany. In summer 1952, they produced and distributed their first 
brochures – a propaganda tool – declaring the incredible number of 90,000 young 
Germans serving in the foreign legion, among which 13,520 had died in Indochina 
alone. Even as early as 1953 in the area of Rhineland-Pfalz and some other 
locations, a poster war (Platkatkrieg) was carried out. The main content of these 
posters was to warn young Germans about the danger of French recruitment for 
their legion, and awaken them to the fact that all of the French promises were lies. 
The truth of the foreign legion was: sickness, and death.243 Then, after the fall of 
Dien Bien Phu, young members of the SPD argued that 46,000 young Germans 
had died on the Indochina battlefield.244  
Another youth organization, the Stadtjungendring (Abteilung 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Jugendpflege Marburg an der Lahn), chose to question 
the West German authorities on the matter of young Germans recruited into the 
FFL. In a letter dated 29 September 1952 to the federal government and 
Bundestag as well as many relevant governmental bodies, this organization 
questioned the issue of the advertisement of recruiting young Germans for the 
FFL. The letter condemned the French authority for what they had done with 
young Germans who had been recruited and risked their lives for foreign interests 
in maintaining order in its colonial possessions. It even questioned their aims in 
doing that and suggested that the issue could only be accused for French flirtation 
to German minors who were facing social and political difficulties. This 
organization repeated what the allies at the Nürnberg Trials had said in 
condemning the people in Nazi-occupied nations who had actively collaborated 
with Germany or been passively exploited to work for Nazi Germany during WW 
II. This connected to what the French did with young Germans when hiring them, 
although in different circumstances, to serve its own interests. Also, they begged 
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people to listen to their own conscience and sense of responsibility in dealing with 
the problem.245  
The youth organization went further, requiring the French government and 
churches to solve the problem by immediately ending every contract signed by 
German minors and prohibiting any continued advertisement and/or recruitment 
of German underage youths in the foreign legion. Article 141a of the Criminal 
Code had to be enforced seriously again. This organization also called for other 
social organizations such as the Youth Association, schools, and families to 
protect German youths from being recruited into the legion.246  
Additionally, many individuals were very concerned by the issue of 
Fremdenlegionäre too. Mr. Hans-Ludwig Seresse sent a letter to Adenauer on 12 
July 1952 mentioning the number of 400 to 600 young Germans joining the FFL 
monthly. In his letter, he asked whether the Chancellor was aware of the situation 
or not. And again, the Foreign Office replied that they had been concerned by the 
issue for a long time but the federal government could do nothing to completely 
prevent underage Germans from joining the legion as West Germany was still an 
occupied land.247  
 In short, the first Indochina War did not only influence colonized countries 
but also the Western world including the U.S., France, the SU, Red China and 
West Germany. Although the West German government, political groups, other 
social organizations, and individuals reacted differently to the war, they all shared 
a common concern about the political and military events outside Europe. Thus, 
the problem of Germans in the FFL in Indochina served as a central political and 
social issue disputed by different political and social organs because humans have 
always been the most crucial element of any conflict in world history. It is 
understandable that the matter of Fremdenlegionäre in the Indochina War had a 
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great effect on the post-war West German political life embodied in the media, 
which will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE WEST GERMAN PUBLIC VIEW OF  
THE FIRST INDOCHINA WAR 
There were a number of public attitudes towards the first Indochina War. 
One of the main purposes of this thesis is to survey on the West German public 
view and mass media on this issue. In order to achieve this, most popular 
newspapers published from 1950 to 1954 in West Germany were examined, such 
as Die Zeit (DZ), the Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung (FAZ) and Der Stern (DS).248 Together with these newspapers and other 
daily or weekly magazines, journalists and commentators also reported 
moderately on the first Indochina War. There is no doubt that the mass media 
often follows the agenda set by government, in part because government policies 
and pronouncements are considered inherently newsworthy according to the news 
values governing decisions by journalists and editors. In the main, the reporting of 
the war that was published or broadcasted was a largely uncritical reproduction of 
the official military line.249 
Although many journalists made accurate reports, these would often be 
changed by publishers, a process referred to by journalist David Halberstam as 
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“the hamburger machine.”250 In fact, they had their own approach for 
corresponding and commenting on the conflict. As the war intensified, they 
intensively focused on the year 1954. We recall that after the fall of Dien Bien 
Phu the final decision on the hotly-debated project of the EDC was to be made. 
Besides, other media sources like memoirs of the former German legionnaires 
were also collected and surveyed.  
5.1. West German newspapers and the first Indochina War 
It is widely accepted that in democracy-based society, the press is 
considered “the fourth power” of the state. However, this consideration might not 
be true in the case of the former GDR as most newspapers, magazines, radio and 
later television were mainly controlled by the authorized party or by the 
government. From 1950 onwards, a series of East German newspapers, whether 
they officially saw themselves as “the voice of the SED” or not, published many 
articles, news stories, etc. reporting what was happening in Indochina. Compared 
to the Soviet-zone at that time, the press was treated differently in the FRG. We 
all know that freedom of speech was guaranteed in the Bundesgebiet according to 
the Basic Law so that everyone could raise their voice and express their opinions 
on every political and/or social event. But why did the press have so much 
influence on society? And what were the main events covered by West German 
newspapers in the early 1950s? It is also commonly agreed that the media in 
general and the press in particular, play a crucial role in society. The press is a 
society’s mirror reflecting every aspect of social life. It reflects the government’s 
policies and their implementation in society on the one hand and has its own 
power that can greatly influence government policy on the other. In other words, 
the press and policy-makers have a close connection with one another. Regarding 
the first Indochina War, all the aforementioned newspapers concentrated on the 
issues, through which one can trace the war in Indochina logically and 
interestingly as follows. 
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5.1.1. The attitudes of the world great powers  
As discussed above, at the outset the first Indochina War was simply a 
colonial war in which the French colonialists sought to regain their former 
colonial possession. To achieve that goal, they had no other choice than to engage 
in military combats with the Vietminh who were attempting to liberate Indochina. 
This colonial war then became internationalized with the involvement of the U.S. 
since they decided to assist France financially and militarily from May 1950. We 
remember that, as early as 1950, the SU, the PRC and other socialist countries 
started recognizing Ho Chi Minh as the leader of the DRV. The PRC began to 
support the Vietminh after the success of the Vietminh border campaign. This 
move was closely reported by the West German newspapers.251  
In January 1950, the SU officially recognized the government of Ho Chi 
Minh, thereby offering a diplomatic gesture to a colonized region in Asia. 
Meanwhile, there were some contradictory public opinions on this diplomatic 
gesture. Most of the West German press called the French-backed government of 
Bao Dai a “legal government” and described the Vietminh as “rebels.”252 
Moreover, France was very worried about the U.S. intentions of cutting aid to 
France in Indochina as well as not directly intervening in the war. One month 
earlier, the U.S. had considered a direct intervention in the Indochina War, but the 
U.S. would find this almost impossible (wenig wahrscheinlich) due to its vivid 
experiences in Korea. The inflexible attitude of the U.S. put France under the 
hardship at Geneva.253 From the American perspective, Indochina played an 
important role in global politics and “if communism expanded into this area, it 
would be dangerous for the free world.” (Die Gefahr einer Einverleibung 
Südostasiens in den kommunistischen Block ist eine Gefahr für die ganze Freie 
Welt.) The U.S. also warned that if Red China intervened in Indochina then the 
free world would immediately be united according to the so-called “united 
actions”. The press also reported that both France and Britain were wary of any 
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Chinese intervention in the conflict. This fear was absolutely understandable 
considering the war in Indochina was becoming more internationalized with the 
involvement of great powers.254  
Concerned by the on-going conflict, West Germany was itself seen to be 
indirectly involved and very much affected by the Indochina War. West Germany 
was actually an advocate of the Western family of which the U.S. and France 
were key members. Consequently, it observed out the war process in Indochina 
with close attention. The West German press, nevertheless, went further by 
predicting that the U.S. would soon construct a defense system for the region of 
South-east Asia.255 West Germany also confirmed definitely that the Americans 
would continue assisting France in Indochina only on the condition that France 
would ratify the EDC as soon as possible.256  
It would be a mistake not to mention Britain even though it was not a 
member of either European organization, like the on-going plan of the EDC or the 
ECSC. Its position seemed to be outside of common European issues, but it was 
also a key component in the Western club. This is why the West German press did 
keep a watchful eye on British policy towards the Indochina War also. In 1953, 
the British government refused to send its air force to assist France on the 
Indochina battlefield.257 Just at the outset of the Dien Bien Phu battle in March 
1954, the U.S. had called for Western participation in the conflict in order to share 
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the burden with France. But again, Britain was undecided on whether to involve 
itself in the war or not.258   
Taking India for consideration, although India was not considered a world 
superpower but rather a newly independent state,259 it had a gradually growing 
role in Asia as a neutral country with a large population. Jawaharlal Nehru’s call 
for peace in Indochina, to some extent, attracted the West German press.260 There 
was no doubt that India was emerging in world politics as an influential power; 
and in any case, West Germany wanted to keep an eye on the growing countries in 
Asia, for which India served as a good example of the new world power.261  
Rapid victories of the Vietminh forces over the French army on the 
battlefield, added to by the increased cost of war meant that France found itself 
unable to bear the burden alone. France kept on insisting that its attempts in 
Indochina must be recognized as its significant contribution to the Western 
common action against communist expansion in South-east Asia and through out 
the world. Therefore, France had to upgrade the scale of warfare. With no 
hesitation, the U.S. repeatedly appealed to its Western allies to assist France in 
Indochina in stead of leaving America to help alone in that cause.262 However, 
when other Western allies did not respond to the American request as quickly as 
expected the U.S. became angry and suspected the Western allies’ loyalty. The 
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Americans immediately cautioned their allies about their unclear attitudes and 
slow response towards the war in Indochina.263  
West German newspapers asserted that the loss of Dien Bien Phu was a 
great victory for the communists. Clearly, this was unacceptable for the free world 
because it would soon be endangered by communism.264 When the Indochina War 
was almost at an end, along with calling for the Western allies to rescue France in 
the battlefield, the U.S. simultaneously kept on urging France to ratify the EDC. 
Any delay in ratifying the EDC would be unfavorable for the Western world, they 
argued. In the meantime, many Western countries were welcoming German 
rearmament and the German contribution to the EDC.265  
Military developments in Indochina in general and on the Dien Bien Phu 
battlefield in particular disturbed the West German press a great deal. Articles 
published on the launch of the Vietminh’s decisive campaign (from 13 March 
1954) gave readers the reactions of the great powers, and details of a possible 
intervention of China in Dien Bien Phu. For the time being, France impatiently 
urged the U.S. for more intensive assistance.266 Nevertheless, the U.S. had to wait 
and see others’ moves. Most importantly, they had to observe Chinese attitudes 
before they could react. As a matter of fact, this waiting worried Paris very much.  
The position of the UN was a crucial topic which also concerned the West 
German press. As a common home of all nations, the UN was also alarmed by the 
idea of any intervention by Red China on the battlefield. France continued 
opposing an internationalized war. Meanwhile, socialists in the French 
government and national assembly were wary of a war escalation.267 The West 
German press was firmly convinced that the U.S. would not interfere in the 
Franco-Vietnam war, at least not by sending troops there. Meanwhile, France was 
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still hoping for a favorable arrangement, a ceasefire agreement, for instance, in the 
up-coming Geneva Conference.268  
The American position towards the conflict also attracted the attention of 
the West German press when the SZ ran the news that the Vice President of the 
U.S., Richard Nixon, might send troops to Indochina in a case of urgency. 
Nonetheless, it would not be easy to do as a decision to send troops into battle 
must be ratified by the U.S. parliament.269 One can conclude that the U.S. policy 
towards the first Indochina War was not always clear, and sometimes confused 
their allies at different and decisive moments. 
In hindsight, post-war Indochina was calculated and formulated by the 
powers even before the fall of Dien Bien Phu. Naturally, West Germany observed 
the process with great anxiety. The West German press tried to understand why 
France did not wish to see Indochina divided as the peace agreement was settled. 
This problem would be discussed in detail at the Geneva Conference in the 
months to come. Before the collapse of Dien Bien Phu, the attitudes of the great 
powers towards a political and military resolution for Indochina were still 
unclear.270  
Not long before the Geneva Conference, West Germany was able to detect 
disagreements among the great powers, particularly between the U.S. and France. 
At the end of war, the U.S. foresaw that France would no longer be able to 
maintain a presence in Indochina. More importantly, as the fate of Dien Bien Phu 
had not yet been determined, all the superpowers had their own scheme in the 
world political theatre, in which Indochina would definitely be used as a playing 
card. At the outset, the West German press predicted that the U.S. was willing to 
support a divided Vietnam, in which the U.S. could then intervene and replace 
France.   
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The attitudes of the great world powers towards the conflict in Indochina 
were shown very clearly in the West German media, especially with regards to the 
event of Dien Bien Phu, where French prestige was challenged. As a result, this 
could take the French colonial empire into another era. West German newspapers 
strongly stressed that the whole world was focussing on Dien Bien Phu, seeing it 
as the Stanlingrad or Verdun of Asia.271 The U.S. did not doubt that the fall of 
Dien Bien Phu would be unavoidable. Political commentators and analysts 
pointed out that the U.S. policy under the Eisenhower administration was more 
active than during the Truman period in preventing communist expansion in Asia. 
They also asserted that European politics should be accompanied by U.S strategic 
policy in Europe. This meant European interests must always be coupled with the 
U.S. policy in the European continent. Lastly, the West German press supposed 
that, whatever the situation in Indochina, the SU would not join the battle in 
Indochina.272  
By observing all the effects of policies of the great powers, notably the 
U.S. policy in Korea previously, West Germany was vigilant enough to analyze 
and shape its own attitudes towards the war. From then on, other future conflicts 
outside Germany would be seriously considered before the country showed any 
official attitude or took action.  
5.1.2. West German government’s attitudes towards the first Indochina War 
At the beginning, West Germany did not concentrate on the war in the Far 
East as Germans had no direct interests in the region. Even after the foundation of 
the Federal Republic in 1949, the West German state only observed the changing 
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moves in Europe, focused on its post-war affairs and sought for integration into 
the West. From 1950 onwards, at the time of the Korean War, the Germans were 
concerned by Indochina where the French were fighting against the Vietminh 
forces. There were two main reasons for the West German concerns about the 
Indochina conflict. Firstly, for Western Europe, if Asia fell into communist’ hands 
it would be a defeat for the Western world. Secondly, West Germany observed the 
first Indochina War because Indochina was still significant for the French as part 
of their cultural and economic interests, and above all, because their national 
prestige were represented there.  
The West German press started observing the first Indochina War more 
intensively just after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. With 
American indirect intervention through military and financial aid for France, the 
war undoubtedly became more popular. To some extent, it could influence world 
politics. The West German press was soon paying attention to French public 
opinion and wondering where the real interests of France in Indochina lay. To 
maintain the war, France had to spend 50% of its budget on the war and 
manpower for a meaningless war in which a victory for France would hardly be 
possible. Meanwhile, French domestic politics was constantly unstable.273 Daily 
news stories and articles were brought to readers reporting the escalation of the 
war.  
With the atmosphere of the Korean War and the rise of Red China, the first 
Indochina War had to be seen in the context of the Cold War of which Asia was 
the center. Since the second phase of the war in Indochina, the West German press 
could see that the French policy towards the Indochinafrage was not being clearly 
declared by French defense minister Pleven.274 Therefore, France had to re-access 
the connection between the three states of Indochinese Union and their “mother 
country”. This forced France to hesitate before shaping any foreign policy towards 
West Germany. 
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Military victories gained through the entire conflict by the Vietminh were 
regularly viewed and assessed by many newspapers. Indochina could be seen as 
“another Balkan in Asia”, according to the analysis of DZ, 28.12.50. In Europe in 
the early 1950s when West German leaders feared a communist expansion from 
the east led by the SU, it is understandable that the West German press was 
concerned by Soviet aid to the Vietminh via Chinese land. Any military 
movements in North-west Vietnam in 1952 were judged and reported constantly 
by West German journalists. The West German media also evaluated the 
effectiveness of Chinese aid to the Vietminh.275 One should keep in mind that 
after the Korean War ended in 1953, the Indochina War was then considered an 
extended war with the indirect intervention of the same great powers like the U.S., 
the SU and Red China. Convinced that those world powers were, at that time, 
ruling world politics, the West German press started to observe their own 
government’s official attitudes towards the war.  
As early as 1954, observing increasing American aid to France in 
Indochina, West German leaders questioned themselves about how they should 
react.276 Should West Germany be in the same front as the U.S. in Indochina to 
show loyalty to its biggest ally? On the one hand, West Germany hoped stability 
in Indochina would soon be restored so that France could withdraw and then ratify 
the long-awaited EDC project. On the other hand, could it be that West Germany 
had long been hoping for some kind of French defeat in the colonial territories, so 
that any game in Europe would be fairer amongst the players? Did all these West 
German calculations cause Adenauer’s policies towards Indochina to be 
sometimes confused? As it was, Adenauer’s attitude towards the war was always 
that of a mere “observer”. 
From the outset of the Dien Bien Phu campaign, the West German press 
closely followed and soon predicted Dien Bien Phu a visible disaster for 
France.277 Dien Bien Phu was then observed and reported on regularly in every 
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West German newspaper. The press saw France would not be able to escape the 
consequences of Dien Bien Phu. Thus, reluctantly or not, France should seek a 
political solution. The West German press could see the connection between 
Indochina and decisions made in the French parliament where a majority of 
deputies hoped to put an end the war. Thereupon, all observations actively led 
West Germany to the subsequent decisions dealing with regional and international 
issues. 
The West German public also even compared Vietnam after Dien Bien 
Phu with another Korea by which the whole world’s political situation might be 
changed significantly.278 Two days after the fall of Dien Bien Phu, the FAZ ran an 
article on the front page reiterating that Dien Bien Phu reminded Germans of 
Stalingrad where the German army was defeated in WW II. Obviously, the West 
German government’s attitudes towards the first Indochina War as viewed by the 
West German press are only one channel for historical researchers when 
examining West Germany’s policies on the French colonial conflict.  
5.1.3. French dilemma in Indochina 
As is commonly accepted, the return of the French to its former colony of 
Indochina presented a mountain of difficulties compared to what the French 
colonialists had experienced prior to 1945. The conflict was between one side 
who had been a weak victor in WW II and wanted to regain control over its 
former colony in Indochina in an effort to rescue its image as a great empire, and 
the other side who were the indigenous men of a newly liberated nation, ready to 
pay any price to maintain their immature independence. By their own tactics, the 
communist guerrillas pushed the French troops into getting constantly stuck in the 
mud. 
The West German press saw the irony in the fate of the French when 
France had to keep on demanding American financial and military aid for France 
in Indochina. Yet up to the end of 1950, France received from the U.S. only one-
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fourth of the total cost of the war. Also, German journalists analyzed the French 
economic conditions of the French at that time.279 The West German media 
described the French war in Indochina as one in which even a victory would be a 
defeat (Ein Krieg, in dem auch der Sieg eine Niederlage wäre) when criticizing 
the French dilemma on the Indochina battlefield. France depended too much on 
American aid at this time. One option for France was to internationalize the war, 
from which would pave a way for the UN to intervene in the conflict. France 
could therefore end the war honorably. Another option for France was to continue 
the war, which would increase the financial and human burden on itself. With 
regard to the latter, France was no longer able to do it due to terrible domestic 
problems of financial weakness and political instability.280 
West German correspondents in Paris also reported that the French 
National Assembly and the French people were indeed fed up with the war in 
Indochina. Evidently, this made the long-drawn-out war in Indochina unfavorable 
for France because the majority of French did not want to lengthen the war. West 
German journalistic commentators realized very clearly that negotiation with Ho 
Chi Minh to find a peaceful solution would be unavoidable for France.281 Several 
months later, the SZ shared this view.282 This meant in the West German view, it 
was considered a future defeat of France in the war when the conflict almost came 
to an end. 
In February 1954, a conference was held in Berlin for the first time with 
the intention of discussing the issues of Germany and Austria, but they then 
turned to related issues of Asia. The meeting place for the next conference on 
Asia in Geneva was also decided. The Geneva Conference would be very crucial 
for the whole of Europe. This is because in fact, the Indochina War did not only 
influence France but the process of European integration and the French role in 
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that process as well. The influence of the war might slow down this European 
integration process.283  
More importantly, it could change both German and French awareness and 
actions in their development aid strategies in Africa. In terms of finance and 
military, Indochina became a huge burden for France towards the end of the war. 
According to what France had proposed in the framework of the EDC, France had 
to contribute 14 divisions; meanwhile West Germany was committed to providing 
12 divisions. Nonetheless, the realities on the Indochina battlefield meant that 
France could never meet these demands while most of its divisions were stationed 
in Indochina or in North Africa.284  
Last but not least, the West German press was to some extent interested in 
what the position and role of Indochina would be when it was completely 
decolonized. Would Indochina still belong to the French Union? The press 
predicted possible scenarios for Indochina as follows: Indochina would be 
independent and fully separate from France; or Indochina would be autonomous 
and would then volunteer to join the French Union.285 For the Federal Republic, 
this was very important while Germany was attempting to assess French domestic 
and overseas problems. West German leaders fully understood that French 
eminence depended heavily on its colonial territories in Asia and Africa. 
Therefore, what would France be without its colonial territories? The West 
German press observed French attitudes towards the war during which France 
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opposed any “united actions”286 in Indochina despite fearing an intervention from 
Red China.287 France did not want to see this happen because, if it did, France 
would have to distribute its interests to those who intervened. The press continued 
reporting on Indochina even after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu and saw that 
the French National Assembly did not intend to send more troops to Indochina 
after the fall of Dien Bien Phu.288 This was seen as a signal of the total defeat of 
France in Indochina in West German public opinion. 
5.1.4. The fall of Dien Bien Phu and its impacts  
It is not difficult to understand why the West German media focused 
intensively on the event of Dien Bien Phu and its echoes in world politics. Almost 
every West German weekly or even daily newspaper reported comprehensively on 
what was happening at Dien Bien Phu from the launch of the mission on 13 
March 1954 as well as the surrounding circumstances. Dien Bien Phu and the 
Geneva Conference had a great influence on one another. The SZ, for instance, 
gave weekly coverage to the gradual collapse of Dien Bien Phu. Additionally, it 
followed the event to evaluate how the American intervention proceeded.289 They 
realized Vietnam’s strong will and might in gaining a decisive military victory 
over Dien Bien Phu because the Vietminh leaders believed that by winning the 
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battle they would have a better position at the negotiation table in Geneva in May 
1954.290 The FAZ compared Dien Bien Phu to Verdun and predicted that the fall 
of Dien Bien Phu would be a great defeat for France which would also badly 
damaged its prestige and honor.291  
The West German press also showed their concerns about the fate of Dien 
Bien Phu when they criticized the military situation. By referencing the 
Vietminh’s continuous success on the battlefield they affirmed that the outcome 
of Dien Bien Phu was being finalized in a way that would be unfavorable for 
France and its allies.292 With the headline “Frankreich gefallen” (France 
defeated), DZ stated outright that France was absolutely the loser and Dien Bien 
Phu was a great symbol for France’s defeat. The newspaper went on to conclude 
that, Dien Bien Phu would be written about in the history books as one of the 
most impressive oriental victories but the worst catastrophe of the Western world, 
and that Dien Bien Phu totally destroyed the image of France as a great nation.293 
Evidently, the outcome of Dien Bien Phu demonstrated the inevitability of 
French defeat in Indochina and this would have a profound effect on the attitudes 
and moves of the participants at the Geneva Conference which was about to be 
held mainly to discuss Indochinese issues. After nine years of fighting against the 
Vietminh, the French control in Indochina declined shortly after the bloody battle 
of Dien Bien Phu because they were unable to obtain U.S. reinforcements or 
additional military aid. The West German press saw that a win for the Vietminh in 
Dien Bien Phu would be a huge challenge for France at the Geneva Conference. 
The day-by-day process on the Dien Bien Phu battlefield created difficulties not 
only for the French military forces in Indochina, but also for the French 
diplomatic delegation at Geneva.  
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More than that, it would have a great influence on the French domestic 
political stage if the national assembly kept on opposing Laniel’s government.294 
All national theaters were closed after the fall of Dien Bien Phu.295 This was not a 
military failure alone but rather had a profound impact on the French domestic 
political theater. The West German press predicted that Laniel’s government 
would be pulled down after the shameful fall of the stronghold.296 Besides, the 
French defeat would cause a lot of disputes within both the government and the 
national assembly, especially about the fate of more than 16,000 troops fighting 
there.297 
Moreover, DZ commented that happened in Paris and Geneva would have 
enormous consequences for Germany as it could totally change the world’s 
political complexion which in turn could have a crucial impact on Germany.298 
From the beginning of May 1954, West German public opinion was concentrated 
on the Geneva Conference and the fate of the EDC as the two issues that were 
always connected and influenced by one another. EDC protesters in West 
Germany were looking and hoping for a ceasefire and peace agreement for the 
whole of Indochina. They also opposed talks with Bao Dai and demanded 
negotiations with Ho Chi Minh.  
At Geneva, an eight-point proposal proposed by the communists for a 
general and free election for the whole of Vietnam greatly attracted the attention 
of the West German press. It reminded Germans of the same suggestion made by 
the SU two years before, of a similar proposed election in both the Soviet Zone 
and the Bundesgebiet. At the negotiation table France supported a general election 
for the whole of Vietnam controlled by an international control committee. West 
Germany carefully watched this move, wondering whether the same model could 
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be applied for the whole of Germany.299 The West German view suggested that 
the outcome of the the situation in Indochina would be decisive for peace not only 
in Asia but also in the entire world.300  
Thus, Dien Bien Phu and its consequences at the Geneva Conference were 
becoming heated issues in the West German press. A large number of articles and 
news stories in West German newspapers reported on Dien Bien Phu and the 
Geneva Conference. Dien Bien Phu and its fall finally marked French military and 
political destruction in the former colonial possession. This can be inferred from 
the West German description of the battle and its suggestions that it would lead to 
an end of the French colonial presence in Indochina and Asia as a great empire. 
Rarely, however, did the West German use the exact term “French 
decolonization”. What happened to France in Indochina, notable in the failure of 
Dien Bien Phu and at the negotiating table at Geneva, directly indicated the 
beginning of French decolonization, with all its subsequent consequences.   
5.1.5. West German state and other countries’ attitudes towards EDC and West 
German rearmament 
In most of the West German newspapers, the story of the Indochina War 
and the EDC plan were regularly reported and discussed on the front page, 
notably when the Indochina War was reaching its final scenes in 1954. Also, 
given the context of the Korean War and the internationalized escalation of the 
first Indochina War, West German leaders were anxious to the EDC plan come 
into effect soon. In the early 1950s, the public view in both German states was 
often concerned by the issue of German rearmament. Being a part of the European 
defense community seemed feasible for the federal state. Nevertheless, the West 
German public view never forgot the two previous wars waged by Germany.  
Only one year earlier, the question of West German rearmament was much 
in the public’s minds when DZ started a series of debates on the issue “If we 
                                           
299
 SZ, 13. Mai 1954. 
300
 FAZ, 29. Juni 1954. 
161 
 
Germans have to be soldiers again…” (Wenn wir Deutsche wieder Soldat sein 
müßten…). The answers were different most likely because what had happened in 
German history was still prsesent in their thoughts: “If we are again soldiers – 
good, but for what?”301 One can see that West Germans were still suspicious of 
West German ambition in this matter and the goals of German rearmament were 
still suspected by themselves. 
 In an interview with the Deutschland-Union-Dienst on German 
remilitarization, Dr. Konrad Adenauer asserted that “German remilitarization 
(within the framework of the EDC) could not be questionable... The government 
and the Chancellor think that (German troops) could protect France.”302 (...dass 
von einer deutschen „Neuaufrüstung“ oder „Wiederaufrüstung“ oder 
„Remilitärisierung“ keine Rede sein kann. Die Bundesregierung und der 
Bundeskanzler denken allein und ausschließlich an eine mögliche Verteidigung 
Frankreichs). Again, he reaffirmed the American role in solving the problem. The 
West German leader was at first wise enough to link West Germany and France 
within the framework of the EDC. This diverted the public’s attention and made 
them think the EDC was not for West German interests alone but for the security 
of France as well. From this point of view, West German rearmament was just a 
question of time. Adenauer and his followers in the parliament and government 
understood the connection between the project of the EDC and the 
Indochinafrage. In contrast, some key elites in France feared “if the EDC came 
into being while the Indochina conflict continued to drain French troops from the 
continent, the Germans would achieve numerical superiority in the EDC and 
consequently in Europe.”303However, we know that the EDC project was not 
conceived in the same way by all politicians, even by those of the CDU and the 
main opposition party SPD. Only military and economic power could ensure 
German peace against the sphere and expansion of the SU from the eastern part of 
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Europe, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer repeatedly stressed. Meanwhile, SPD 
favored a neutral West Germany. 
The West German press did not forget to observe the public view in 
America and Britain towards this matter. Both Schuman and Acheson believed the 
European defense system could be accomplished only if it was included a German 
presence, but only whithin the framework of the EDC.304 Until 1951, Western 
allies still did not really desire to see Germany join a broader defense 
organization, NATO for instance, but they needed to restrain West German armed 
forces that would be controlled by a supranational defense organ of European 
states.  
In early 1952, French representatives in NATO stated that France would 
never accept West German membership within it; a West German national army 
would thus never exist in their minds.305 It is easy to appreciate that given the 
severe feelings experienced with Germany in the past, France would never again 
wish to see a strong German army. This also explained why West Germany kept 
on watching the fierce debates in the French national assembly on the EDC and 
soon realized there were only a few deputies in the French national assembly 
supporting EDC.306 From early 1953, the West German public started evaluating 
the possible ratification of the EDC. One of the possibilities was that the EDC 
would never be ratified in the French national assembly due to diverse opposition 
groups within it. No individual in the French national assembly could have any 
effect on that. At the time, West Germany even started thinking of a further step: 
if the EDC failed to be ratified then West Germany might have its own national 
army.307 West German journalistic commentators soon judged the positions of the 
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communists in the French national assembly who would never be in favor to 
ratifying the EDC.308  
Towards the end of 1953, West Germany no longer hid its ambition of 
remilitarization. West German rearmament was a uniquely important goal as it 
would not only serve as national security but also bring the German occupation 
status to an end. Then it could pave a way for German reunification.309 Therefore, 
Konrad Adenauer deeply understood both advantages and disadvantages of the 
allies’ troops being stationed on German soil. On the one hand, it guaranteed 
security for Germany against any threat which might occur from the Soviet bloc 
from 1945 to 1953, but on the other, the German budget for the allies’ troops was 
becoming a great burden on the German economy.  
Moreover, the West German political elite might learn that West Germany 
was ready to protect itself, so the allied troops within West German territory 
would no longer be needed. As far as one could tell, what Adenauer envisaged  
looked the same as what Stalin had proposed in notes sent to West German 
leaders a couple of years before. Stalin suggested a general election for the whole 
of Germany with the preconditions that all allied troops must be withdrawn from 
German soil. Adenauer strongly rejected the proposal and believed that with 
German economic and military strength, Germany could be later reunited. 
Convinced by those theoretical points, West Germany hoped the EDC 
would be passed by the end of 1954 because in December 1954 there would be a 
presidential election in France which could, to some extent, influence the process 
of ratification. West German leaders and the public fully acknowledged that the 
EDC’s fate would be decided mainly by the French domestic political situation 
which was always to be seen in close connection to the situation in Indochina. 
This is the reason why West German politicians paid great attention to every 
move in the French political arena. As early as 1954, West Germany could see 
instabilities in the French political and social life.  
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Increasing awareness of French people on the issue of Indochina was also 
observed. West German leaders were aware that if a new government was formed 
in France or Laniel’s opposite members in the national assembly took advantages 
of the French political and social weakness, it would for sure re-assess German 
policies including the EDC.310 Meanwhile, the West German public view also saw 
the common understanding between Britain and West Germany in the profile of 
Indochina as Indochina problems would in turn influence Europe.311 
As time went on, the West German media’s interest was dramatically 
growing about the exact date when the EDC would be ratified by the French 
national assembly. Meanwhile, lots of French former soldiers objected to the 
ratification of the EDC due to what they had experienced in the last two wars with 
Germany.312 In a speech addressed to French voters in St. Etienne, French foreign 
minister Georges Bidault did not hide his dream of the EDC project when he 
stressed that the EDC plan would ensure world peace. Through such a 
supranational structure, France would play a leading role in Europe, he added. He 
showed his hard stance by assuring that he would never exchange the EDC for 
peace in Indochina.313 As one can see, his hawk policies on Indochina formed a 
stark contrast to those Mendès France, his successor, showed in the months to 
come. 
As for the West German top leader, the EDC plan was always in the mind 
of the Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and other policy makers of the CDU party 
who were hungrily waiting for its ratification at the French National Assembly.314 
West Germany was not only the state that truly expected it to be ratified soon, but 
West Germany soon also realized the U.S.’ pressure on related governments and 
parliaments of their West European allies in ratifying the EDC project. If not, no 
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more foreign aid would be offered.315 (Ohne Ratifizierung der Europa-Armee 
keine weitere Auslandshilfe). West Germany believed that the current French 
government was not strong enough to push the EDC plan through. Thus, it hoped 
for a change in the French cabinet which would result in the EDC being 
ratified.316 In contrast, SPD deputies in the Bundestag kept on debating about the 
EDC as the leader of this, Schumacher protested against Bonn’s Vorleistungs-
Politik – Concession Policy.317 In the mean time, the communists in the 
Bundestag stood in line with the SPD by organizing many demonstrations outside 
the Bundestag building to object to a plan of German rearmament.318  
As analyzed above, many articles demonstrated that West German media 
and citizens observed and analyzed the French dilemma in Indochina and North 
Africa in detail. The two French overseas territories were at the same time 
demanding more aid both in finance and human resources. Therefore, how could 
France meet the demands of the EDC project which required a significant military 
contribution from the French army? Obviously, French military resources were 
divided and mainly stationed in Indochina and North Africa. As a result, France 
was threatened by the idea of a superior German army within a prospective 
European defense organization like the EDC. This was an indication of French 
awareness and timidity around international and regional affairs after being 
defeated at Dien Bien Phu. However, from mid-August 1954 West Germany 
realized that many members in the French cabinet would oppose the ratification of 
the EDC. Finally, on 30 August 1954, the EDC was rejected in the French 
national assembly with 319 votes against and 264 votes for.319 Many reasons were 
blamed for this failure but the main one was the French attitude towards German 
strength and their perception of it as a threat once the EDC was ratified in the near 
future.  
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Not very long thereafter, French prestige was again challenged in Algeria. 
France had to leave this African colonial possession in 1962. The failure of the 
EDC, to some extent, might not be considered such a bad thing for West 
Germany. Just several months after the death of the EDC, West Germany was 
invited to join NATO – a broader transatlantic defense system. More importantly, 
being a member of NATO, West Germany would not be restricted strictly as 
much as in the structure of the EDC. The EDC was indeed, like other realistic 
projects, watched closely by Adenauer due to the fact that he tried to grab any 
possible chance to rescue German international prestige and credit not only in 
economics and politics but also in military terms. He also argued in the SZ on 12 
and 13 December 1953 and in some other writings that a neutral Germany would 
mean a victory for the communists and the Soviets over Western Europe. He was 
a man who advocated the politics of strength, the theory that the stronger party 
would always win. Finally, West Germany’s goal was to firmly integrate into the 
West in order to reach a further goal: German reunification.  
5.1.6. Germans in the FFL 
The presence of Germans in the FFL in Indochina was perhaps the issue 
that most attracted the attention of the West German public, as it was seen as an 
indication of direct involvement in the conflict. Ironically, this presence was not 
only to assist France in maintaining its colonial interests in Indochina, but later, in 
Algeria as well. It can be urgued that the issue the West German press focused on 
in this area was not the legitimacy of the French military actions in Indochina, but 
“rather the legitimacy of French recruitment for the Foreign Legion.”320 
According to the East German leaders’ view, this action proved that France was 
trying to exploit West Germany as its colony in Europe. Meanwhile, many 
Germans who joined the FFL thought that experiencing the danger in Indochina 
would be better than confronting the Soviet army when the need arose.321  
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The issue of the recruitment of Germans for the FFL, including tactics of 
recruitment, increasing numbers of Germans joining the legion and German 
minors serving in the legion, was the central topic of many West German 
newspapers. The West German press estimated the number troops stationed in 
Indochina at 150,000, of which many were Germans but no exact number was 
counted.322 However, the SPD believed the number of 80,000 Germans serving in 
FFL in Indochina from 1946.323 Those Germans involved in the recruitment had 
to be brought to justice, the Chancellor declared. Moreover, he also requested an 
amendment of the Criminal Law. In the meantime, Bundestag SPD members 
condemned the so-called “brutal actions” of the French occupation authority in 
recruiting young Germans into the foreign legion. They were joined in this by the 
communists in the parliament.324  
Regarding their transportation to the battlefields, all newspapers agreed 
that young Germans were gathered in Landau, then transported to Marseille, and 
then to Saigon or North Africa.325 They were categorized as the third or fourth 
class of society. They were divided into two groups: group one included those 
who were jobless, parentless, homeless and unsure for future. Group two 
contained those who had unclear reasons such as arguments with girlfriends, not 
enough money to buy motorcycles or they were simply interested in adventures.326  
The West German press also worried about the legal consequences of the 
French recruitment. On 13.5.1954 DZ questioned whether the French occupation 
authority on West German soil was not outside the scope of the Criminal Code 
(Strafgesetzbuch) or at least whether this matter should be ruled on (by the Allied 
High Commission)? Article 141 of the Criminal Code stipulated that whoever 
recruited a German for military service to a foreign power would be punished 
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with imprisonment from three months to three years. Unfortunately, after WW II 
the Allied Control Council repealed many former German laws including 
paragraph 141 and there were no articles in the Basic Law against recruitment for 
foreign military service. It can be argued that the Allied Control Council Law Nr. 
11 limited West German actions against the recruitment.327 Again, the country’s 
lack of full sovereignty should be remembered. On the one hand, as an occupied 
state, it was impossible for West Germany to solve its foreign affairs. On the other 
hand, this limitation was the result of the Adenauer government.328  
At the same time, the French occupation authority confirmed that they had 
no official policy of recruiting Germans for their foreign legion. In the SZ on 10 
May 54, French officials admitted to only 18,000 Germans serving in the FFL. 
However, the SPD asserted that the number must have been 90,000. They also 
noted that 80,000 of them had been fighting in Indochina. The French communists 
even accused the French military leaders of recruiting former SS officers into the 
legion.329 At the end of June 1954, the French Foreign Minister downplayed that 
number by stating that at Dien Bien Phu, around 1,600 Germans or German-
speaking people were engaged. The West German press reported that diplomatic 
representatives in Paris had officially requested the French authority to take good 
care of them after the fall of Dien Bien Phu. However, SPD deputies were not 
convinced by the number or satisfied with the solutions and demanded to continue 
improving the situation.330  
How the minors were recruited and how they must be realeased were 
questions intensively debated in the West German press. The French authority 
claimed that they had freed from 150 to 200 German minors but only twelve of 
them had travelled to West Germany. In fact, no one really knew the exact 
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number of German minors serving in the FFL. State Secretary Hallstein affirmed 
that this problem would be talked over in detail with his French counterpart.331  
Thus, the problem of Germans in the FFL was examined regularly in the 
West German press during the first Indochina War. However, the second phase of 
the conflict received far greater attention. This reflected the increasing concerns 
among West Germans on the war in the Far East, where many Germans were 
serving for the French colonial interests. It could be inferred that Adenauer and 
his government never wanted to push this issue too far, as they did not want to put 
the relationship with France at risk.  
According to the West German press, the important issue of Germans in 
the FFL served as a very typical example of the problem of post-war German 
society. Each picture of Germans reflected in the West German newspapers was 
one of a multi-faceted West German society. The destiny of Germans in the FFL 
was considered to be one of the reasons to analyze government attitudes towards 
the war in Indochina.  We might not see clearly the attitudes of the West German 
public towards the French colonial war if we did not analyze it through the lens of 
the West German press. This was to answer the question of under what 
circumstances and by what means was France able to maintain colonial 
possession in Indochina during the unavoidable wave of decolonization after WW 
II. This in turn also led to the reactions of the federal government and other 
political organizations towards the problem of German rearmament and future 
West German strategies.  
From the above study, we find that West Germany and Indochina had 
some common points: both were seeking full sovereignty, freedom and 
independence from occupiers and colonizers. All in all, the first Indochina War to 
some extent played as a factor causing debates both in the government and in 
public opinion. These demonstrated the realities and tendencies of the very 
complicated political life of post-war Germany in the early 1950s.  
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5.2. The first Indochina War in the memoirs of former French legionnaires  
The importance of the first Indochina War is memorialized in the minds of 
those Germans who engaged in it. Their service as legionnaires in Indochina was 
written down to share with audiences, revealing part of their lives in a war in 
which they had fought not for Germany, but for French interests. Researchers 
studying on the first Indochina War all know some well-known authors like Peter 
Scholl-Latour who served in Indochina at this time. In 1945 and 1946 he was a 
member of the Commando Parachutiste Ponchardier, a unit of French 
paratroopers. In 1973 he and his team were prisoners of the Viet Cong for one 
week in the second Indochina War. His most widely-read books are Der Tod im 
Reisfeld – 30 Jahre Krieg in Indochina and Der Ritt auf dem Drachen – Indochina 
– von der französischen Kolonialzeit bis heute. In addition, researchers can find 
other memoirs by some other Germans who had been in the FFL in Indochina, 
such as Albert Verbeet with his book Freiwillige in den Tod – Ein Deutscher 
erlebt die Dschungelhölle von Indochina. Here, we will examine what was written 
in these books and what impact they had on the German public opinion.  
Der Tod im Reisfeld – 30 Jahre Krieg in Indochina was published in the 
1980s. The author acted first as a legionnaire, then as a journalist in the first, the 
second and even the third Indochina War. He states in the acknowledgements that 
he has experienced part of his life in Indochina. He writes about the three 
Indochina Wars from 1945 to 1980s and, evidently, what he has written in his 
books seems most likely true and reliable. The first chapter deals with the first 
Indochina conflict in which the author found that two-thirds of the travellers on 
the ship Andus to Saigon in 1946 were Germans. He also mentions the reasons 
why the Germans joined the FFL and came to serve in Indochina; he found that 
they came from French prison camps where they had suffered and almost starved. 
They sought to join the foreign legion as they had given up on a reunion with their 
missing relatives in the East, and they needed simply to feed themselves.332 With 
a charming writing style, the author guides readers through many different periods 
of the war, accompanied by his comments as a member of the war and a war 
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journalist. His general view on the war was that it was in no way a victory for 
France. 
Another of Peter Scholl-Latour’s books was Der Ritt auf dem Drachen – 
Indochina – von der französischen Kolonialzeit bis heute. In this book, he 
provides another figure for the number of Germans in the French troops in 
Indochina. He believed that of the total 160,000 troops in Indochina, 60,000 were 
French; the rest were legionnaires including 20,000 Germans.333 With hundreds of 
illustrations and short descriptions of the wars in Vietnam from 1945 to the 1980s, 
from the Vietminh victory at Dien Bien Phu to the Vietnam-Cambodia or Sino-
Vietnam conflicts in the late 1970s and 1980s, the author links those wars through 
a journalist’s lens. Not only during the first Indochina War did he predict 
precisely the outcomes of the war, but also in 1965, when he returned to Vietnam 
when the Americans landed in the South, the author was skeptical about American 
victory.334 However, at the time the Federal Republic was siding with the 
Americans and when it was required by the Americans to send battalions to South 
Vietnam, his act was criticized by some of his colleagues and German politicians. 
Finally, only a Red Cross Ship, the Helgoland, was sent there.335 He also 
mentioned the students’ protest movements against the American war in Vietnam 
in West Berlin and in the FRG. Ho Chi Minh became the catalyst for the 
emergence of the German left movement. 
Another book on the subject is Freiwillige in den Tod – Ein Deutscher 
erlebt die Dschungelhölle von Indochina, written by Albert Verbeet and published 
around 1955. As explained in the introduction, this book was partly printed in 
daily and weekly magazines and newspapers in West Germany. Additionally, 
three radio programs and more than a hundred newspapers broadcasted and hosted 
discussions on it. About two hundred mining companies and student hostels, 
schools and other youth organizations invited the author to give talks on the 
“Foreign Legion in Indochina”. One can read the following comments in the first 
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pages: Freiwillige in den Tod is not only a live fact but also adventurous and 
sometimes, full of unbearable tension”, according to Hessischer Rundfunk, 
Frankfurt.336 Another radio program, Süddeutsche Rundfunk, Stuttgart, 
commented that “this book can prevent young people from joining foreign 
legions.” A Catholic newspaper, the Passau Bistumsblatt, also offered the 
comment that the book is “a full description of breathless excitement. His 
experience was better than any theory.”337 Raising his voice on the problem of 
Germans in the FFL and the EDC plan, Der Neue Vertrieb, Flensburg, suggested: 
“It enlightens the Germans and French who were still confused about the issues of 
pro legionnaires and anti EDC.”338 Waldeckische Landeszeitung, Korbach, went 
further, directly criticizing the advertisement of the recruiters: “every young 
German must have read this excellent book about the foreign legion. The book 
destroys illusions constructed by a thousand advertisers.”339  
The West German mass media had a very positive reaction to the book. It 
tells the story of a German who had been in the FFL and was also a war witness, 
and it attracted many readers because of its exciting and ironical scheme. The 
main character, Erich Kuran, a former SS soldier, is caught and imprisoned in a 
French camp after WW II. A French officer tells him that one way to free himself 
is to join the FFL. Kuran agrees in a mood of hopelessness.340 When he attends a 
compulsory training course at St. Nicolas in Marseille, he and his comrades feel 
betrayed on seeing a sentence written in German and hung right on the wall of his 
living room “Legionär, du bist gekommen, um zu sterben” (Legionnaires, you join 
to die).341  
Another character is Nagel, whose mother is a Jew who died in a Nazi-
concentration camp during WW II. Nagel was also in the concentration camp 
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from 1938. At one point when he tells his comrades, “I have no father and no 
more motherland. I will never go back to Germany. I will stay in the legion, till I 
fall.”342 (ich habe keinen Vater und habe keine Heimat mehr... Ich werde nie mehr 
nach Deutschland zurückkehren. Ich will Legionär bleiben, bis ich falle.) He is 
another case whose origins are not one hundred percent German blood. What he 
says shows clearly his disappointment, hopelessness and unbalance. There seems 
no way out for him other than staying in the legion. After such bitter experiences 
on the battlefield, Nagel once more expresses his thoughts: “I am quite alone in 
the world, because the people have shut me out. Death is nothing for me, because 
living is nothing for me either. I see myself as a machine; when it breaks, another 
will replace it, as if I had never existed.”343 (ich bin allein auf der Welt, weil die 
Menschen mich ausgeschloßen haben. Das Sterben ist für mich nichts, weil auch 
das Leben nichts für mich ist. Ich komme mir vor wie eine Maschine; ist sie 
kaputt, wird eine neue an ihren Platz gestellt. Dann war ich nichts gewesen.) 
Because legionnaires were part of the public view, in some cases, they represented 
their generation’s images and viewpoints.  
A third character, another German-speaking soldier called Walter Ott, 
shares his opinions with Kuran after his move to the Korean battlefield on the 
situation in Indochina: “Ho Chi Minh and his people seem to be on their way to 
victory. They keep on preventing us receiving our supplies… Our reinforcements 
are insufficiently trained or not at all… most of us have fallen.”344 (Ho Chi Minh 
und Viet scheinen auf dem Wege des Sieges zu sein… sie schalten immer mehr 
unseren Nachschub aus… Der Ersatz ist gar nicht oder mangelhaft ausgebildet... 
das alte Führer und Unterführerkorps zum größten Teil gefallen.) Another of 
Kuran’s comrade in Indochina, Stephan Schneider, writes to him, “In my 
depthless sadness and despair I now have only one wish, not to have to suffer 
much longer. Legionnaires, you join to die.”345 (... nun habe ich in meiner 
abgrundlosen Traurigkeit und Verzweiflung nur noch den Wunsch, nicht mehr 
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lange Zeit leiden zu müssen... Legionär, du bist gekommen, um zu sterben!) After 
suffering through the two wars in Asia, Kuran swears to tell the public what he 
and his comrades encountered in the legion in Indochina: “I just want to tell what 
I and hundreds and thousands of my comrades experienced. But first let me come 
home, to Germany, to my motherland.”346 (Sonst will ich nichts mehr vom Leben, 
nur noch sagen, was ich erlebte. Was hundert und tausende Kameraden erlebten. 
Dann habe ich meine Aufgabe erfüllt. Laßt mich erst  einmal nach Hause 
kommen, nach Deutschland, in meine Heimat!) 
By the end of the war, Kuran has become more and more suspicious of the 
French game in Indochina, as he realizes that the French setback in Indochina is 
catastrophic, a repetition of Napoleon’s withdrawal from Russia. Also he 
describes how the French army recruits Germans into the legion: “They have a 
head office in Germany, which have spread its net over the whole country, 
especially in the refugee camps, old parts of town, in front of job centers, coal 
mines, railway stations and waiting rooms. Money, alcohol, idle girls and 
tempting work contracts are their means. For each German taken they receive – on 
top of their fixed salary of 400 DM – a bonus... Legionnaires are soldiers who are 
destined to die in battle.”347 (Sie haben eine Zentrale in Deutschland, die ihr Netz 
über das ganz Bundesgebiet ausgebreitet hat, besonders in Flüchtlingslagern und 
Altstadtvierteln, vor Arbeitsämtern, Zechen, Bahnhöfen und in Wartesälen. Geld, 
Alkohol, leichtsinnige Frauen und lockende Arbeitsverträge sind ihre Hilfsmittel. 
Pro Kopf erhalten sie für den Fang – neben dem Fixum von 400 DM – eine 
Prämie... Legionäre sind Soldaten, denen es bestimmt ist, im Kampf zu sterben!) 
The four central characters in these books were identified with four 
different backgrounds and demonstrated their lives in the wars both in Indochina 
and Korea. Their stories can be understood as part of the public view of those 
wars, particularly the war in Indochina which the witnesses saw as “dirty, despair 
and meaningless”. Reading them, readers could imagine and reflect on the whole 
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issue of the Germans in the FFL, from how young Germans were recruited in the 
legion, the tactics of French officials in doing so, to the attitudes of the young 
German generation towards the war. In summary, the books had a great impact on 
West German public opinion at the time. The main characters of the book 
represent a large part of the young German generation during Europe’s post-war 
period. What they witnessed and commented on within the book on the first 
Indochina War can be interpreted as the common consensus and voice of their 
generation about the “dirty war” in Indochina.  
Additionally, in post-war Germany, radio played an important role in 
reflecting social events and orienting public opinion, even on some level, 
adjusting public attitudes and influencing actions. Traditionally, radio programs 
were very popular in Germany. Former leaders of the Third Reich took advantage 
of this to run effective propaganda campaigns supporting Nazi regime. It was 
estimated that Germany under the Nazi regime spent over 540,000,000 USD on 
propaganda. During that time, radio was believed to be and used as an instrument 
of modern war; Hitler said, “In war time, words are acts”, and radio creates 
“mental confusion, contradiction of feeling, indecision and panic.”348 Radio in 
particular or media in general were seen as a powerful tool of modern times.  
After WW II, warfare was a continual topic of many radio programs. 
Furthermore, war became a central topic in film and TV programs (in the second 
half of the 1950s). The main content of those radio or TV programs was about the 
last war in every aspect: harassment, corollaries of war, the destiny of prisoners of 
war in the allies’ prison camps and other negative effects of war as well as 
associated affairs.349 Concerning the war in Indochina, radio programs from 1950 
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onwards in West Germany concentrated mainly on the issues of the recruitment of 
young Germans into the legion and their fates after desecrating from their service 
in Indochina or finishing their service there; and the connection between the “dirty 
war” and the EDC plan. From these radio programs, researchers can see that, 
along with West German printing publications, audiovisual sources also show 
West German public opinion on the war and related matters. What can be inferred 
from them is that West German public opinion was against the war and the plan of 
German rearmament within the framework of the supra-national defense system 
of the EDC, and notably the weak relations between West Germany and France.350  
All of the above-mentioned sources prove the widespread influence of the 
first Indochina War on West German public opinion. Obviously, it was a great 
media event in the early 1950s. One can understand that media, on the one hand, 
reflects opinions of society and, on the other hand, has an effect on society. In 
other words, media can both direct and change the awareness of any society. More 
importantly, all stories presented to audiences were written by witnesses, and the 
recent history of the previous war was still fresh in the minds of Germans living in 
post-war Germany. At the time, many Germans’ relatives were in the prisons of 
the victors. The future and destiny of the next German generation, as a result, 
must be taken into account. Finally, curiosity about the adventures in the lives of 
Germans outside Europe and their experiences in another war in Indochina 
encouraged many Germans to keep a close watch on the media.  
Last but not least, it is interesting to realize that the internationalization of 
media trends after WW II became increasingly evident. Readers and audiences all 
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over the world were becoming more concerned about international issues. Under 
these circumstances, the issue of the first Indochina War was internationalized. It 
was not only observed by the West German press but also by a wider press 
community. As a matter of fact, many media channels of the main players in the 
first Indochina War such as France, the U.S. and the PRC were also interested in 
this controversial international issue. Obviously, how the international media 
viewed Indochina demonstrates the attitudes of the involved partners towards that 
conflict. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE IMPACTS OF DECOLONIZATION IN INDOCHINA AND  
LESSONS LEARNT FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
There have been a number of definitions of decolonization propounded by 
historians and scholars. John Springhall has explained that “the taking of 
measures by indigenous peoples and/or their white overlords intended eventually 
to end external control over overseas colonial territories and the attempt to replace 
formal political rule by some new kind of relationship.”351 In recent years, there 
have been significant changes in research on colonialism. Scholars have shifted 
from center-periphery models to the idea of entanglement and from colonies 
viewed as passively subdued to colonial power to a large array of human 
interaction based on the colonial experience. Decolonization has been seen as one 
of the outcomes of WW II; and it was also a result of developments since WW I, 
however. 
After WW II, there were many international factors governing and 
deciding the matter of colonialism and decolonization. The factors are changes at 
the extent of global distribution of power and the effects of WW II. One of the 
leading world powers now seen as a sponsor of the Western countries, the U.S., 
took the responsibility in guaranteeing security for the Western world, i.e., Great 
Britain, France, and West Germany and so on. It is important to mention here that 
the U.S. also expressed the importance of decolonization, but not only for the 
benefit of colonies. This led to the question of whether the above – mentioned 
countries needed colonies for their military purposes or other reasons. Colonial 
                                           
351
 John Springhall, Decolonization since 1945: the collapse of European overseas empires, 
Palgrave, New York, 2001, p. 3. See also: Giuliano Garavini, After empires: European integration, 
decolonization and the challenge from the global South 1957-1986 (translated by Richard R. 
Nybakken), Oxford University Press, 2012; Martin Thomas (Hrsg.), European decolonization, 
Ashgate, 2007; Raymond F. Betts, Decolonization (2nd edition), Routledge, New York, 2006; 
Clive J. Christie, A modern history of Southeast Asia: decolonization, nationalism, separatism, 
Tauris Academic Studies, London, 1996. 
179 
 
empires would affect their dominance in the world’s economic power. All of these 
factors affected colonial powers on the issue of re-defining their main political 
and economic interests.  
6.1. The impact of decolonization in Indochina on the FRG  
6.1.1. Impact on political and social life  
The impact of the first Indochina War and French decolonization in 
Indochina on the FRG can be seen by tracing the Federal Republic’s foreign 
policy. Obviously, the newly established state of the FRG had to deal with the 
issue of “One Nation – Two States”, in the context of which West German foreign 
policy would mostly focus on the German question (deutsch-deutsche Frage). 
After 1955, this question revolved around who was the legal representative of the 
whole of Germany (Alleinvertretungsanspruch), driven by the Hallstein doctrine. 
The second problem was the relationship with France and Great Britain as well as 
Western integration. The final one was the issue of transatlantic relations and their 
associated security issues.352  
Of the above-mentioned issues, the relationship with France was 
emphasized as one of the main tasks which West German foreign policy needed to 
pursue. Since the end of WW I, Germany had no longer had colonial possessions. 
Therefore, the decolonization process after WW II did not have much direct 
impact on West Germany. Until 1955, West German foreign activities were 
limited by the allies’ control. Nonetheless, the decolonization process had an 
indirect impact on it due to the triangle relations among West Germany, France 
and Indochina.  
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the attitudes of the West German government 
towards the first Indochina War were clear enough to assert that Adenauer’s 
government supported France when the conflict in Indochina was nearly at an 
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end. Regarding the issue of the German minors fighting in the FFL in Indochina, 
one might suspect the official attitudes of the West German authority as well as 
Adenauer personally. There was no doubt that the Federal Republic and the 
Chancellor strongly advocated the EDC project in which a promising West 
German contribution would be remarkable, and in some certain ways, would 
restore the German position in terms of military in post-war Europe. More 
importantly, the “ratification of the EDC Treaty was also existentially important 
in shaping relations with the U.S. and the Soviet Union.”353 The fate of the EDC 
plan now rested in the hands of France, a former enemy but now one of the 
Western allies with whom West Germany hoped to cooperate. Any strong 
opposition to the problem of young Germans involved in the French troops in 
Indochina or elsewhere might appear to undermine West German loyalty to 
France and other Western allies. Was it right to suppose that one of the hidden 
reasons behind the Chancellor’s weak reaction to that problem was that he wished 
to see those young Germans in the French troops in Indochina well-trained as 
soldiers for a future West German army once the EDC was ratified? 
It is necessary to add, however, that not only did West Germany side with 
France in the first Indochina War itself, but the Korean War was also a strong 
catalyst in strengthening West Germany’s will in showing its position towards the 
so-called “anti-communist expansion” campaign or the East-West conflict in Asia. 
Primary and secondary sources have proved Adenauer and his advisors’ early 
concerns with France’s overseas conflicts and their potential effects on European 
security, integration and the destiny of the EDC plan.354 As soon as the French 
were defeated at Dien Bien Phu and with the result of the Geneva Conference, 
West Germany was aware that the victory would belong to the communists and 
“the West” was already defeated in Asia. The outcome of the Geneva Conference 
on Indochina concerned some West German politicians like Gustav 
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Heinemann,355 as “he thought that the 1954 Geneva settlement on Indochina, in 
which the involved parties had agreed to schedule free elections to determine the 
area’s future, could serve as a model for Germany.”356 Once Germany was 
unified, the on-going hotly debated problem of West German rearmament would 
no longer be a question. 
The first Indochina War, evidently, also had profound effects on social 
perception. Divided Germany after WW II, even until the mid-1960s, was not 
very much interested in what was happening outside Europe. When it did, it was 
because those happenings played a marginal role in West German social life. But 
to some extent, some important events in the non-European world in the late 
1940s or 1950s, such as the emergence of the PRC (Red China), the first (and then 
the second) Indochina War, the Suez crisis, and Cuban revolution, etc. attracted 
lots of West German social concern. Consequently, left-wing (die linke 
Offentlichkeit) and social movements emerged which took a critical view of the 
post-colonial problems of the Third World.357 
More than ever before, West German public opinion on the decolonization 
process was intensely concentrated. North-South issues were interpreted as a 
variation on the all-dominant East-West conflict. The decolonization process 
through peaceful means was ignored, and the colonized nations had to struggle 
violently for independence from colonizers. Then violent conflicts were viewed as 
the result and embodiment of communist expansion prevention around the world. 
In this context, the first Indochina War served as a symbolic example. This war 
was originally seen as a colonial war between France and the native rebel forces 
led by the Vietminh. However, after the outbreak of the Korean War, Indochina 
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was interpreted as a battlefield in the great struggle between the free world and the 
communist threat in Asia. 
As previously analyzed in Chapter 5, West German public opinion was 
very much interested in the first Indochina War since it was moderately 
internationalized from the second half of 1950. The destiny of thousands of 
Germans in the FFL in Indochina during and after the war was constantly reported 
in West German newspapers and radio programs. Paradoxically, although most 
West German newspapers were consensus against the war, France’s unfavorable 
results on the battlefield seemed, to some extent, to satisfy some Germans and/or 
commentators, as the military victory of the Vietminh in the war helped them 
regain their prestige while recalling that the German army had to unconditionally 
surrender to the allies in May 1945.  
6.1.2. Impact on foreign policy making 
The decolonization process of France in Indochina then spread to Africa in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, and this together with other political changes in 
Europe generated many opportunities for West Germany in formulating its foreign 
policy towards the newly independent countries. Most of these countries were 
African, Asian and Latin American colonized countries, then better known as the 
Third World. Among these newly independent countries, Africa was seen as the 
top priority for West German foreign policy due to the traditional natural 
connections between the two continents. In the mind of Adenauer, “whenever he 
looked at Africa he thought of Europe.”358 West German interest in Africa at that 
time was at first economic. The Chancellor himself saw that without raw materials 
supplied by Africa, Europe or at least the European economies would collapse. As 
a state not directly influenced by the process of decolonization, West Germany 
therefore held a neutral position in establishing trade activities in the continent of 
Africa. It can be said that the political transformation in Africa from French 
colonial rule to independence affected internal markets and European and West 
German development policy (Entwicklungspolitik) a great deal. This policy then 
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became a competitive tool for both German states in gaining international 
recognition. Thanks to the superior development aid given to African countries, 
mostly in economics, the FRG was far more successful in terms of international 
relations. 
Not only did the process of decolonization and the on-going conflict 
between East and West have effects on the CDU-led government of Adenauer but 
it also influenced other West German political parties like the SPD and FDP. All 
these party leaders shared a common view on the decolonization process. Kurt 
Schumacher declared in 1951 that the liberation campaigns of those peoples who 
had been colonized represented a modern model of the liberation cause of all 
human beings, and once again in 1954 at a SPD Congress the party referred to the 
end of colonialism.359  
West Germany’s socio-political life in the post-war period was 
fundamentally interested in sensitive and basic issues like violence, peace and 
war. West Germany’s first move in foreign policy was to cooperate firmly with 
the West, notably with the U.S. The most remarkable aspects of the first formative 
years of the Federal Republic were the Chancellor’s determination and loyalty to 
the Western alliance. The decade that followed was marked by the compromising 
policy of the government of Willy Brandt commonly known as Ostpolitik. This 
turning point paved the way for shaping West German foreign relations with the 
Eastern European countries. It should be well noted that West German success in 
the field of foreign policy was rooted in its outlook on the world outside including 
the continent’s complicated events after WW II and during the Cold War.  
After losing WW II, “the strategic bombing, the impact of what was 
known about war-crimes and the role of the military in Hitler’s Third Reich all 
were  still vividly remembered and constituted obstacles to public interest in 
military matters.”360 The first Indochina War and the following Algerian war as 
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well as the decolonization process in Africa thereafter greatly affected West 
German representatives’ thinking. Withdrawn from the lessons of the 
decolonization process, West German public and politicians viewed the process as 
a globally central problem in the 20th century, notably in the context of the East-
West conflict. Therefore, West Germany clearly perceived that the world was on 
its way to becoming not only a multi-polar world but also a flat one.  
West German leaders also recognized that the world’s economics would be 
divided into two blocs: the first one would be the economics of non-communism 
and the ther would be the economics of communism backed by nationalists of the 
Third World.361 On reorganing this, the Federal Republic planned a strategic and 
very energetic foreign policy fitting the nature and benefits of the state in each 
period of the Cold War. One of the most impressive and successful results of this 
time was its diplomatic ties with the newly independent nations of the Third 
World. It would have been considerably harder to achieve these goals without the 
West German Chancellor Adenauer’s maneuvring with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs after 1955, while at the same time they supported the decolonization 
process and backed France in its attempt to protect its colonial interests. These 
strategies proved rational and effective during the existence of the two German 
states until the German unification. 
 It would be a mistake not to mention the impact of French decolonization 
in Indochina and in other locations where it took place in the years that followed 
on the European continent in a broader approach. In the post-war period, both 
West Germany and France were making every effort to recover from the legacy of 
WW II. Each country, however, chose a different path to accomplish its own 
goals. France hoped to regain a leading role in Europe but its will was embodied 
differently depending on each period, especially on the impacts of the escalation 
of the Indochina War. In looking for influence and some other goals in the 
continent, France also fully understood that its most powerful ally, the U.S., 
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would not provide security for France in Indochina and/or the whole of Europe 
without conditions. The EDC plan serves as an example of such a bargaining chip 
between France and the U.S.362  
The death of the EDC plan several months after the loss of Indochina was 
interpreted as a significant indication of France losing its national identity. This 
breakdown was blamed on many factors such as the fact that German rearmament 
only ten years after its military surrender was unacceptable for France, or on 
France’s fear of a term like “supranational defense system”. The absence of 
Britain in this defense community was also a factor in France’s hesitation. 
However, noone could deny the impact of the French loss in Indochina on the 
failure of the EDC project.  
In any case, moving past its unstable political life and complicated foreign 
policy, France was sensible enough to shift from an old-fashioned empire to a 
more modern and effective model of European integration. This process would be 
sped up by cooperating with West Germany in all fields. Additionally, France 
would be able to reduce American influence on the European continent. 
Furthermore, France was convinced by Adenauer that the unsuccessful military 
adventure of France and Britain in the Suez conflict demonstrated that Europe 
should be more independent from the Americans. In order to achieve this, Europe 
had to force itself more intensively along the route of unification. The Rome 
Treaty signed in 1957 on EURATOM and the EEC were other examples of this 
process. As for foreign policy the new government of the Fifth Republic led by 
Charles de Gaulle launched and applied policies of limiting American influence 
and uniting Europe. Now was the time for France’s actively reconciliated with its 
neighboring country of West Germany. 
In a word, the impacts of French decolonization on the former colonial 
powers can be summarized on different levels through which France could 
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recognize its real position in Europe in terms of economics, politics and culture.363 
Also, although not directly affected by the decolonization process, West Germany 
could still observe and analyze those changes in the balance of power in the 
continental as well as around the globe. From these perspectives, both France and 
West Germany agreed to reinforce the process of European integration making 
Europe a “third force” in order to meet Europe’s demands on productive resources 
and market expansion, thus approaching a transition to a democratic-socialist 
system, and finally restoring the decline of European influence.364 Accordingly, in 
late 1950s, “most Western policy-makers had come to the conclusion that 
colonialism had to go if they were to preserve any influence outside their own 
continents.”365 
6.2. The French decolonization in Indochina – lessons learnt for the FRG 
In diplomatic decision making, sometimes, many activities or tactics are 
stated publicly, but many others are not. This theory has been applied to West 
Germany from its formative years until 1955 during which time West Germany 
could not form independent diplomatic strategies due to the fact of its 
occupational status. As a very pragmatic, realistic Chancellor and a foreign 
minister, at the start of the German occupation process, Adenauer fully conceded 
that the division of Germany was inevitable. He tried his best, particularly in the 
diplomatic field, to construct a strong West Germany. Subsequently, he was 
convinced by the magnetic theory that the rest of Germany would collapse and 
integrate with the Western part of Germany one day.  
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Germany’ historical development, especially after WW II, has shown that 
it has acted on the belief that German interests are “best served through the 
multilateral integration of their country in the transatlantic alliance with the U.S., 
Canada, and other West European powers.”366 More importantly, West Germany 
would pursue its view of a united Europe. Nevertheless, West German had to 
choose how to rationally interact with the above-mentioned powers.367 Its pro-
Western values sometimes confused West Germany as it decided on its priorities 
for shaping and developing foreign relations with Western allies: France or the 
U.S.?  
West German foreign policies in the post-war period, argues Timothy D. 
Showers, were influenced by these principles: first, West Germany was an entity 
within a larger European community; second, all international conflicts could be 
handled peacefully; third, West German integration into European institutions 
could serve and stabilize West German interests and Europe in a broader approach 
after such a chaotic period as the war.368 All this meant that West German would 
abandon its own “sonderweg” (special path) to develop itself. In the last 50 years 
or so, (West) German foreign policy has proved flexible but determined. Although 
West German foreign affairs until 1990 were still more or less controlled by the 
allies, West Germany has never been completely mastered by WW II victors. On 
the contrary, West Germany has constantly sought its own direction in developing 
relations with its past enemies. On this point, France serves as a very impressive 
example of a post-war West German strategic partner in the continent and 
worldwide. 
As discussed in previous chapters, French decolonization in Indochina was 
watched by Adenauer’s government, the public and different political groups in 
the West German territory. They considered France’s defeat in Indochina the 
decline of the French empire, and with broader perspective, European 
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decolonization continued to progress in Asia as an inevitable tendency. This 
changed France’s position in the European continent as well. Together with what 
Germany had experienced in the past two world wars, West German leaders 
acknowledged that a militarily-rooted approach to solve conflicts would no longer 
to be an option. 
Instead, economic and political cooperation and unification must be seen 
as the most realistic and effective direction for the new world’s trend in a new 
world order. The community of coal and steel jointly governed by West Germany, 
Italy, France and the Benelux countries represented the starting point of the 
history of European integration. Last but not least, given the context of the Cold 
War in Europe since 1946 and its special position and situation in Europe, in stead 
of joining the arms race, West Germany chose to develop its economy to achieve 
the so-called “economic miracle” in the 1950s.  
The lessons drawn from the impact of the first Indochina War and the 
decolonization process in Indochina and then in Africa, along with the very 
special position of West Germany in Europe during that period, helped the West 
German government to map and exercise successfully its domestic and foreign 
policies in the 1950s and 1960s. The lessons can be basically summarized in the 
following issues: the German-Franco reconciliation; West German integration into 
the West; West German development aid to Third World countries; and the 
emergence of the New Left in the FRG. 
6.2.1. German – Franco reconciliation 
One of the main factors leading to the German-Franco reconciliation was 
the first Indochina War in which France’s ambitions of empire were challenged 
and failed. In my opinion, the achievement of German-Franco reconciliation after 
a hundred years of conflict was a result of France’s German policy in the post-war 
period. However, France’s withdrawal from its traditional colonial possessions in 
Indochina in some ways forced France to evaluate its main interests against the 
background of the new world. 
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Post-war France, like Germany, had to deal with difficulties and 
embarrassment in defining and solving domestic and foreign policies based on the 
“formulation of a policy of total independence of both Kremlin and the 
Americans.”369 Pursuing this goal, as a matter of fact, was not simple for France, 
particularly after being forced to withdraw from Indochina. France then became 
more sensitive about its national identity than ever before. The only option for 
France after its decline as a European colonial power was to participate more 
intensely in the process of European integration.  
At exactly the same time, West Germany was also in the process of 
pursuing more influence in European and international politics by closely tying 
itself to the Western countries, and being embraced as a member of multiple 
supranational organizations. It could be said that France and West Germany 
shared a common standpoint. Consequently, a German-Franco rapprochement 
would play a decisive role in the development and modernization of the whole of 
Western Europe from the late 1950s and early 1960s onwards.  
Looking back, the Berlin blockade in 1948 and the establishment of the 
GDR in 1949 together with the Soviet intention to expand their sphere of 
influence towards Eastern Europe forced France to gradually relinquish its hostile 
attitudes towards West Germany. Given other international events in the context 
of the Cold War, France had to reluctantly accept the idea proposed by its 
Western allies on West German integration into the Western club and 
participation in the emerging anti-communist front. These moves were confirmed 
by the facts that in July 1951, France, Britain and the U.S. proclaimed the end of 
hostilities with Germany, and by West German membership in NATO in May 
1955.370 
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The increase of the Soviet threat and its influences on Asia after the 
Korean War and the first Indochina War had huge and crucial impacts on French 
policy-makers in terms of the reconciliation with West Germany, though this 
proceeded with reluctance at first. Along with the hot war in Asia, the Cold War 
escalation in Europe was exhibited in the arms race between the two oppositing 
blocs. The Soviet launch of an artificial satellite in 1957 and the emergence of the 
Berlin Wall in 1961 were evidence of the growing tensions within the Cold War 
context in Europe. These events to some extent pressured West Germany to seek 
its own path in a bid to strengthen the Western line of defense against any 
upcoming Soviet attack on West German soil: e.g., the free city of Berlin. Also, 
any West German strategies had to be able to adapt to the newly emerged détente 
tendency in the East-West conflict and to withstand Germany divided long-term.  
In contrast, France was able to acknowledge this inevitable trend, although 
later than other European colonial powers, England for instance. This was done 
only by accepting the bitter facts of the French imperial decline in 1954 marked 
by the fall of Dien Bien Phu, and the loss of Algeria in 1962. Under the 
circumstance of the decolonization process, France realized that it was now 
merely a medium-sized power that that dramatically lost its traditional influence 
in Europe. This resulted in France’s new understanding that in the ideological and 
military combat between the two camps of capitalists and socialists, France or any 
other Western ally ought to put aside any bilateral conflict in order to reach the 
whole community’s common goal in the long run.  
The Élysée Treaty signed by French and West German representatives in 
January 1963 marked the turning point in the history of continental Europe as the 
two former enemies became reconciled.371 The main content of the treaty was to 
                                           
371
 About the political background leading to the Élysée Treaty, see more: Henning Türk, Ein 
Residuum gescheiterte Pläne: Die Vorgeschichte des Elysée Vertrages, Dokumente – Zeitschrift 
für den deutsch-französischen Dialog, vol. 2/2012, S. 43-46. On behalf of a recently overall 
evaluation on the reconciliation between France and Germany, please see: Reiner Marcowitz, 
Überwindung traditioneller Stereotype: Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen 1949-1963, 
Dokumente – Zeitschrift für den deutsch-französischen Dialog, vol. 2/2012, S. 37-42. 
191 
 
formalize the meetings between the leaders of the two states at different levels, 
such as meetings of the Ministers of Defense, to take place every three months, 
meetings of the Chiefs of Staff every two months, and meetings of the top leaders 
every six months. The two sides agreed to consult and exchange all mutual 
concerns in economic, military, and cultural aspects. The treaty also stressed the 
importance of student exchanges of the two states. It turned the relationship 
between the two countries from enemies to friends, from confrontation to 
cooperation.  
All in all, the reconciliation between West Germany and France was a 
major change of European history. The Franco-German rapprochement then 
played a crucial role in the process of European integration, as Thomas Hoerber 
states: “Franco-German reconciliation was the driving force. The rapprochement 
was seen as the healing of an old wound and the foundation of European 
integration and finally peace in Europe, not least for France.”372 France benefited 
from the Franco-German reconciliation, too. At present, France is one of the five 
nuclear powers and a permanent member of the Security Council of the UN.  
After realizing the bitter fact that France would soon be replaced by the 
Americans in Indochina and would be forced to decolonize in Algeria in 1962, 
France recognized that its era of empire had reached an end. This meant that 
France’s identity was severely damaged, and France’s future was no longer to be 
dependent on its Western ally, that is, the U.S. Thus, another way out for France 
was to escape from the U.S’s sphere of influence. This could be achieved only by 
shaping its own independent foreign policy tied closely with its Western European 
neighbors through a Eurocentric orientation strategy. This resulted in the French 
ideas and membership in the European supranational organizations, i.e., the EEC, 
EURATOM and so on. Historically speaking, since the late 1950s France has 
played a leading role in the process of European unification. Nevertheless, all 
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France’s efforts might have been unsuccessfully without West German 
cooperation via effective policies implemented by the Paris-Bonn axis.  
Franco-German friendship has been promoted recently. Jaques Chirac, 
former Chancellor of France, declared in 1987 that it would be impossible to 
launch a war in (West) Germany or in France that would remain seperate. If 
(West) Germany was attacked, France would immediately and whole-heartedly 
pledge to give any necessary assistance.373 Stronger pledges in the military field 
created space for the two states to share their mutual acknowledgement of each 
other’s security and defense measures, and the Franco-German Committee for 
Security and Defense was founded in January 1988.  
However, in the post-Cold War period, France sometimes showed anxiety 
of a reunited Germany, suggesting that France still did not want to see a really 
strong German that could threaten France’s national security. France’s concerns 
about national security were proved realistic when it feared a growing Germany 
might leave the existing community to pursue its traditional expansionism. These 
concerns, however, were solved when former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
gave reassurance on 21 June 1990 at the Bundestag that the Franco-German 
friendship would forever be important and decisive for German foreign policy.374 
From the mid-950s and the start of the 1960s, the international and 
regional context changed dramatically. This was marked by the French 
decolonization wave started in Indochina in 1954, the Korean War and the détente 
era between the two oppositing blocs and so on. The end of the French empire 
was followed by remarkable transformations on France’s political stage such as 
the collapse of the Fourth Republic and the birth of the Fifth Republic. All of 
these changes forced France to reconsider itself in its role as a traditional leading 
country in the European continent. It could be concluded that France, whether 
reluctantly or not, had to search for cooperation with West Germany in the late 
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1950s and early 1960s as it had been rapidly gaining economic and political 
influence inside and outside Europe. What France and West Germany did in the 
second half of the last century proves the fact that a Franco-German détente and 
cooperation was inevitable and undisputable. The rapprochement between the two 
countries also aimed to create a common leadership in a developed and unified 
Europe as the third force for which the two sought independence from both the 
SU in the East and the U.S in the West. Despite unavoidable misunderstandings 
and ups and downs between the two states in the post-war era, particularly on the 
topic of European integration, Peo Hansen states this: “the preservation of pacific 
relations between Germany and France is referred to as one of the projects’ prime 
achievements.”375  
6.2.2. West German integration into Western institutions 
A dream of a unified Europe has been in the minds of the philosophers for 
centuries. The idea, however, was again evoked after WW II; it was seen as a 
possible way to prevent any potential future conflict among the memberstates of 
the European continent. In 1948, under the coordination of Joseph Retinger, 
former assistant of General Wladyslaw Sikorski,376 a grand conference was held 
in Europe. The participants were hundreds of politicians from Western Europe 
including Spaak, De Gasperi, Churchill, Schumann, Adenauer and Francois 
Mitterrand.377 Winston Churchill advocated strongly for the idea of a united 
Europe when on 19 September 1946, at the University of Zürich, Switzerland, he 
delivered a speech to students in which he called for “a kind of a United States of 
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Europe” and said, “France and Germany must take the lead together.”378 The 
conference called for a united Europe in which politics and economics should be 
integrated.  
The conference went even further, urging the establishment of a European 
parliament and a European Court of Human Rights. The Council of Europe was 
thus founded in May 1949 and governed by a Council of Ministers and an 
Advisory Council. The problems occurred when France and Britain and the U.S. 
disagreed over the West German role in the European system.379 It is essential to 
mention here that France had to reluctantly accept many ideas on the 
incorporation of West Germany because of the fact that the French economy and 
military were rather fragile compared to others in the continent. In June 1953, the 
French colonial war in Indochina forced France to be more dependent on 
American financial assistance; Mendès France, later President of the Council of 
Ministers, revealed that “the collapse of our economic potential entails that of our 
military potential… and we must reawaken France.”380  
Jean Monnet, standing behind Robert Schumann, instead, proposed a plan 
which might settle the dispute – the plan of the ECSC. Accordingly, a jointly 
governed structure on coal and steel in the whole community of the Six including 
France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries would be created. On 9 
May 1950, Schumann declared his ideal of a united Europe which he believed 
“will not be made at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through 
concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. The coming 
together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old 
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opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken must in the first place 
concern these two countries... By pooling basic production and by instituting a 
new High Authority, whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other 
member countries; this proposal will lead to the realization of the first concrete 
foundation of a European federation indispensable to the preservation of 
peace.”381  
 As for West Germany, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer warmly welcomed all 
the ideas from which an occupied state could profit. In some cases, any ideas on 
West German involvement in regional and global projects would be more than 
enough for a defeated Germany after the severe wars launched by it in the first 
half of the century. Furthermore, the allies’ invitations would best satisfy 
Adenauer’s ideas or West German national interests on a united Europe in which 
West Germany’s say must be heard and thus, West Germany would be treated 
equally. 
6.2.2.1. West German economic integration into the ECSC 
Right after WW II Germany and from its formation in 1949, West 
Germany was always the central point of the continent and the world alike. 
Reinforced by the situation of the Cold War, West Germany could not be 
neutralized. Because of this, the Western allied powers tried to bring the federal 
state to be in a worthy position in regional and international organs again. The top 
priority in these policies was West Germany’s economic revival, effectively 
assisted by the Marshall Plan. Its initial purposes were quite simple: to feed the 
West German population and pay for the occupation. Just a few years after the 
war, the question of further economic integration into the West was pushed on. 
West German leaders advocated these policies as they saw that only by being a 
full member of the Western family could the voice of the country be heard. 
Therefore, it could return into the international community of respected nations. 
Evidently, France did not expect to see any German recovery, at least so soon 
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after the war. As a matter of fact, France was under as much pressure as its old 
rival was to regain its strength. 
The ECSC was a great project and a momentous opportunity for West 
Germany to integrate its economy into the Western family. The ECSC plan was, 
in fact, not only a symbol of West German involvement in a specific regional 
institution, but it was also of practical value for the federal state. This is because it 
“meant the abolition of the International Ruhr Authority, and represented a 
significant advance toward the restoration of German sovereignty… and promised 
gains both for the legal aspect of political recovery and the Adenauer’s larger 
aspiration-a fundamental reconciliation with France in the context of Western 
European community.”382 The ECSC was considered the first step for West 
German economic integration into the West, from where West Germany could 
play an independent role independent of the Marshall Plan. Certainly, being an 
equal member of the EEC some years later, West Germany profited from utilizing 
its natural resources like coal to develop its economy.  
Before WW II, Germany had been one of the continent’s leading powers. 
After the war, it had the full potential to regain a leading position once the 
occupation status came to an end. Moreover, with coal and steel, the principal 
industrial sectors for modernization, French industry was suffering from the 
effects of a serious structural handicap due to its lack of coking coal - 
indispensable for the production of steel - within French territory. As a result, if it 
had to import, or in other words, if it had to be too dependent on German natural 
resources, French production costs would actually be much higher than those of 
the Germans.  
Not only could France control Germany’s war industry, it would benefit 
from doing that. Coal extracted from West German soil could be used to produce 
                                           
382
 Wolfram F. Hanrieder, West German foreign policy, 1949-1963, Stanford University Press, 
Stanford, California, 1967, p. 60.  
197 
 
automobiles or trade with the U.S. for their military purposes.383 Is it true that the 
more France depended financially on American aid in Indochina, the more 
inclined its position it became? The ECSC thus might become a future calculation 
for France’s struggle against the American influence. With regard to a bilateral tie 
between France and West Germany, the ECSC would create a crucial bridge of 
reconciliation between the two and prevent any future conflicts raised either by 
France or West Germany. The Saarfrage could then be solved as the two 
countries would behave honestly. By somehow tying West Germany into regional 
framework, in future it might not become a dominant power on the continent, or at 
least, not become a communist state.  
For West Germany, a state reconstructed from ruins after WW II, 
economic integration through the ECSC made an enormous amount of sense as it 
would mean it could again be incorporated with other nations in a European 
community. Thus, regional and international trust in the German nation would be 
restored. At the same time, through the ECSC West Germany could reach two 
goals: firstly, it would be guaranteed from being vulnerable to the growing Soviet 
threat; secondly, the ECSC paved the way for the West German economy to 
access outside markets which later become beneficial for its heavy industries. A 
poll conducted in June 1950 showed that a majority - 77% - were in favor of West 
German participation in the ECSC.384 This figure can be understood to show that 
both West German top leaders and public opinion advocated integration into the 
West. West German economic interests were then reinforced several years after 
the launching of the ECSC during the negotiation on the formation of the EEC in 
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1957.385 By accepting France’s requirement of the engagement of its colonial 
territories within the EEC, West Germany showed that it fully understood it 
should not longer oppose its neighboring country. Moreover, the federal state saw 
that, from an economic perspective, this would bring more opportunities than 
challenges as West German products could be sold in the markets of the French 
colonial states. Finally, in political terms, this agreement would also allow West 
Germany to develop its political and social influences over long-term period in the 
region.  
The middle of the 1950s marked a turning point for West German 
domestic and foreign policy; in particular the issue of European integration 
became a catalyst for different political parties in the Federal Republic to reach to 
a consensus in policy making. West German economic integration into the 
Western world could not have been reached without the special and close 
relationship between Adenauer and de Gaulle. Both West Germany and France 
fully acknowledged that the future of the two nations depended on the efforts of 
the leaders of two states.386  
6.2.2.2. West German military integration into NATO 
From the late 1940s, the entire Western world was in the shadow of the 
intensified Cold War, through which the world was divided into two opposing 
ideological blocs. West German rearmament suddenly appeared essential to 
America’s containment policy in Europe. Its special geo-political location in the 
center of Europe and its historical characteristics made West Germany the main 
symbolic frontier of the global conflict, or the frontier of the Western world in 
curbing the communist expansion in Europe.   
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Simultaneously in Asia, under the Eisenhower administration, Vietnam 
was seen as a frontier for the U.S. who was involved in an effort to prevent the 
expansion of communism in South-east Asia and Asia. The Americans were 
convinced that if West Germany was not rearmed promptly, it could result in 
West Germany being neutralized. It is worth noting here that West German 
rearmament was more strongly required because of the weak commitment of 
France to NATO as France, had to bear the military and financial burden of the 
war in Indochina at the same time. Theoretically, a neutralized West Germany 
would be seen as a victory for the Soviets. Consequently, the whole of Europe 
might fall under the Soviet influence which was, of course, unacceptable for the 
Western world.  
West German leaders stated that its rearmament along with an official 
membership of the NATO would “serve as vehicles for regaining almost full 
sovereignty from foreign occupation, which made West Germany almost equal to 
the other West European countries in international affairs.”387 Yet from the outset, 
German rearmament in any form was not readily accepted by the West German 
public. A poll conducted in November 1950 found that only 22% of the people 
asked said “Yes” to the prospect; while 45% said “No”.388  
 We should look back to the background of the West German rearmament 
issue in order to see how it developed. West German rearmament emerged as an 
urgent matter when the Korean War broke out in June 1950. The West feared that 
the U.S. might reduce the number of its troops in Europe if they thought they 
might be needed on the Korean battlefield. Threatened by the idea of a potential 
Soviet attack from the East, the Council of Europe and the Americans thought of a 
West German defense contribution to the Western front. Obviously, West German 
direct membership of NATO was never part of France’s plan. France, instead, 
proposed the European collective defense community, or the Pleven Plan, in 
which West Germany would be rearmed but not have a national army. Also, the 
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issue of West German remilitarization would satisfy, albeit to a much lesser 
degree, the Germans who wanted “the extension of European integration to the 
sphere of European defense”.389 
Moreover, one should not forget the initial goal of French leaders was not 
military integration; it advocated political integration first, then military 
integration. The will of the French politicians seemed to be in line with French 
public opinion in 1950 when 50% of French people asked said “No” to German 
rearmament.390 This was because since 1945, French security policy “had been 
dictated by the conviction that German aggression was the dominant factor in 
France’s destiny.”391 Only five years after the German army’s capitulation, it was 
uncomfortable for France to accept a “legal successor to Hitler’s Reich”.  
But as time went by the political context in the European continent 
changed dramatically due to a circumstance, through which the U.S. and West 
German interests coincided: West Germany should be on an equal footing with 
other Western powers. Thus, if France did nothing, it would be isolated. West 
Germany would soon be a dominant power again in Europe which France truly 
had not expected to see. Furthermore, as the most important Western ally of 
France, the U.S. strongly supported the EDC plan because, more than ever, the 
Americans had to placate and wished to see a politically stable France. Otherwise, 
if French domestic political life was unstable, it would create chance for the re-
emergence of the French communists whose presence in the French cabinet had 
been limited since 1947. Their regeneration might then conflict with the U.S. 
policy for Europe.  
Another factor that forced France to accept German rearmament was the 
insecurity it felt, being threatened by the SU as well. In this case, France was 
dealing with a dual anxiety of both Russian and German threatening their security, 
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in what can be called “dialectical relationship”.392 French policy towards 
European security was sometimes uncertain, complicated, and somehow 
paradoxical. It could be argued that French European security policies within the 
context of increasing tension between the SU (and its allies) and the rest of 
Europe were unrealistic and impossible to apply. This argument can be drawn 
from the fact that France desired a West German military contribution (if 
rearmed) to the European defense structure that would be stronger than that of the 
SU, but had to be smaller than that of France.  
Ironically, the balance of military power between Fracne and West 
Germany was never guaranteed just because of the fact that France wished to be 
equal with West Germany in military terms. It would hardly be able to be as most 
of its troops were stationed in Indochina and in North Africa.393 Many French 
people believed that France would have difficulty fighting colonial wars while 
simultaneously retaining superiority over the resurgent Germans. At the same 
time, some French military elites feared German rearmament because it would 
pave a way for a vengeful Germany to try to regain its lost territories of the last 
wars. 
How did West Germany react? Seemingly, Dr. Konrad Adenauer viewed 
the EDC plan “as a way in which the FRG could be accepted as an equal partner 
in an integrated Europe.”394 As discussed earlier, in the first years of the 1950s, 
the foreign policy of the FRG was limited and controlled by the allies. To be 
accepted as a Western member, West Germany attempted to regain the trust both 
of its neighboring countries, including colonial powers such as France and Britain, 
and of those outside Europe. 
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It is quite understandable that in his memoirs, Adenauer shows his deep 
desire and determination for West Germany to integrate into the Western family 
both militarily and politically. For him, “the condition for a German contribution 
to the defense of Europe was the full and equal status of Germany with the other 
European peoples. Equal responsibilities mean equal rights. In my opinion, 
German rearmament would have far-reaching consequences for our political 
position in the world. Rearmament could help us reach our full sovereignty. It was 
simply the question of our political future.”395 (Voraussetzung für eine deutsche 
Beteiligung an der Verteidigung Europas war für mich völlige 
Gleichberechtigung Deutschlands mit den anderen Völkern Europas. Gleiche 
Pflichten setzen gleiche Rechte voraus. Die Wiederbewaffnung würde meines 
Erachtens weitgehende Folgen für die politische Stellung unseres Volkes in der 
Welt haben. Auf dem Weg über die Wiederbewaffnung konnte die volle 
Souveränität der Bundesrepublik erreicht werden. Es war die Frage unserer 
politischen Zukunft schlechthin.)  
The French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman in 1951 endorsed this. He 
wrote, “Germany would either dominate the European army – the flower of the 
French army was dying in Indochina – or throw it over to pursue a militarist 
revanchist course.”396 The Pléven Plan, however, encountered some difficulties as 
it had to give answers to such questions as: the relationship between the new 
defense community and NATO; the role of West Germany in the European army; 
financial problems and some others related to the replacement of the Occupation 
Statute. In September 1951, at the start of the third phase of the negotiations on 
West German membership and its role in the EDC, three ministers (of the U.S, 
France and Britain) gathered in Washington. They decided that “the participation 
of Germany in the common defense must naturally be accompanied by the 
replacement of the present occupation status by new relationships between the 
three Governments and the Federal German Republic” - the first formal 
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recognition that German participation in EDC would imply the end of the 
occupation.”397 In a meeting held in Lisbon from 20 to 25 February 1952, the 
Atlantic Council “officially agreed to the arming of 12 German divisions within a 
European army, although Germany itself was not to join NATO.”398 Direct access 
to NATO-membership seemed to be a better solution as this organization would 
operate as a transatlantic institution, broader than that of the European. It was 
doubtless the case that by accessing NATO directly the length of West Germany’s 
integration process into the Western club would be shortened.  
The obstruction to West German NATO membership was lifted by 
Germany after a fierce debate on 27 February 1955. Ten years after the end of 
WW II and the German army unconditional surrender, Germany was allowed, 
within the framework of NATO, to reorganize its Bundeswehr with 400,000 
soldiers, the second largest standing army in Europe after the Soviet Red Army.399 
Nonetheless, West Germany would not be allowed to develop atomic, biological 
and chemical weapons. West German membership within NATO proved a victory 
for West Germany in its efforts to regain prestige and power after the war. On the 
other hand, the SPD supposed that German rearmament would prevent Germany 
from reunification. Konrad Adenauer responded by pointing out that West 
German politics would always be looking to the West, and when the West was 
strong, the SU would have talks with Germany.400  
To conclude, the EDC was a setback, but it opened a new path for 
alternative solutions based on an Atlantic partnership.401 Adenauer wisely traded 
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the occupational status for his goal of military integration into the Western 
Alliance. The Germans learnt that military means are not and should not be the 
only effective tools with which to implement foreign policy goals. They soon 
founded that “by integrating into the West and stressing common values, they 
could achieve respect and policy success.”402 In the first period of the European 
integration process, together with the establishment of the coal and steel 
community in 1951 (later transformed into the EEC with the Rome Treaty of 
1957), West Germany and France played a crucial role in tandem in starting and 
speeding up that process. The timely return of the French to Europe after 
decolonization in Indochina was confirmed as one of the main causes leading to 
the success of the European integration.  
Few can imagine what the European Union would be like today if, in the 
1950s, France had continued to focus only on its colonial territories and had 
refused to play its vital role in Europe. Undoubtedly, West Germany also enjoyed 
direct or indirect benefits brought by French decolonization. West German 
remilitarization and membership in the political and economic life of Europe were 
achieved much earlier than expected. Finally, the Franco-German reconciliation 
and the dual role of the two states in European unification from the 1950s to the 
end of the Cold War was undeniably as historians have stated: “the process of 
West European integration during the Cold War seemed to have succeeded in 
uniting at least one half of Europe.”403 
6.2.3. West German policy towards Third World countries 
6.2.3.1. West German development aid to Third World countries 
The decolonization process in the 1950s and early 1960s profoundly 
changed the entire world. A new world order was set in which almost European 
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colonial powers had to get rid of their traditional possessions overseas to 
concentrate on continental development and modernization. From the second half 
of the 1950s when the European decolonization process began, particularly in the 
region of sub-Saharan Africa, many Germans started to pay attention to this area. 
Their interests resulted in a variety of technical assistance projects, road 
construction, market expansion, etc. German influence in all fields of the area was 
gradually established.404 African decolonization was not only a meaningful 
victory for the African continent, but also brought many new opportunities to all 
members of the Europe of Six for accessing raw sources in the region.405 Now the 
game became fairer among the players, showing the role of European states in 
Africa as well as in newly independent countries all over the world in a broader 
perspective. 
History of West German development aid policy: Before WW I, under the 
reign of the King Wilhelm II, Germany had possessed its own colonial territories 
in present-day African countries like Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Cameroon, Samoa, Togo, etc. Among these colonial possesions, Middle 
Africa had been seen as an area containing “raw materials from the resource-rich 
Katanga-region of the Congo and transportation routes to bring those to ocean-
ports were at the focus of resource-oriented motives.”406 From the end of the 19th 
century to the onset of WW I, it was not only Germany that occupied land 
overseas and controlled them as colonies, but also other European colonial powers 
such as France, Britain, Belgium, Holland, and so on. The prevailing ideology of 
the European colonizers was that the greatness of a great power was achieved by 
having some overseas possessions.407 After WW I, Germany’s colonies were 
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abolished. This move, accompanied by bitter injustices regulated in the Versailles 
Treaty, meant that German society was not satisfied with the peace agreement. 
This forced the Germans to regain face by finding a new doctrine of existential 
space or the so-called “living space”. Originally, this theory was rooted in the 
Geopolitik provided by geo-politicians surrounding Karl Haushofer.408 
Benefiting from the Marshall Plan from late 1940s, the West German 
economy reached its peak, its “economic miracle”, during the 1950s and early 
1960s. Economic statistics on West German foreign trade in the 1950s and early 
1960s show the country’s ability to give development aid to developing countries, 
for example, “imports jumped from 10.7 billion DM in 1950 to 55 billion DM in 
1964, and to 68.9 billion DM in 1966; and exports rose from 8.4 billion DM to 
80.4 billion DM over the same sixteen-year period.”409 As West Germany 
gradually integrated into Western economic and political organizations, it started 
thinking of assisting other less developed countries, notably those newly 
independent ones in Africa and Asia. Compared to other European powers, West 
Germany was the most capable of offering development aid. In the 1950s, West 
Germany was believed to have a “lack of a colonial past and therefore to have 
easier access to the decolonized nations than the other European powers.”410  
Sure of its economic potential, West Germany did not hide its ambitions to 
influence the course of international politics.411 Without a colonial past, West 
Germany could shape and implement its foreign aid policy which was more 
flexible on aid recipients compared to other Western allies such as Britain, France 
(still facing its own colonial problems), the Netherlands and Belgium. And largely 
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this is because “their lack of a reputation as a colonial power has made their 
assistance more acceptable to the emerging nations.”412 It was also believed that 
by offering development aid to those countries outside Europe and North 
America, West Germany did not have any difficulties in dealing with the natives’ 
concerns about their Nazi past.413 From the start of West German development 
aid, political conditions were not attached to any recipients.414 
Basic ideas of West German development aid policy: By the late 1950s, 
the West German Foreign Office believed that the Federal Republic should 
increase its development aid to newly independent African countries. This plan of 
action also aimed to compete with Soviet influence in the same field. It could be 
said that West German development aid policy aimed to serve its political goals as 
West Germany hoped that developing countries would turn away from 
communism and join the West. Therefore, the Federal Republic would have more 
allies in a new world order. Last but not least, Africa would become a region in 
which West German had the influence to exploit raw materials and export 
markets, contributing to West Germany’s rapid economic boom. 
 In contrast, newly independent countries, particularly the ones in Africa 
were at the starting point of their economic development after being decolonized. 
They also hoped to rely on the developed European countries’ assistance to 
overcome initial challenges to construct and modernize their countries. Taking 
advantage of this, West Germany shaped its development aid policy towards less 
developed African countries. In comparison with other donors, e.g., the U.S., 
West Germany’s development assistance policy contained different characteristics 
as it aimed to be philanthropic and reach its goal of Helping Themselves (Hilfe zur 
Selbshilfe). The West German aid policy aimed to achieve sustainable 
development for recipients; it was considered “not primarily as a means of change 
                                           
412
 Karel Holbik and Henry Allen Myers, West German Aid 1956-1966 – its economic and 
political aspects, Boston University Press, 1968. p. 41. 
413
 Loc.cit. 
414
 Karel Holbik and Henry Allen Myers, op.cit., p. 39. 
208 
 
but as a catalyst to initialize change.”415 Social and not-for-profit organizations 
also initiated their own ways of distributing aid. Some of them such as Misereor 
and another help organization called “Brot für die Welt” (Bread for the world) 
have played a crucial role in the German development aid agenda.416 
West German internal politics basically came to a consensus on foreign 
development aid policy in Africa as West Germany would benefit from the matter 
due to the economic aspects. In 1958, just two years after the launch of its first 
foreign development aid program, the Federal Economics Minister Erhard was 
very enthusiastic about this area because of its economic importance (sales and 
raw material markets).417 It is perhaps significant that most African countries 
which received West German foreign aid used to be French or German colonies. 
From the mid-1950s, European and French decolonization in Asia and Africa 
offered West Germany many occasions to re-establish relations with former 
colonies in the continent. As we can see, this benefited West Germany both 
politically and economically.  
Objectively speaking, the European integration process and the 
modernization of the country also required West Germany to broaden its relations 
with other countries outside Europe. On the one hand, the general purpose of the 
West German aid was to “enable the recipients, who still lack the resources to 
maintain a satisfactory rate of growth without assistance, to take their place in a 
world “characterized by division of labour and governed by market principles.”418 
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On the other hand, one should understand the original label of the West German 
aid was used as a tool to show the German people the reason for it: “First, by 
portraying German aid as the promotion of free market economies, the Federal 
Government gives it a purpose that is more readily comprehensible to the German 
public. Even in the crudest terms... the growth of free enterprise will somehow 
make the recipients of aid more pro-Western, the image is not without its 
domestic political value.”419 Evidently, this policy aimed at a further goal: to 
improve the image of West Germany internationally and increase the confidence 
of the international community in West Germany. Furthermore, it would be able 
to enlist more allies in the post-colonial era. 
However, certain conditions were set for recipients. Firmly tied to the 
Western culture, West Germany could never give aid to communist countries. As 
a result, recipients had to be outside the communist bloc, and they had to show a 
“friendly manner to the Federal Republic” by refraining from formal recognition 
of East Germany. This meant also a respect for the right to self-determination of 
West Germany. Nonetheless, the Federal Republic did not attach any political 
condition to the recipients, as Minister of Economic Co-operation reaffirmed in a 
broadcast program at the beginning of 1961.420 
West Germany’s aid policy has sometimes been adjusted since its launch 
in order to meet the demands of each time period. Initially, West Germany aid 
was directed at former colonies or the so-called “orphan” countries like Ghana 
and Guinea. This targeted to help them to “escape from economic dependence on 
their former rulers.”421 More importantly, the West German development aid 
policy did not forget to support two African countries which had former colonial 
links to Germany prior to 1918: Tanganyika (East Africa) and Togo (West 
Africa). These two countries were the recipients of large West German 
                                           
419
 John White, op.cit., p. 65. 
420
 John White, op.cit., pp. 71-72. 
421
 John White, op.cit., p. 74. 
210 
 
commitments, in 1964, for instance, about 25 million DM committed in grants 
and loans to Tanganyika and about 58 million DM to Togo.422  
It should be added here that until 1964, the government went to noticeable 
effort to explain its aid policy to the West German public. Beside the economic 
effect of the policy, one of the most crucial reasons for the West German aid 
policy was the belief that it would offer “a welcome and unique opportunity to 
West Germany to play a significant part in international affairs.”423 By using “soft 
power” to give aid to former colonies of the Western colonial powers, West 
Germany gradually gained the confidence of the international community. 
Recipients then became raw materials suppliers for the West German economy 
and huge importers of products “made in Germany”. 
Results of the West German development aid policy: A few years after the 
launch of the West German aid program, one can see that the West German 
assistance policy was being widely applied in South American, Asian and 
European developing countries as well.  
   (Unit: in million DM) 
 GRANTS CREDITS TOTAL 
Country 
Technical 
Assistance 
Other 
Grants 
Long-term 
Capital 
Assistance 
Other 
Official 
Credits 
 
Brazil 9.6 - 106.9 36.7 153.1 
India 26.3 - 1,378.6 21.7 1,426.6 
Turkey 3.1 0.2 462.2 6.5 472.0 
Argentina 1.6 - 73.3 9.2 84.1 
Chile 5.0 - 116.3 26.9 148.2 
Liberia 2.9 - 304.8 - 307.7 
Peru 1.2 - - 0.8 2.0 
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Pakistan 6.1 44.6 126.3 89.2 266.2 
Iran 7.9 1.2 6.3 - 15.4 
Spain 1.0 - 24.8 34.3 60.1 
 
Table 2: Official grants and credits offered to “Principal Recipients of German 
Resources among Developing Countries 1960 – 1963.”424 
As shown in the table, India was the largest recipient of all. Being a newly 
independent state in Asia since 1947, India played a vital role in the continent as a 
neutral country. Additionally, India’s large population gave it a lot of potential as 
a customer for West German products. Another example of West Germany’s aid 
policy shows how much West Germany spent in this field in Asia and Africa in 
the early 1960s.  
(Unit: in million DM) 
Continent 
Bilateral Capital 
Assistance 
Up to 31.12.1963 
 
Bilateral 
Technical 
Assistance 
Up to 31.12.1963 
 
Direct 
investment inc. 
re-invested 
earnings 
1951 – 1963 
Trade Imports 
and Exports 
1959 – 1963 
Europe 29.9 9.1 10.9 16.2 
Africa 7.7 33.4 13.6 18.2 
Asia 56.6 46.2 7.7 32.8 
Latin 
America 
5.8 11.3 67.8 32.6 
Oceania - - - 0.2 
Total 100 100 100 100 
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Total 
Value 
2,278 329 2,179 108,287 
 
Table 3: Comparative Distribution of Principal Categories of German 
Activity in Developing Countries in percentages.425 
India again received a large amount of grants from West Germany from 
the beginning of the program, for instance, the Federal Republic granted India 1.5 
million USD of its 12.5 million USD development fund in 1959-1960 with a 
change from the idea that “the trade follows the flag” to “trade follows technical 
help.”426 One should keep in mind that West German assistance policy was guided 
by multiple and inextricable purposes. They were linked by economic terms from 
which each partner could benefit and by the enhancement of West Germany’s 
reputation in the international arena. These policies, formulated within West 
Germany’s foreign diplomatic strategies, could serve as powerful tool in the 
competition with East Germany and the SU in the field of development aid. It 
could also be argued that West German economic superiority in comparison with 
France in the continent allowed the federal state to some extent to exceed France 
and Britain in terms of development aid to the freshly independent nations in Asia 
and Africa.427  
From the outset of its development project, the Federal Republic sincerely 
wished to assist developing nations by sharing its own experiences in 
reconstructing the country. West German development aid policy, however, 
would make no sense if we overlook the fact that West Germany was seeking its 
own dependent countries in the post-war new world order. Instead of setting its 
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ambitions for cultural influence on “colonized nations”, as other European 
colonial powers had done previously, West Germany formed its own 
“colonization approach” by binding dependent countries with economic benefits. 
The Federal Republic learnt and hoped that this approach would encourage 
recipients to become allies with pro-Western value, as well as promoting West 
Germany in the field of diplomacy and improving its international reputation. 
More important for post-war Germany were these hidden purposes because West 
Germany believed that development aid policy in Third World countries would 
serve “as a means to reinvent a national identity that, after WW II, was so laden 
with negative associations that a new, constructive relationship to international 
politics was indispensable” as well as “a means of re-establishing the country’s 
reputation as a trustworthy, respectable power.”428 It is also crucial to mention 
here that behind the scenes lay West Germany’s political and diplomatic 
objectives.  
6.2.3.2. West German diplomatic policy towards Africa and Vietnam 
With its crucial geopolitical location in Europe and the context of the Cold 
War, evidently West Germany attempted to define its own place in the continent 
with its own sphere of influence. One of most achievable ways to do this chosen 
by West German leaders was to affiliate with the newly independent countries of 
the Third World. The most famous theory applied by West German foreign policy 
makers was the Hallstein Doctrine.429 As mentioned above, this doctrine aimed to 
adjust diplomatic relations with newly independent countries. Attached conditions 
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for the establishment of diplomatic ties with West Germany were also 
implemented.430  
West Germany pursued a further ambition which would allow it to have 
greater political influence on Africa. By providing technical aid (technische Hilfe) 
to the newly independent countries in Africa, West German experts believed and 
hoped that technical developments would reduce any political and social tensions 
and instability in the continent. In other words, Africa in the minds of West 
German elites was considered top priority for its foreign policy in seeking a new 
sort of “living space” in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
From the mid-1950s when the Hallstein doctrine was introduced, West 
Germany’s economic interests in Africa became more associated with political 
and diplomatic strategies. Development aid thus played a crucial role in achieving 
goals. For instance, in 1951, the first diplomatic mission of West Germany in 
Africa, the Consulate General, was opened. Then, six embassies in Africa came 
into operation in 1959. The number of embassies rose to thirty-two in 1963 
simultaneously with the decolonization wave in sub-Saharan Africa.431 
West German intrusion in Africa was explained by many diverse reasons 
which were often referred to in East German propaganda as “neo-colonialism”. 
Inspired by German traditions in colonial possession in Africa before WW I, one 
German geopolitician, Anton Zischka, shared his ideas on Africa in the early 
1950s: “Europe either shares Africa together or it is lost to all.”432 (Entweder wir 
nutzen Afrika gemeinsam, lassen ganz Europa teilhaben, oder es geht für alle 
verloren.) From the beginning of the 1960s when the African countries gained full 
political independence mostly from France, West Germany found an opportunity 
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to replace France in the continent. Traditionally, French colonies were now open 
to engagement from all of Europe. West German investment in post-colonial 
Africa, therefore, would not be seen as competition with France individually in its 
own colonial possessions, but a contribution of the federal state to the global 
struggle for the future of the developing countries in Africa.433 Last but not least, 
Africa might serve as a new living space for many Germans, as Jason Verber 
writes in his thesis, “Africa would provide... also the possibility of settlement for 
some millions who lost their homes in Europe.”434  
The emergence of West German “neo-colonialism” at the beginning of the 
second half of the 20th century coincided with France’s financial exhaustion due to 
the outcome of the Indochina war and the on-going conflict in Algeria. France 
realized that it was unable to maintain its presence and rule in the African 
continent.435 88% of the West German overseas investment fund was spent in 
these former French colonies. So what were the real motivations here for West 
Germany to engage in Africa? They were oil, manganese, copper, chrome, 
vanadium, cobalt, gold, diamond and bauxite for aluminum production. This 
investment, together with the opened gate of the EEC, would pave the way for 
West Germany to exploit raw materials and share interests with France in the 
region.436 Ironically, using its economic superiority, West Germany gradually 
eliminated France from its traditional colony. In this case, Madagascar serves as a 
striking example. Krupp AG financially supported the nationalist movement in 
this country in exchange for the sole rights to its uranium and graphite.437 
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Furthermore, Africa in the long run would be able to offer strategic war materials 
such as ores, petroleum and uranium.438 
Economics and politics were not the only reasons for West Germany to 
return to Africa. Being a member of NATO since 1955, the Federal Republic 
supported France in the Algerian conflict where from 1957 2.5 billion DM was 
contributed by West Germany. Moreover, 70% of the total French troops fighting 
on the Algerian battlefield were Germans.439 This military contribution could be 
seen to explain Dr. Konrad Adenauer’s declaration that “there is a strong army in 
Algeria where soldiers are fighting bravely and successfully.”440 (da steht eine 
riesige Armee, deren Soldaten mutig und erfolgreich in Algerien kämpfen.) This 
attitude was nearly the same as when the Chancellor praised those who had fought 
on the Indochina battlefield some years before. In turn, France would have to 
allow West German companies to exploit oil in the Sahara and station its military 
bases on French soil.441 
Thus, the decolonization and European integration process in the 1950s 
created invaluable opportunities for West Germany to develop its economy and 
improve its reputation at an international level. Under these circumstances, West 
Germany closely cooperated with its former enemy - France - in sharing 
economic, political and military benefits and influence in its former colonies of 
Africa. The two leading countries have played a vital role in directing the EEC 
since the early 1960s. 
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West German foreign policy in the Cold War was again challenged by the 
American war in Vietnam, or the second Indochina War. After 1954, the U.S. 
gradually replaced France in Vietnam by backing the Diem regime in the southern 
part of the country. Being one of the closest allies of the U.S. in NATO, West 
Germany had no alternative but to stand in line with the Americans.442 However, 
it was a reluctant gesture, sometimes even, just lip service.443 One is aware that 
the Bonn government was seeking diplomatic recognition at the international 
level. One country wishes to set up diplomatic ties with West German had to 
accept the Alleinvertretungsanspruch of the country. Setting up diplomatic 
relations with the U.S. ally in South-east Asia was essential for the federal state. 
In fact, a trade delegation was sent to Saigon in 1955, just one year after the 
Geneva Conference, and of course, a general election for the whole country was 
still planned on paper (and it would be never held). Although s West German 
embassy was then opened in 1957, full diplomatic ties with the Republic of 
Vietnam were not established until 1960. 
From this we might interpret that the Bonn government was doubtful about 
the credit to the Diem regime of people in the South. In his memoir, Dr. Konrad 
Adenauer reports that soon after the Geneva Conference, the judged that the 
outcome of the conference was not actually a victory for the Western world, but 
rather that, to some extent, the communists were the winners.444 Therefore, if a 
general election were held, the victory would go to Ho Chi Minh, the Bonn 
government believed.445 The West German attitude towards the second Indochina 
War was vastly different from what the young republic had seen in the first 
Indochina War. It would be easier for the federal state to gain some sort of 
political influence regionally and internationally only by making use of its 
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absence in the colonial presence in the area. At the same time, it should not make 
any political comments on any conflicts beyond its territory.446 
During the second Indochina War, West Germany was put under great 
pressure many times to define its official attitude towards the requirements of the 
U.S for a stronger military allegiance in the conflict. Simultaneously, West 
Germany also had to demonstrate its position on France’s view on the American 
war in Vietnam. With France, any recklessness might harm the on-going 
European unification process. Despite the confusion, West Germany finally chose 
not to engage in the conflict, at least, not in a direct way. More than ever, with 
experience and lessons taught by the previous wars, West German leaders were 
sensible enough to understand that the West German public would not forgive 
them if they sent troops to fight on the battlefields of Southern Vietnam.447 
Nevertheless, West Germany opted to deal with the Americans in the 
second Indochina War by its own means. Development and technical help were 
used as the main tool to support the American-backed regime of Diem and his 
successors. For instance, 1.5 million DM was offered for the construction of the 
Cao Thang Vocational College in the 1960s, another fund of 1.9 million DM for 
the establishment of a medical college in Hue where West German experts taught 
until 1968. In addition to a long-term capital support agreement of 50 million DM 
for infrastructure, another supplementary loan of 15 million DM for the import of 
essential commodities was envisaged in November 1962.448 In 1963, another deal 
of 15 million DM was given to the Diem’s government in order to stabilize the 
import and foreign currency situation in Southern Vietnam.449 Meanwhile, the 
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West German press revealed that the money offered to the Southern government 
was mainly used to build strategic hamlets.450 
After the 1963 coup d’état that brought the fall of the Diem regime, and 
the escalation of the warfare in Vietnam, West Germany again had to re-define its 
position on the conflict. However, being a divided-country defended by the 
American troops on its soil, it would be difficult for West Germany to criticize the 
involvement of the U.S. in Vietnam, said West German Chancellor Kiesinger in a 
press conference in 1966.451 Just one year later, West German foreign policy was 
again challenged when it had to decide whether to continue backing the U.S. or 
share France’s sentiments on the conflict.452 Ultimately, West German diplomats 
in Saigon opted to be “go-betweens” as a neutral approach to respond to what 
both the U.S. and France expected from the federal state.453 Nonetheless, West 
German elites were to some extent divided in the forming of this policy. Military 
leaders, for example, started thinking of forming and sending a foreign legion to 
Vietnam. Furthermore, in an election campaign in Pinneberg in 1965, former 
defense minister Strauss urged the federal government to send 50,000 soldiers to 
Vietnam.454 As a matter of fact, this proposal would never be carried out due to 
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the rising protests of the West German public against the American war in 
Vietnam and the so-called “neo-colonialism” of West Germany.455 
In conclusion, international events in the late 1940s and early 1950s were 
the most important factors in making Germany re-define its position in Europe. 
However, the West German government and political parties saw the collapse of 
France when its colonial ambitions were taken over by the Japanese in 1940. 
Historical experiences in WW II allowed West German leaders to observe an 
emerging Asia and the unavoidable decolonization process of the French empire 
when, in the late 1940s, some other colonized nations in South-east Asia had been 
granted independence by the U.S., Britain and the Netherlands. Also, West 
Germany appreciated that: if Europe were not united, a new world order in which 
newly independent Asian and African countries were emerging as the Third 
World would be unfavorable for Europe. Therefore, European integration would 
be the most important solution for Western European nations to balance power 
within the new order. 
In the course of the following Algerian war and the total decolonization of 
France and some other European empires in the years that followed, the West 
German political elites and the public’s view on colonization and decolonization 
changed profoundly. Cooperation with freshly independent countries by offering 
development aid and investing were key tools for the federal state to promote 
West Germany’s position in the international arena. Taking advantage of its 
economic power, up to 1969 the FRG’s development aid policy include 90 
countries widely spread from Asian to African countries such as: Morocco and 
Tunisia, Ghana, Tanzania, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru, India, Pakistan, 
Indonesia, Thailand and Afghanistan.456 It is necessary to note here that in most 
cases, West German development aid policies, whether economical or political, in 
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Africa or Asia, were long-term and sustainable. The West German development 
aid policy proved the fact that, the federal state always showed its pledges tied to 
the Western world not only in lifestyle but also in democratic ideology. West 
German development aid to newly independent countries in Africa and Asia were 
also evidence of its generosity in sharing its own experiences in the course of the 
country’s reconstruction.  
In spite of that, West Germany was pragmatic enough to invest in those 
countries because it foresaw that it would not have to strongly compete with 
others for influence. Although West German leaders had dreamed of regaining 
African colonial possessions, what they had experienced during the Third Reich 
and the on-going international affairs taught them that pursuing nationalism and 
colonial ambitions was old-fashioned and unrealistic. They fully understood that 
former colonies were now UN Trust Territories.457 In the second Indochina War, 
West German foreign policy proved flexible enough to balance its relations with 
other Western powers. Providing funds while disapproving of sending troops to 
South Vietnam depicted the way that West German foreign policy corresponded 
to increasing problems in a new world order. 
6.2.4. The emergence of the New Left in the FRG 
Looking back at the history of the New Left (die Neue Linke) in the FRG 
after WW II, one can link it to the social and peace movements outside parliament 
- the extra-parliamentary opposition (Außenparlamentarische Opposition - APO) 
in the 1960s. The peace movement actually emerged in the 1950s and was initially 
supported by the SPD.458 An early purpose of the movement was to protest against 
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the deployment of nuclear weapon systems in West Germany, followed by 
remilitarization and West German membership within NATO from 1955 (the 
ohne mich Bewegung). From 1960, a new peace movement, the “Easter March 
Against Nuclear Arms” (Ostermarsch der Atomwaffengegner), another model of 
the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, was formed mainly by Christian 
pacifists, and participation of the communists was not welcomed. Demonstrations 
were organized yearly from Good Friday to Easter Monday with an increasing 
number of participants year on year, for instance, from 1,000 demonstrators in 
1960 to 150,000 in 1968.459 
After 1965, the goals of the movement were expanded from opposing the 
U.S. deployment of tactical nuclear weapon systems on West German soil to the 
defense of democracy and peace. West German public opinion was again 
provoked by the federal government and parliament’s preparation of the draft of 
the Emergency Laws (Notstandsgesetze), and by the Grand Coalition (Große 
Koalition) of the CDU and the SPD in 1966, which, according to public opinion, 
threatened democracy and peace. The extra-parliamentary opposition thus became 
important in its social reactions to the policies made by the control of 95% of the 
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coalition in the Bundestag. One of the most crucial components of the APO was 
the German student movement organized under the organ of the Socialist German 
Student League (Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund - SDS). Together with 
other social movements of university professors, churches, workers, feminists, 
and trade unions, the SDS played a leading role in those social movements in the 
second half of the 1960s. 
Rapid post-war changes in economics and culture, and other international 
occurrences around the world, were viewed as the basis for the New Left (the first 
stage of the establishment of the APO). They held the older generation 
responsible for the Nazi regime, and for the decline of the West German economic 
miracle. The American engagement in the Vietnam War coupled with its intention 
to deploy nuclear weapon systems on West German soil, as well as the lower 
living conditions of the newly decolonized countries in the Third World etc. were 
also seen as reasons for protest. Under these circumstances, the initial goals of the 
APO were: to alter current society in order to safeguard democracy, which at the 
time was being threatened by the Emergency Laws; to investigate the extent of the 
denazification of the country; to reform the curriculum applied at universities; to 
protest the American imperialistic foreign policy expressed by its engagement in 
the war in Vietnam. 
In accordance with the student peace movement, which was the core actor 
in the APO, other social movements fueled and led by the German Peace 
Society460 (Deutsche Fridensgesellschaft) and War Resisters’ International461 
(Internationale der Kriegsdienstgegner) also performed by their own means. After 
the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964, those two organizations explicitly 
declared their support for the Viet Cong and called on the Americans to stop the 
“illegal, dirty and cruel” war. They went further, demanding that the involved 
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partners respect and negotiate on the basis of the Geneva Agreement and stop 
bombing the North.462 
To sum up, the New Left movement’s activities were not fruitful. It was 
unofficially disbanded in 1968463 not just because of severe suppression by the 
police but mainly due to a variety of reasons, of which the lack of a central 
doctrine and theoretical unity were blamed as the ones. Historians may argue that 
pursuing many goals simultanously caused the limitations of the APO. Activists 
and their leaders did not know how to choose their main targets among neo-Nazi 
opposition, protest against capitalism and imperialism, peace maintenance, or 
environment protection, or individualism liberation and so on.  
Despite the decline of the peace movement, it is commonly accepted that 
the movement itself was a wide social evolution in post-war Germany attracting 
varied social classes. The ups and downs of the APO in the 1950s and 1960s were 
evidence of enormous changes in society after the foundation of the federal state 
and had influences on West German public opinion in the following years. Those 
changes in the social classes might not have occurred if there were no activities 
stemming from the political peace movement outside the parliament. In turn, one 
may say that the peace movement would not have been started and directed by the 
New Leftists without the politically and economically profound impact of what 
was happening inside and outside the federal state. Within a global historical 
context, the second Indochina War may be seen as an extension of the first one. 
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Finally, the decolonization process with its visible consequences greatly affected 
the West German public understanding at the time and in the following years. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
The contemporary world history in the 20th century witnessed a series of 
great upheavals. Therefore, explaining the entangled histories of the world in 
general and Europe in particular has become a central topic for scholars. In my 
thesis, by giving an explanation to postcolonial theory, I have made an attempt to 
interpret the global entangled histories. The French Indochina War was studied as 
a case in this perspective to expore the the interconnections between the war and 
its outcomes and the relation between France and Germany in the second half the 
20th century. I have demonstrated that the successful fight for national 
independence in the colonized world on the one hand and loss of colonial empires 
and the modernization of the European societies on the other hand are not two 
different processes, but they are interconnected, and least even the same, with 
different consequences for the former colonizers and the colonized, of course.  
After WW II, a new world order was established. The significant events of 
the contemporary world history including two world wars and the Cold War were 
characterized by the competition for world influence between the U.S. and the 
SU. The emergence of the Cold War, during which the two fierce wars in 
Indochina and Korea broke out in late the 1940s and early 1950s, profoundly 
changed the power balance of the world’s politics. Also, the threat of Soviet 
expansionism and the Suez crisis in 1956 demonstrated the fact that France and 
Great Britain had to reconsider their regional and global role when their imperial 
powers were on the decline.  
This thesis has examined the relations between France and West Germany 
as well as their intervention in the first Indochina War in the historical context of 
the contemporary world. These countries have had a significant influence on the 
global politics on the one hand, and the political relations between themselves on 
the other. In Europe, a geo-political union has founded the European Union upon 
numerous treaties and has undergone expansions to include the majority of states 
in Europe. Its origins date back to the post-WW II era, in particular the foundation 
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of the ECSC in 1951, following the Schuman declaration, or the Treaties of Rome 
establishing the EEC and the EURATOM. These issues have been discussed in 
previous chapters.  
With its unconditional surrender in May 1945, Germany reached the end 
of WW II in great failure. Within the first years after WW II, varied and 
conflicting policies implemented in the different occupational zones led to the 
formation of the two German states in 1949. Nevertheless, the FRG did not enjoy 
full sovereignty until 1955. Consequently, in the formative period of the state, 
formulation and implementation of domestic and foreign policies were limited.   
A ruined Germany in postwar Europe seeking a path of peace and 
prosperity did not allow West Germany to continue making such reckless and 
aggressive military policies. Learning from the past and the continuous changes of 
the political situation all over the world, the Bonn government realized that 
international conflicts should be resolved peacefully. Dealing with conflicts by 
violence, as exemplified by France in Indochina and Algeria or elsewhere all over 
the world, was definitely not the best method. These evaluations were entirely 
consistent with the legitimate and reasonable aspirations of the West Germans 
according to how they viewed the first Indochina War and how they portrayed it 
via the press and other media.  
In the meantime, France was still interested in colonial war in Indochina 
after 1945. With its total defeat at Dien Bien Phu, France’s target of recolonizing 
Vietnam had failed. After the end of WW II, while Germany was still in ruins, 
many young Germans were forced to leave their homes to join the Foreign Legion 
and France’s war in Vietnam. It was also an adventure and a new home for those 
who were trying to escape the chaos and rubble of post-war Germany. Many were 
combat veterans from the army and recruited straight from prisoner of war camps 
after the defeat of Germany. But many uprooted and disoriented younger men 
whose homes and families had been lost were also attracted by the chance of a 
new start as well as good food and pay. Highly regarded by the French for their 
discipline and bravery, Germans made up over half of the FFL units in Indochina 
who bore much of the heaviest fighting against the communist Vietminh forces of 
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Ho Chi Minh. In his book Hell in a Very Small Place: the Siege of Dien Bien Phu, 
Bernard B. Fall portrays a guerrilla force of Viet Minh destroying a 
technologically superior French army. He opines that there is a myth of Dien Bien 
Phu as a “German battle” in which the Germans were said to make up “nearly half 
of the French forces.”464  
 Modern world history has been shaped by decolonization and continues to 
be so. The 19th and 20th centuries also experienced the process of decolonization. 
In 1945, WW II was ended. The next thirty years were to see rapid disintegration 
of the European empires and the creation of many new independent states. The 
most dramatic wave of decolonization was concentrated in the period from 1918 
to the 1960s, notably after WW II when more than fifty countries with over 800 
million people gained independence from European rule. Since the 1990s, the 
breakup of the SU’s “empire” of satellite states has dramatically changed 
European and wider international relations and left the U.S. as the only global 
superpower. The reasons why France decolonized and the effects of the 
decolonization process on former colonizers like France has been the focus of this 
study.  
Regarding the problem of decolonization, there have been a large number 
of research works and writings. The issue still remains important for scholars and 
historians nowadays. Not until 1954 did the French colonial empire collapse. 
Actually, the French empire started to fall during WW II. This was marked by the 
fact that many colonies of France were occupied by other foreign powers such as 
the Japanese in Indochina, the British in Syria, Lebanon and Madagascar, the 
Americans in Morocco and Algeria and so on. However, clarification of the 
connection between decolonization and European integration is still rare, 
especially using the case study of the first Indochina War and that process.  
In the case of France, the country was heavily involved in Vietnam from 
the middle of the 19th century. France was another great imperial power who 
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decolonized after WW II although its reasons and methods were quite different 
from those of Britain. Whereas the British realized the colonies were beginning to 
become a burden, the French believed they had to re-assert their national prestige 
by keeping control of their colonies. It can be understood that the French 
experience of decolonization was somewhat the same to Britain’s.465 The legacy 
of British colonialism is also not the best; however.466 France fought two costly 
and bloody wars over its colonies.  
The first was in Indochina, which had been under French rule since the 
middle of the 19th century. During WW II, the status of a defeated France meant 
that it was unable to keep its own colonies. Thus, Indochina, for instance, was 
invaded and occupied by the Japanese. During this time a group called the 
Vietminh led by Ho Chi Minh fought a guerrilla war against the Japanese. At the 
end of WW II the French intended to retake control of Indochina but before they 
could the Vietminh declared independence. 
In 1946, the states of French Indochina withdrew from the Union. After 
many negotiations with the ruler of the DRV, Ho Chi Minh, throughout the year 
1946, the first Indochina War broke out as a result and lasted nine years. Dien 
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Bien Phu was the decisive point of the war with an armistice being signed soon 
after. From 1954 onwards, the world witnessed a wave of decolonization and the 
independence of many colonized countries in Asia and Africa. Many countries of 
the two continents founded a non-alignment bloc, a specific organization of the 
Third World.467  
At the same time, the reconstruction of Western Europe after the 
warrequired all the continental states’ efforts to unify in order to build a common 
market in which France, Great Britain and West Germany were strongly expected 
to be key players. Great Britain strongly supported the ideas of European 
unification. However, it was still reluctant to join in such a move. One of the 
reasons for this was the French objection to the inclusion of former parts of the 
empire. Meanwhile, France determined to regain prestige by conquering 
Indochina, which had been its traditional colony for more than eighty years.  
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  Picture 12: Panorama of the opening session of the  
Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung 1955 
Before the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, France had to manage the 
Indochina War on its own. In China, the communist takeover by Chiang Kai-shek 
and the foundation of the Mao Tse-tung-led government proved that the 
communist threat in Asia was becoming more evident. Under these circumstances, 
“Indochina nevertheless remained the most vulnerable to Communist attack and 
the key to the recovery of France and the reintegration of West Germany.”468 As 
time went on after 1950, France gradually had to rely on American financial and 
military assistance. This dependence suggested that France was conducting a 
proxy war to prevent the communism expansion in Asia; and that must be counted 
as the French contribution to the Western protection of the world from the menace 
of communism.  
France recognized that the prevailing mood could not be denied entirely 
and created a French-associated government in Saigon, the “State of Vietnam”, in 
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order to deal with the Vietminh and their comrades. However, the State of 
Vietnam led by former emperor Bao Dai was in fact no more than a “paper 
regime”. Unsurprisingly, French arguments coincided with the U.S. policy in the 
early 1950s. Unfortunately, we may see that the Americans missed a lot of 
chances in understanding and setting up diplomatic ties with the government of 
Ho after the foundation of the DRV in 1945.469 Being aware of remarkable events 
in Asia from late 1949, the Eisenhower administration shifted their global 
strategies when they saw that Indochina must be considered top priority in 
security policy.  
What is more, in some ways, Indochina could be considered more 
important than Korea because of its strategic geographical and political location in 
Asia. The Eisenhower administration went further, as they believed “the 
consequences of loss there could not be localized, but would spread throughout 
Asia and Europe.”470  During the first phase of the conflict, an uneasy peace 
punctuated by low level fighting continued while negotiations were conducted 
between the two sides. Those efforts were to try to resolve the issue peacefully 
before the Vietminh seized the initiative and launched another surprise offensive. 
The French fought back hard. After that, the story of the first Indochina War was 
one of ever-escalating and intensifying conflicts. When the Chinese Communists 
won the Civil War against the Guomintang on the Chinese mainland, they also 
committed forces to supplement the USSR’s (covert) aid to the Vietminh as they 
felt the communist bloc should be responsible for the liberation of the remaining 
colonized nations. Standing beside the Vietminh in combat against French 
colonialists were several large left-wing nationalist groups (Pathet Lao, Khmer 
Issarak, United Issarak Front).   
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The nine-year long war of France in Indochina against the Giap’s guerrilla 
forces was ended in 1954 after a decisive battle in the Dien Bien Phu valley where 
the pride of the French traditional army was bitterly defeated. In this research, the 
ways in which the first Indochina War affected France, West Germany and 
Europe in general have been analyzed. Also, the attitudes of the German federal 
government under the leadership of Dr. Konrad Adenauer and the West German 
public view on the Indochina War were discussed. The most direct involvement of 
Germany in the Indochina conflict was German service in the FFL in Indochina 
(and in Algeria later on).  
It can be said that the French colonial war in Indochina sometimes caused 
the Adenauer government embarrassment, as it forced them to address two main 
problems: firstly, the official attitude proclaimed by the federal government 
towards the conflict; secondly, German military service, especially minors in the 
FFL in Indochinese jungles. The Adenauer government did not state its official 
position on the war until the end of April 1954, nearly at the end of the Dien Bien 
Phu battle. Notwithstanding, Adenauer’s statement should not necessarily be 
understood as a statement of support from the federal state for France’s colonial 
interests in Indochina, but rather for the Western world in general in a bid to 
prevent the spread of communism at global level. This declaration was wisely 
given only when the Indochina War became internationalized with the increasing 
interference of the U.S.  
Regarding the issue of German participation in the FFL in Indochina, 
under great pressure from public opinion via the press and other media, Adenauer 
was forced to cooperate with the French authority in the occupied zone. 
Unfortunately, the results of these moves were inadequate. Thus, public concerns 
seemed not to be fully satisfied. Until now, although much research has been done 
on the issue, the exact number of young Germans in the FFL in Indochina remains 
unknown.471  
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It can be argued that decolonization occurred for a number of different 
reasons. These reasons include the fact that the cost of maintaining colonial ties 
with countries outweighed the benefits of those ties. In Britain this was realized 
soon after the war but in France not until de Gaulle returned to power in 1958. 
Another reason for decolonization was the progress of the colonized people in the 
colonies who were constantly demanding their own independence and self-
determination. The outcomes for the former colonies were different from one 
another. They depended greatly on the way in which they were decolonized. 
Many were unprepared for independence and suffered from many challenges in 
country governance from democracy to military dictatorship. However, there were 
some, and India or Vietnam represents examples, which prospered through 
independence. As has been mentioned before India prospered from independence 
whereas Indochina particularly Vietnam spent many years at war with the 
Americans after they were granted independence. 
In this final chapter of the thesis it is also important to mention again the 
published sources relating to the impacts of the first Indochina War on the FRG. 
In some documents, the attitudes of the FRG towards the first Indochina War have 
been published. The Federal Republic was also concerned by the Indochina War 
because the fate of the European military integration project, the EDC, was to 
some extent linked with the outcome of that war. Unfortunately, the EDC project 
was killed by the French just over three months after the fall of Dien Bien Phu. 
Many factors have been blamed for the death of the plan, among which was the 
fear of a re-emergent German Wehrmacht. But in my own research, I have found 
that one of the main reasons was the fact that France’s pride and identity were 
totally compromised by the military defeat at Dien Bien Phu. Nevertheless, the 
failure of the EDC plan did not prevent West Germany from becoming a member 
of NATO in that same year. The European integration process did not stumble; on 
the contrary, France’s Eurocentric adjustments accelerated this process. 
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 French decolonization in Indochina along with other significant events in 
Asia and the Middle East like the Suez crisis afterwards had great impacts on 
Europe as a whole and West Germany specifically. French withdrawal from Asia 
signalled the chain collapse of the French colonial system in Africa in the late 
1950s and early 1960s. Also, the end of French colonial rule in Indochina in 1954 
marked a turning point for the decolonization process of the European powers. 
More importantly, this process did affect very significantly the West German 
perspective on colonialism and decolonization alike, especially because the war in 
Indochina became a huge media event.  
 Impacts of the first Indochina War and decolonization process together 
with the Western integration agenda required West Germany to re-define its 
strategic policies in the new world order, in which the absolute polarization 
between the two super powers was over. Those policies aimed to speed up the 
European integration process and to expand diplomatic relations with newly 
decolonized countries (or Third World countries) in Asia and Africa through vital 
means of development aid programs. The European unification movement 
intensified by the Suez crisis convinced the Adenauer government of the fact that 
Europe must be less dependent on the U.S. Accordingly, the Treaty of Rome in 
1957 gave birth to the EEC and EURATOM marking a further integration of 
Western Europe. 
 The first Indochina War, the European decolonization, the European 
integration process, as well as remarkable coincidences in the 1950s and 1960s 
brought West Germany many valuable lessons. They can be summarized as 
follows:  
Firstly, one lesson learnt was with the need to re-conciliate with France. In 
Europe, reconciliation with France was one of the most important targets and 
results of the federal state. The Élysée Treaty of 1963 terminated the long period 
of hostility and opened up a new stage for long-term cooperation between the two 
countries. The Franco-German rapprochement marked a very notable point in 
modern German diplomatic history. Based on the tandem relationship, West 
Germany defined and developed its strategic foreign policies towards Europe and 
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the world. The successful model of the present-day EU is definitely an excellent 
exemplar of such cooperation.  
Secondly, it was the West German government which directed the strategy 
of firm integration into Western institutions. Regional economic integration 
originally stemming from the formation and operation of the ECSC demonstrated 
that West German foreign policies in the 1950s and thereafter were basically built 
on its geo-politics and geo-economics ideals. The successful model of this 
economic organization reminds us of the West German Chancellor Konrad 
Andenauer and his belief that the signing of the ECSC started a new stage of 
European history.472 Additionally, the establishment of the ECSC, in his mind, 
would “not only change the economic relations of our continent, but also the 
whole thinking and political sensibility of European people.”473 However, the 
most crucial aspect of the ECSC was that it “satisfied German national aspirations 
for equality of treatment... and helped bind the young republic into the Atlantic 
alliance.”474 
West German membership in NATO several months after the failure of a 
supranational military structure (the EDC) and its military reactions to 
international conflicts afterwards proved the fact that West Germany only pursued 
military goals to ensure its national security, not those of aggression. In 1966, in a 
Peace Note, Germany even suggested not using force to shape a peaceful order in 
Europe. 
The signing of the Rome Treaty two years later to form the EEC and 
EURATOM confirmed the will and determination of the Bonn government to 
integrate into Western institutions in both economics and atomic energy. The 
important changes in foreign relations at this time are also reflected by the West 
German policy of expanding relations with East European countries via Ostpolitik 
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in the late 1960s and early 1970s. For example, as early as 1967, West Germany 
established diplomatic relations with Romania and Czechoslovakia at the level of 
establishing trade representation offices in the capitals of the two countries. 
Another important event was the German national reconciliation on 21 October 
1969, when the FRG officially recognized the GDR as the second German state 
on German soil. In summary, West German achievements in economic, political 
and diplomatic fields in the 1950s and 1960s were vital prerequisites for the 
developments in the decades that followed. 
 Thirdly, the decolonization process brought the federal state an 
opportunity to define its foreign policies towards newly independent states in 
Africa and Asia. One of the central points of the West German strategic policies 
was to return to Africa, especially to South West Africa. However, these 
approaches were absolutely different from what the German empire had done 
prior to WW I. The social challenges of post-war Germany, for example the fact 
that millions of Germans were expelled from its former Eastern territories, 
growing numbers of emigrants from the Eastern part of Germany, etc., forced the 
Federal Republic to seek another kind of “lebensraum”. Therefore, its former 
colonies became the West German leaders’ choice for this. Nevertheless, one 
should keep in mind that under the flexible and practical leadership of Dr. Konrad 
Adenauer, the West German government acted as if it was really an anti-colonial 
state.475  
Like many Asian countries in the late 1940s or 1950s, many African 
countries were newly independent ones. Also, in the context of the Cold War as 
well as the diplomatic conflicts between the two German states based on the 
Ulbricht and Hallstein doctrines, West Germany chose to return to Africa as its 
first priority in a bid to increase its international prestige and to become an equal 
member in the world scene. In this way, the federal state hoped to gain 
international recognition as the unique legal representative for the whole German 
nation. In some certain ways, there were some similarities between African and 
Asian countries and West Germany in the 1950s and 1960s. They were all newly 
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independent states, and they all sought international recognition and relations. 
However, the main differences between them were that the African and Asian 
countries were less developed, and therefore mainly sought to develop their 
economies. Meanwhile, West Germany was much more prosperous, but sought 
international political influence. Some researchers might argue (and might be 
right) that with its economic advantages, West Germany undertook so-called 
“civilizing missions” in these under-developed countries. They also defended that 
with development aid policy, a tool employed by West German politicians in 
Africa, Asia and some other countries, West Germany dreamed of keeping up 
with American developmental politics and to improve its standing vis-à-vis the 
U.S.476 
West German economic cooperation and development aid policies in 
Africa mostly took the form of investing large amounts of capital in order to 
exploit African raw materials to serve the economic promotion of West Germany 
on the one hand. Africa would also be a huge market for West German products 
on the other. In turn, with financial and technical assistance programs, African 
countries would also have much more favorable conditions for economic 
development and the improvement of their quality of life.  
With regard to Asia and Indochina, the eclipse of the European colonial 
powers in the continent like France, Great Britain and the Netherlands, continued 
by the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, had great impacts on Europe in the 1950s 
and thereafter.477 In this context, West Germany had to focus on dealing with 
regional and national issues such as rearmament and reunification. The issue of 
rearmament and the strategy of the Western allies’ deployment of tactical 
weapons on West German soil fueled the most crucial peace movements which 
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attracted hundreds of thousands of people during the late 1950s and 1960s. These 
uprisings also marked the emergence of the New Left movement in West 
Germany which greatly influenced West German political and social life in that 
period and even in the years that followed. It was seen as the fourth lesson learnt 
for the FRG. 
At the same time, West Germany had to determine and adjust its 
diplomatic strategies in Asian countries, especially in Indochina after the retreat of 
the European colonial empires in the region. However, the involvement of the 
U.S. in the second Indochina War put Germany into a dilemma again. Sometimes, 
it caused embarrassing problems of how to balance its relations with major 
countries in the region and across the Atlantic (Western Europe and the U.S.). 
Finally, Germany opted to show moderate attitudes and behaviors towards the 
second Indochina War. In a government declaration on 28 October 1969, federal 
Chancellor Willy Brandt announced: “We unite with all tormented countries in 
the hope that the Vietnam War will finally be ended through a political solution 
that can be approved by all the parties involved. We re-affirm our willingness to 
participate in the reconstruction of the two ruined sides.”478 (Wir vereinigen  uns 
mit allen Staaten und nicht zuletzt mit den gequälten, betroffenen Menschen in 
dem Wunsch, daß der Krieg in Vietnam endlich beendet wird durch eine 
politische Lösung, die von allen Beteiligten gebilligt werden kann. Wir 
bekräftigen unsere Bereitschaft, am Wiederaufbau beider zerstörter Landesteile 
mitzuwirken.) 
Lessons drawn from the first Indochina War and rapid political changes in 
the international system helped West Germany understand that, even under 
pressure from the U.S., the most reliable ally of West Germany in NATO, direct 
involvement in the American war would not be a wise strategy for the Bonn 
government.479 West German leaders, in this case, acted according to what the 
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vast majority of the West German population wanted: 90% of people questioned 
in a poll objected to the idea of sending West German troops to Vietnam. 
Furthermore, in an interview in 1966 Konrad Adenauer publicly expressed his 
opinion that the U.S. should withdraw from Vietnam.480 As analyzed in the 
previous chapters, West German development aid policy for developing countries 
in Africa and Asia was one of West Germany’s diplomatic tools in the years from 
the mid-1950s onwards.481 Looking back at the activities of West German 
development assistance in South Vietnam, we can see that they were purely 
civilian and humanitarian despite the fact that in the West German press, the real 
purposes of this aid operation were doubted. The Helgoland hospital ship was an 
excellent example of West German humanitarian activity in central Vietnam in 
the 1960s.482 
In conclusion, the first Indochina War, European decolonization and the 
European integration process in the late 1950s had great impacts on West German 
political and social life. The consequences of those changes in the world order 
created for West Germany both opportunities and challenges in policy making. 
The most fundamental problems that West Germany had to deal with were to 
balance its national interests (national unification) and define its relations with the 
West (Western integration). West German leaders fully acknowledged that further 
Western integration would widen the gap between the two German states. 
However, the federal state opted to accept this reality but set priorities for each 
period. Westpolitik in the 1950s and 1960s, and Ostpolitik since the 1970s proved 
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the pragmatism and realistism of West German foreign policy in the last 
century.483 
Vietnam and Germany in the past shared many common features in their 
historical partition, warfare and unification. During the Cold War, both Vietnam 
and Germany were main frontier states and strongly affected by the two opposing 
ideologies. Although they are fundamentally different from each other in the 
organization of the state, political system, level of development, etc., those 
common points in history have attracted researchers of varied disciplines, e.g., 
history, political science, sociology. The first Indochina War may thus be 
regarded as my first research on the inter-connections between this theme and the 
issues of European decolonization as well as the European integration process. 
Certainly, further and deeper study on this topic should be conducted in future 
since it would open up more routes or other outlooks on the relations between the 
conflicts in Asia in the 20th century and the changes in Europe in the modern 
period of world history.  Although colonialism and decolonization are now buried 
in most parts the world, their ghosts still haunt us in a large number of countries. 
Although these colonial countries have achieved independence, decolonization 
and its connections with the history of European unification still remain 
interesting issues for current and future research.  
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ABBREVIATIONS 
APO Außenparlamentarische Opposition  
Extra parliamentary opposition 
CCG/BE  Conseil de Controle de la France pour I’Allemagne 
   Control Council of France to Germany 
CDU/CSU  Christlich Demokratische Union/Christlich-Soziale Union 
   Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union 
CPV   Communist Party of Vietnam 
CSSR   Czechoslovak Socialist Republic  
DRV   Democratic Republic of Vietnam  
DS   Der Stern 
DZ   Die Zeit 
ECSC   European Coal and Steel Community 
EDC   European Defense Community 
EEC   European Economic Community 
EURATOM  European Atomic Energy Community 
FAZ   Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
FDP   Freie Demokratische Partei  
Free Democratic Party 
FFL   French Foreign Legion 
FRG   Federal Republic of Germany 
FRUS   Foreign Relations of the United States 
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GDR    German Democratic Republic 
NAC   North Atlantic Council 
KPD   Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands 
Communist Party of Germany 
OMGUS  Office of Military Government U.S. zone 
PRC   People’s Republic of China 
SED Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands 
Socialist Unity Party of Germany 
SMAD Sowjetische Militäradministration in Deutschland 
Soviet Military Administration in Germany 
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 
Social Democratic Party of Germany 
SS Schutzstaffel 
Protection Squadron 
SU   Soviet Union 
SZ   Süddeutsche Zeitung 
UN   United Nations 
U.S.   United States 
WEU   Western European Union 
WW I    World War I 
WW II   World War II 
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